People ex rel. Wheeler v. Rust

• Decision Date: 21 April 1920
• Docket Number: No. 12826.,12826.
• Citation: 127 N.E. 69,292 Ill. 412
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WHEELER et al. v. RUST et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

292 Ill. 412

127 N.E. 69

PEOPLE ex rel. WHEELER et al.

v.RUST et al.

No. 12826.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 21, 1920.

Quo warranto by the People, on the relation of James A. Wheeler and others, against H. J. Rust and others. Judgment for relators, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tazewell County; T. N. Green, judge.

Jesse Black, Jr., and Prettyman, Velde & Prettyman, all of Pekin, for appellants.

Edward E. Black, State's Atty., of Pekin, and Dailey, Miller, McCormick & Radley, of Peoria, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

On February 17, 1919, which was during the February term of the Tazewell county circuit court, leave was granted the state's attorney to file on behalf of the relators an information in the nature of quo warranto against H. J. Rust, F. C. Gale, W. G. Fair, A. Van Horne, and D. F. Velde, constituting the board of education of the Pekin community high school district, to test the legality of the organization of said district. The information filed on said day consisted of one count, which was in the usual form of information in such cases, and alleged the district had never been legally organized, and called upon the defendants to answer by what warrant they claimed to exercise the rights, powers, and authority of a board of education of said district. Summons was ordered issued returnable February 27. On March 10, 1919, by leave of court three additional counts to the information were filed. April 12, after defendants had been ruled to plead and had failed to do so, they were defaulted, and judgment was entered finding all the material allegations of each and every count of the information were true, and that the district had not been legally organized. The district was declared dissolved, defendants were ousted from their offices as members of the board of education, and were adjudged to pay the costs, and each of them was fined $1.

The additional counts set up the proceedings had in the organization of the Pekin community high school district and the irregularities which it is alleged rendered the organization invalid. The first additional count charges that 71 inhabitants of schooll district No. 108 (which is coterminous with the city of Pekin) petitioned the county superintendent of schools of Tazewell county to call an election for the purpose of voting for or against the establishment of a high school for the benefit of the inhabitants in the territory included in districts 101, 102, 108, 77, 82, 70, 71, 98, and 97 in Tazewell county and districts 40 and 44 in Peoria county; that the county superintendent of schools granted the petition May 2, 1918, and thereafter called an election to be held in the territory described in the petition for the purpose of voting for or against the proposition to form the territory described into a community high school district and to establish a high school therein, which election was set for and held on May 20, 1918; that notice was given of said election and the ballots cast thereat were returned to the county superintendent; that the proposition was carried by a majority of the votes in the territory, but not by a majority vote in each of the districts; that the county superintendent had carried and declared said school district to be communityhigh school district No. 303, Tazewell county, Ill., and that the board of education, when elected and organized should be a body politic and corporate by the name ‘Board of Education of Pekin High School District No. 303, Tazewell county, Illinois.’ Said count further alleges the territory described in the petition is not made up of parts of several districts, but consists of the whole of the districts mentioned; that the petition should have been filed with the trustees of schools of the townships in which the respective districts were located; that notice of the election should have been given by the township treasurers, who should have canvassed the returns as provided by sections 85 and 87 of the act entitled ‘An act to establish and maintain a system of free schools' (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 122), and that an affirmative vote in favor of the proposition was required in each of said districts.

The second additional count alleges that by special act of the Legislature of March 11, 1869 (3 Priv. Laws, p. 495), which was declared to be a public law, all the territory within the limits of the city of Pekin, according to its then or future boundaries, was created a school district, to be known as the Pekin school district, and it was placed under the exclusive management and control of a board of school inspectors, who should have power to erect, rent, or purchase suitable school buildings and grounds, to maintain schools for all the children of said city, and generally the management and control of said school district and schools therein. Said act provided that no act of the Legislature then in force or that might thereafter be enacted for the establishment of a state system of public schools should be construed to repeal, alter, or change any of its provisions, ‘unless such acts shall specifically provide for such repeal, alteration or change.’ Said count further averred that ever since the passage of that act the schools in district No. 108, which is coterminous with the city of Pekin, have been under the management and control of a board of school inspectors; that said act is now in force, and there is no authority of law for joining said district No. 108 in a community high school district.

The third additional count, after setting up the proceedings had in the organization of said community high school district substantially as set out in the first and second additional counts, charges that the Community High School Law of 1917 is unconstitutional and invalid.

It will be seen the information itself set out the title of defendants, so that it was unnecessary for them to plead their title. It was not disputed that the information correctly set up the proceedings to organize the district, and if it showed an illegal organization the people were entitled to judgment. The three grounds upon which the organization of the district was attacked were: (1) That the petition for organization of the district should have been filed with the trustees of schools of the respective townships in which the districts were located, and the township treasurers should have given notice of the election and canvassed the returns, as provided by section 85 and 87 of the General School Law; (2) by the act of 1869 the city of Pekin, according to its then or future boundaries, was made a school district, and the schools therein were placed under the exclusive control and management of a board of school inspectors; that said act of 1869 had never been repealed, and the city of Pekin school district could not be joined with other districts in the organization of a high school district; (3) that the Community High School Act, as amended 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 737), delegates legislative authority to the county superintendent of schools, and is unconstitutional and void. No questions of fact being in dispute, only questions of law were raised for decision, and these questions were as fully raised by the information as they would have been by pleas. The default of defendants admitted the truth of the facts alleged, but not that the people were entitled to the relief prayed. Board of Supervisors os...