People ex rel. Ritholz v. Sain

• Decision Date: 30 November 1962
• Docket Number: No. 37425,37425
• Citation: 26 Ill.2d 455,187 N.E.2d 241
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Benjamin RITHOLZ, Appellant, v. Frank G. SAIN, Sheriff, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 241

187 N.E.2d 241

26 Ill.2d 455

The PEOPLE ex rel. Benjamin RITHOLZ, Appellant, v. Frank G. SAIN, Sheriff, Appellee.

No. 37425.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 30, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1963.

Charles A. Bellows, Chicago (Bellows, Bellows & Magidson, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Rudolph L. Janega and James R. Thompson, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

HOUSE, Justice.

Benjamin D. Ritholz was first arrested for the purpose of extradition by Frank G. Sain, sheriff of Cook County, under authority of a rendition warrant issued on December 16, 1960, by the Governor of Illinois on requisition of the Governor of Michigan. A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the criminal court of Cook County to test the legality of the arrest and detention and the writ was issued. After a hearing the trial court ordered that Ritholz he discharged and in People ex rel. Ritholz v. Sain, 24 Ill.2d 168, 180 N.E.2d 464, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the requisition was insufficient to justify the issuance of the rendition warrant.

Another requisition was then made by the Governor of Michigan charging the same crime but eliminating the defects that made the first requisition insufficient. The Governor of Illinois issued another rendition warrant on January 31, 1962, and Ritholz was again taken into custody by sheriff Sain. Another petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the criminal court of Cook County, the writ issued and the sheriff filed his return. A verified traverse to the return was filed in which it was alleged that the prior discharge is res judicata of all issues raised in this second proceeding and bars the State from now extraditing relator. After a hearing on the issue raised by the traverse, the writ was quashed and relator remanded to the custody of the sheriff for delivery to the agent of the Governor of Michigan. Relator has appealed directly to this court.

The only question presented in the trial court and on this appeal is whether the first discharge is res judicata of all issues raised in this proceeding and bars the State from now extraditing the relator.

The nature of extradition proceedings has been aptly described by the United States Supreme Court as assimilating 'very closely those commenced in any state for the arrest and detention of an alleged criminal. They go upon the theory that extradition is but a mere step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may lawfully be tried.' (In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 333, 25 S.Ct. 535, 537, 49 N.Ed. 774.) We turn therefore to the general policy expressed by the legislature with regard to the discharge on writ of habeas corpus of an alleged criminal.

Section 26 of an act to revise the law in relation to habeas corpus (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 65, par. 26) provides that 'No person who has been discharged * * * on a habeas corpus, shall be again imprisoned, restrained or kept in custody for the same cause, * * *.' The section further provides, however, that 'The following shall not be deemed to be the same cause: 1. If, after a discharge for a defect of proof, or any material defect in the commitment, in a criminal case, the prisoner should be again arrested on sufficient proof, and committed by legal process for the same offense. * * * 3. Generally, whenever the discharge has been ordered...