People in Interest of Hoylman

• Decision Date: 04 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92CA1842,92CA1842
• Citation: 865 P.2d 918
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of Robert HOYLMAN, Respondent-Appellant. . I
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 918

865 P.2d 918

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee In the Interest of Robert HOYLMAN, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 92CA1842.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. I.

Nov. 4, 1993.

H. Lawrence Hoyt, Boulder County Atty., Leslie W. Lacy, Asst. Boulder County Atty., Boulder, for petitioner-appellee.

Norman J. Mullen, Boulder, for respondent-appellant.

Opinion by Judge CRISWELL.

Respondent, Robert Hoylman, appeals his certification by the district court for short-term hospitalization and treatment pursuant to § 27-10-107, C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B), asserting that that court erred when it denied his request for a hearing before a jury on his certification. We agree and reverse.

Respondent was certified by a doctor for short-term hospitalization and treatment pursuant to § 27-10-107 in October 1992. He filed a timely request for a jury hearing on his certification, and trial was set for a later date.

During a preliminary hearing, however, the district court ruled that § 27-10-107(3), C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B) did not grant any right to a hearing before a jury on a petition for short-term certification. The court then proceeded to take evidence and certified respondent as mentally ill and gravely disabled. Pursuant to the court's order, respondent was confined to a locked ward at Centennial Peaks Hospital.

I.

The parties have entered into an agreed statement of facts for purposes of this appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 10(d). That statement discloses that the court entered a written order for short-term hospitalization on November 18, 1992, nunc pro tunc to October 29, 1992. However, that statement also discloses that respondent's short-term hospitalization was terminated on November 9, 1992, and there is nothing in the record that would evidence any later hospitalization.

Given these circumstances, therefore, because no order of this court could grant any practical or effective relief to respondent, it could be concluded that his appeal has been rendered moot. See Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424 (Colo.1990). And, although the People have not raised the issue of mootness, we conclude that, because that issue may affect the existence of a justiciable controversy and, hence, this court's jurisdiction over this cause, we must address the question. See Larson v. City & County of Denver, 33 Colo.App. 153, 516 P.2d 448 (1973).

Even though no practical relief can be granted to a particular applicant, a case is not to be considered moot if the circumstances upon which the asserted claim is based are capable of repetition, yet are of a nature that they may evade review. Humphrey v. Southwestern Development Co., 734 P.2d 637 (Colo.1987). Such are the circumstances presented here.

By its nature, an order for short-term hospitalization, entered in a proceeding in which a respondent has been denied a hearing before a jury, will expire before the review of such an order may be had before an appellate court. And, if we were to conclude that the cessation of hospitalization pursuant to that order rendered the question of its validity moot, there could never be a determination of any respondent's rights. Yet, the denial of a right to a jury hearing is a consequence that is surely capable of being repeated in the future.

We conclude, therefore, that the issues presented here have not been rendered moot by respondent's release from hospitalization, that there still exists a real, justiciable controversy, and, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction to proceed to determine those issues.

II.

Section 27-10-107, C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B) provides, in relevant part, that:

(1) If a person detained for seventy-two hours under the provisions of section 27-10-105 or a respondent under court order for evaluation pursuant to § 27-10-106 has received an evaluation, he may be certified for not more than three months for short-term treatment under the following conditions:

....

(3) Within twenty-four hours of certification, copies of the certification shall be personally delivered to the respondent.... In addition to the copy of the certification, the respondent shall be given a written notice that a hearing upon his certification for short-term treatment may be had before the court or a jury upon written request directed to the court pursuant to subsection (6) of this section.

....

(6) The respondent for short-term treatment or his attorney may at any time file a written request that the certification for short-term treatment ... be reviewed by the court.... If review is requested, the court shall hear the matter within ten days after his request, and the court shall give notice to the respondent and his attorney and the certifying and treating professional person of the time and place thereof. The hearing shall be held in accordance with section 27-10-111. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may enter or confirm the certification for short-term treatment, discharge the respondent, or enter any other appropriate order, subject to available appropriations. (emphasis supplied)

Section 27-10-111(1), C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B) provides:

Hearings before the court under section 27-10-107 ... shall be conducted in the same manner as other civil proceedings before such court. The burden or proof shall be upon the person or facility seeking to detain the respondent. The court or jury shall determine that the respondent is in need of care and treatment only if the court or jury finds such person mentally ill and, as a result of such mental illness, a danger to others or himself or gravely disabled, by clear and convincing evidence. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent asserts that the plain language of § 27-10-107(3), C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B) and § 27-10-111(1) grants the individual being certified for short-term treatment the right to a jury determination of the factual issues presented. We agree.

If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretative rules of statutory construction; in such instances, it may reasonably be presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly has said. Woodsmall v. Regional Transportation District, 800 P.2d 63, 67 (Colo.1990). Further, the Care and Treatment Act, § 27-10-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B, must be strictly...