People ex rel. Woodbury v. Hendrick

• Decision Date: 18 June 1915
• Citation: 215 N.Y. 339,109 N.E. 486
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WOODBURY, Atty. Gen., v. HENDRICK, Supreme Court Justice, et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

215 N.Y. 339

109 N.E. 486

PEOPLE ex rel. WOODBURY, Atty. Gen.,

v.HENDRICK, Supreme Court Justice, et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 18, 1915.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Application for writ of prohibition by the People, on the relation of Egburt Woodbury, Attorney General, against Peter A. Hendrick, Justice of the Supreme Court, Abel I. Smith, Jr., and Harry K. Thaw. From an order of the Appellate Division (168 App.Div. 553, 153 N.Y.Supp. 188), dismissing the application, the relator appeals. Affirmed.

Egburt Woodbury, Atty. Gen. (Alfred L. Becker, of Albany, of counsel), for appellant.

John B. Stanchfield and Morgan J. O'Brien, both of New York City, for respondents.

HISCOCK.

This proceeding was instituted for the purpose of prohibiting the defendant Peter A. Hendrick, a justice of the Supreme Court, from seeking, in habeas corpus proceedings pending before him at Special Term, the aid of a jury in determining the question of the defendant Thaw's sanity.

The appeal presents for the consideration of the court another chapter in the long history of the attempts of the defendant Thaw to regain the freedom of which he was deprived as the result of his alleged murder of Stanford White in 1906. It is unnecessary to review all of these, and reference will only be made to such matters as are connected with or lead up to the present proceeding.

The defendant now is, and at all the times involved in this discussion was, in custody under and by reason of a valid commitment of him to the Matteawan State Hospital as an insane person, following his acquittal of the charge of murdering White, on the ground that he was insane at the time of the homicide. In March, 1915, while he was in the city prison in the city of New York, awaiting delivery to the authorities of the state hospital after trial upon a charge of conspiracy to escape from said hospital, a writ of habeas corpus in his behalf was sued out, directed to the warden of said prison and the sheriff of the county, and the hearing upon which writ was finally adjourned to a Special Term held by Mr. Justice Hendrick. By the returns to the writ and by the answer thereto filed by or in behalf of Thaw the issue of fact was presented whether he had regained his sanity, and was therefore entitled to be released from custody in accordance with the provisions of the Insanity Law. At that stage in the proceedings an application was made in behalf of Thaw that a jury be impaneled for the purpose of passing on this issue of sanity, and after proper deliberation Mr. Justice Hendrick announced that he would grant the application and would-

“impanel a jury to decide the issues or to aid his conscience in deciding them by its advice and assistance.”

Then this proceeding was instituted, as already stated, to restrain such resort in said habeas corpus proceedings to a trial before a jury of said issue or Thaw's sanity. Upon the petition and return thereto it is plain that Mr. Justice Hendrick does not, by calling a jury, intend at all to evade the burden and responsibility of ultimately deciding the issue which has been raised, but simply intends to take the verdict of such jury by way of advice and aid in making such ultimate decision, and therefore the question is presented whether a justice before whom such a proceeding is pending has the power, in his discretion, thus to call to his aid a jury, it being admitted that the relator in the habeas corpus proceedings is not entitled, as matter of right to a jury trial. In addition, the question is presented whether the determination of the justice to thus call a jury, even if erroneous, furnishes the necessary basis for the issue of a writ of prohibition. These questions will be considered in the order stated.

[1] Two reasons are assigned by the appellant for the assertion that it will be improper to call a jury as is proposed. The first of these is drawn from section 2039, Code of Civil Procedure, relating to procedure in habeas corpus proceedings, and which commands that, issue having been joined by the return of a writ and the traverse or answer of the person detained:

“Thereupon the court or judge must proceed in a summary way, to hear the evidence, produced in support of or against the imprisonment or detention, and to dispose of the prisoner as the justice of the case requires.”

Assuming, for the purposes of the discussion, that these provisions of the Code govern a habeas corpus proceeding instituted as the one in question under section 93 of the Insanity Law (Consol.Laws, c. 27), and assuming, also, that the public, as well as the person detained, is interested in the prompt decision of a habeas corpus proceeding, and therefore is entitled to insist upon obedience to the requirement for a “summary” disposition, I still think that such condition imposed upon the proceedings is not necessarily a bar to a discretionary right to seek the aid of a jury as is planned in the proceeding submitted to our consideration. The command of the statute is for a “summary” way of procedure. That means that it shall be prompt and without unreasonable and unnecessary delay. Having in mind ordinary legal procedure, it doubtless means that there shall be no long adjournments; that such a proceeding shall not be placed on a calendar where it would not be reached in some time; that it shall have precedence over other matters. But of course some discretion must be left to the court or judge as to the time and mode of hearing even such a proceeding. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 Sup.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868;Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 21 Sup.Ct. 455, 45 L.Ed. 639.

The question whether the submission of an issue of fact to a jury for the aid of the court would result in a violation of the statute is one which might easily be decided by the circumstances of the particular case. If a jury could be promptly secured, it is not apparent that any substantial delay would be occasioned by calling one. If one could not be thus obtained, it might result in reprehensible and forbidden delay. It is not to be assumed that a justice would order such a jury when such course might lead to a violation of the statute, and there is no suggestion that recourse to a jury in the city of New York in the case before us will be productive of delay.

While it has been assumed that the public, as well as the person who is detained, has an interest in obedience to the “summary way” clause of the statute, still the great struggle always has been to secure to the applicant for the writ the protection and benefit of a prompt hearing. This is sufficiently evidenced by section 2020 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which inflicts upon a court or judge authorized to grant such a writ a penalty for delay in acting. Therefore it is a feature of importance in this case, as it easily might be in others, that the application for a hearing by a jury is made by the person who is detained, and therefore the party especially protected against delay is not complaining of the possibility of its occurrence.

None of the authorities cited by appellant's counsel seem to sustain his proposition that the language of the Code, expressly or by fair implication, prohibits, under all circumstances, the advisory employment of a jury as is now proposed. I think that they simply sustain the proposition that the issues are to be decided by the court or judge proceeding in a summary or prompt manner, and that neither party is entitled, as matter of right, to have the issues tried before a jury, and which, as we know, not only might, but frequently would, result in delay. The distinction between a proceeding to be decided by a judge in a summary manner and one of which the issues are to be tried as matter of right at a jury term does not, in my opinion, sustain the conclusion that a disposition will necessarily be prevented from being summary because a judge who is hearing the evidence upon an issue of fact calls to him a jury to hear the same evidence, and thereafter for his aid takes its judgment by way of verdict upon the issue which has thus been tried.

[2] In the second place it is argued that the court lacked the inherent power to call to its aid a jury in determining the issue of fact presented to it. If I have been correct in drawing the conclusion that the summary provision of section 2039 of the Code does not forbid it, there is no statute which prevents the exercise of the power, and there is no express authority which, in my opinion, denies its existence. The proposition of appellant is based on general...