People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf

• Decision Date: 27 November 1974
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, on the relation of Robert F. WAYBURN, Law Guardian, on behalf of Charles L. (Anonymous) v. Harriet SCHUPF, acting Director of Detention Services, Human Resources Administration, Juvenile Center for Boys.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 110

365 N.Y.S.2d 110

80 Misc.2d 730

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, on the relation of Robert F. WAYBURN, Law Guardian, on behalf of Charles L. (Anonymous) v. Harriet SCHUPF, acting Director of Detention Services, Human Resources Administration, Juvenile Center for Boys.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings County, Part I.

Nov. 27, 1974.

Robert F. Wayburn, of counsel, Charles Schinitsky, Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, for petitioner.

Elizabeth Argar, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City, of counsel, for the People.

IRWIN BROWNSTEIN, Justice.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding brought on behalf of a juvenile, fifteen years old, who is being detained pursuant to an order of the Family Court pending trial. A petition based upon information and belief was filed in the Family Court on October 8, 1974, accusing the relator of acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and menacing in the first degree. On October 11 a probable cause hearing was held at which a determination was made that there was probable cause to believe that such acts were committed and that the relator committed them. The Family Court also entered a finding that good cause existed to adjourn the fact-finding hearing beyond seventy-two hours. (See Family Court Act § 748(a)).

After this hearing the relator was ordered remanded to Juvenile Center, without bail, pending his trial until November 6. Thereafter the instant writ was issued. The relator does not herein challenge the basis for the finding of probable cause. Rather, the challenge is to the validity of the remand order.

This case squarely raises the issue of whether preventive detention may validly be imposed in the Family Court for juveniles who are accused of being juvenile delinquents. It is of first impression in this State.

In order for a juvenile to be held in custody, a basis for the remand must be found in Section 739 of the Family Court Act which provides that:

'* * * the court shall not direct detention unless it finds that unless the respondent is detained:

(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return date; or

(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date do an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.'

The Family Court Judge specifically held the relator pursuant to Section 739(b) of the Family Court Act and said:

'The reason for the remand is not my fear that they (relator and another juvenile accused with him) would not attend; I thought that I had made that quite clear. If there is any question about it, I am not afraid that they will not attend on the appointed date; the charge is so serious, the crime is of such a nature that the Court is indeed concerned that were these respondents paroled, that . . . there is likelihood that they might commit another crime . . .' (transcript, Family Court Hearing).

Relator urges that the remand order and F.C.A. Section 739(b) is unconstitutional. The constitutional challenge to the statute can be briefly summarized. In the first instance, it is urged that preventive detention for juveniles in New York is violative of equal protection of the law in that there is no compelling state interest or, alternatively, no rational basis for prohibiting preventive detention for adults while allowing it for juveniles. Secondly, the relator contends that the scheme violates due process of law in that there is no Quid pro quo for the deprivation of liberty which the juvenile suffers.

Equal protection of the law requires that a state must not classify its citizens and treat persons differently unless there is a rational basis for so doing (Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938)).

If a suspect classification or fundamental right is involved courts accord the legislation strict scrutiny and require a compelling state interest before upholding the law (In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)).

The challenge to this statute flows primarily out of the fact that preventive detention is not permitted for adults. (Criminal Procedure Law § 510.30). In the adult criminal system the likelihood of committing another crime is not one of the criteria which may be considered in setting bail for a defendant (People ex rel. Schweizer v. Welch, 40 A.D.2d 621, 336 N.Y.S.2d 556 (4th Dept. 1972)).

It is clear that our constitution requires courts to look behind labels in determining the validity of a challenged scheme. Our task is to look at the actual effect which the scheme has on the person.

The effect of permitting pre-trial detention of juveniles is that they are incarcerated and deprived of their liberty. The effect is identical on juveniles and adults. As Mr. Justice Black has written:

'Imprisonment awaiting determination of whether that imprisonment is justifiable has precisely the same evil consequences to an individual whatever legalistic label is used to describe his plight.' (Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 557, 72 S.Ct. 525, 543, 96 L.Ed. 547 (dissent) (1952).

See also People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 77 Misc.2d 41, 44, 352 N.Y.S.2d 561, 564, Sup.Ct., Kings Cty. 1974, affd. 44 A.D.2d 683, 353 N.Y.S.2d 808, October 23, 1970, 2nd Dept.)

The right at issue in this case is the most fundamental of all our rights--the right to liberty. The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that 'No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .' Liberty embraces many of the rights which the Supreme Court has held to be fundamental: travel, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1968); association, N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).

Since the right which lay at the heart of the challenged legislation is 'fundamental', if the scheme is to be upheld the state must show a compelling state interest to justify treating juveniles differently from adults.

Not only is the effect of preventive detention identical for juveniles and adults, but the purpose of it is the same. The...