People ex rel. Sibley on Behalf of Sheppard v. Sheppard

• Decision Date: 19 November 1981
• Citation: 429 N.E.2d 1049,445 N.Y.S.2d 420,54 N.Y.2d 320
• Parties: , 429 N.E.2d 1049 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Agatha SIBLEY, Individually and on Behalf of Willie SHEPPARD, an Infant, Respondent, v. Mamie SHEPPARD et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 420

445 N.Y.S.2d 420

54 N.Y.2d 320, 429 N.E.2d 1049

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Agatha SIBLEY Individually and on Behalf of Willie SHEPPARD, an Infant, Respondent, v. Mamie SHEPPARD et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 19, 1981.

Helen L. Buttenwieser, New York City, for appellants.

James G. Bailey, Kalman Finkel, Mary Marsh Zulack and John T. Kirklin, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

This opinion upholds the right of a natural grandparent to visitation rights with her grandchild, when authorized by court decree, despite an adoption of the child and the protestations of the adoptive parents.

The judgment, issued out of Supreme Court pursuant to section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law and grounded on a decision that it is in the best interest of an adopted child to allow his maternal grandmother to visit on a specified schedule, did not effect an unconstitutional intrusion into the rights of the adoptive parents, the child's paternal grandparents.

Willie Sheppard is the grandchild of petitioner, Agatha Sibley. Respondents Mamie and Willie Sheppard are Willie's paternal grandparents. Willie's parents, never married, are both deceased.

Willie was born in December, 1968 and resided in petitioner's house until early August, 1970. A neglect proceeding was instituted against Willie's mother in October, 1969, and he was removed from petitioner's house about a week after his mother's death. Petitioner was neither a party to nor in any way involved in the neglect proceeding.

On removal, Willie was placed as a neglected child in the custody of Leake & Watts Children's Home. He remained there for about a year, during which time petitioner and her family visited him regularly. In September, 1971, Willie was placed in the foster care of respondents. Petitioner continued to visit Willie regularly until October, 1972, when respondents adopted Willie. Thereafter, respondents generally interfered with and frustrated petitioner's efforts to visit her grandson and to bring him to her home to visit with his mother's relatives.

After six years of obstruction by respondents, petitioner commenced this action by writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law. Supreme Court ruled that the adoption did not extinguish petitioner's rights as a grandparent and that the statutory scheme did not amount to an invasion of the family's right of privacy such as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The court thereupon awarded visitation rights to petitioner. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, without opinion. On reviewing the same issues, this court now affirms.

Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law recognizes a grandparent's interest in visitation and provides that, when one or both parents are deceased, a proceeding in habeas corpus may be brought against a person who has "the care, custody, and control of" the grandchild. ¹ On its face, the section encompasses the situation where the child has been adopted. Respondents urge, however, that section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law, which describes the adoption's effect on the rights and obligations of the natural and adoptive parents and those of the child, ² severs all of the child's ties to its natural family. In respondents' view, the natural grandparents' status is terminated and the availability of the section 72 mechanism is limited to the nonadoptive custodial setting. This analysis, however, interprets section 117 overbroadly and would interfere with the court's ability to protect the best interest of the child.

Section 117 itself does not pretend to discourage all contacts between an adoptive child and its natural relatives. Rather, the statute recognizes that such contacts may exist and that the natural relatives may desire to perpetuate the sense of family, for example, by bequeathing property to the adopted child (see Domestic Relations Law, § 117, subd. 2). The bulk of the statute refers to intestacy and succession. Where any mention of other rights and duties is made, it is only in the context of the natural and adoptive parents' parental duties (see, also, Domestic Relations Law, § 110). Nothing in the statute purports to abrogate the interests of the grandparents, and the child, in continued contacts.

Had the Legislature intended section 117 to limit section 72 in the manner urged by respondents, either or both sections could have expressly reflected that intention. In substance, section 117 has been a part of this State's law since 1938 (see L.1938, ch. 606). Section 72 was added in 1966 (L.1966, ch. 631), the same year in which section 117 was amended to provide specifically that an adopted child retained any interest he or she might have under the will or inter vivos instrument of any member of the natural family (L.1966, ch. 14). The Legislature, presumed to know what statutes are in effect when it enacts new laws (Easly v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 374, 379, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 135 N.E.2d 572), must have been aware of section 117 when it enacted section 72 and intended each to have full effect. The language of neither section supports respondents' interpretation.

As noted, section 72 permits a proceeding against any person who has custody. Nothing in that section excludes custody obtained through adoption. The purpose of the section, as manifested by its own terms, is to facilitate maintenance of family ties between grandparents and grandchildren where one or both of the natural parents have died. This court declines to ascribe to the Legislature an intention to proscribe maintenance of such ties simply because the grandchild has been placed for adoption, particularly where the placement is with the family of one of the deceased parents. Indeed, the statute expressly accords the right to seek visitation in the event of the death of both parents, a circumstance frequently found in the adoption setting.

Respondents in effect seek to create a conflict between the two sections where none exists. Each section was designed to accomplish its own purpose. Section 117, among other things, defines the rights and obligations of the natural and adoptive parents with respect to the child's care and custody. Section 72 simply gives to the grandparents the right to seek contact with their grandchild when such contact will be in the child's best interest and will not unduly hinder the adoptive relationship. The rights recognized under section 72 are unaffected by section 117. ³

An adopted child may not in all respects be isolated from his or her natural family. Some may perceive an inconsistency in the termination of some rights, but not others, between the adoptive child and the natural family. If such exists, the desire for consistency in the law should not of itself sever the bonds between the child and the natural relatives.

Having determined that petitioner's rights under section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law were not terminated by Willie's adoption, we now pass to the question of the procedure's constitutionality. The essence of respondents' challenge is that, under the circumstances, the action amounts to an unconstitutional invasion of familial privacy.

It is well settled that parents generally have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their families as they see fit (see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070; Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042; People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801; Matter of Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463, affd. 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954). As stated by the Supreme Court, "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder" (Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at p. 166, 64 S.Ct. at 442). Indeed, it has been suggested that adoptive parents stand in the same legal position as natural parents (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843, n.49, 844, n.51, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2109 n.49, n.51, 53 L.Ed.2d 14).

Constitutional protection notwithstanding, parents are not totally free to act as they please. "family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest * * *. And * * * rights of parenthood are beyond limitation" (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at p. 166, 64 S.Ct. at 442, supra ). In determining whether a State's interference with the family relationship is proper, the action will not be reviewed under exacting scrutiny, but according to a less rigorous standard of whether there is a "reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State" (Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403, 43 S.Ct. 625, 628, supra ; see, also, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643, 94 S.Ct. 791, 797, 39 L.Ed.2d 52; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, p. 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, supra ).

Permitting grandparent visitation over the adoptive parents' objection does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family. The State, in its role as parens patriae, has determined that, under certain limited circumstances, grandparents should have continuing contacts with the child's development if it is in the child's best interest. When one or both of the parents have died, the child usually suffers great emotional stress. By enacting section 72, the Legislature has recognized that, particularly where a relationship between the grandparents and grandchild has been established, the child should not undergo the added burden of being severed from his or her grandparents, who may also provide the natural warmth, interest and support that will alleviate the child's...