People v. Laeke
| Decision Date | 04 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08CA0079.,08CA0079. |
| Citation | 280 P.3d 1 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Abel Gebre LAEKE, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Antony M. Noble, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.
The issue in this criminal case is whether Abel Gebre Laeke, a mentally ill defendant, has a right to a jury trial under Colorado's insanity statute, section 16–8–105.5(2), C.R.S.2009, even after the prosecution concedes his insanity, because he objected to his counsel's entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), contended he did not commit the underlying charge, and did not personally waive a jury trial. Because we conclude that he does, we reverse the trial court's judgment finding him insane and committing him to the Colorado State Mental Hospital in Pueblo (CMHIP).
Defendant was charged with attempted sexual contact, a felony, and indecent exposure, a misdemeanor. Over his objection, his counsel entered an NGRI plea at his arraignment. The trial court provided defendant and his counsel with a copy of the requisite advisement form. Defense counsel signed the advisement form, but defendant refused to do so, objecting to the insanity plea. The trial court then provided an oral advisement to defendant. As in the written advisement, the court advised defendant that he had a right to a trial by jury or by the court on the issues raised by his NGRI plea. The court then ordered a mental evaluation.
Doctors at the CMHIP concluded that defendant was not competent to proceed. The court ordered defendant to remain at the CMHIP until he was restored to competency.
Following defendant's restoration to competency, the trial court ordered a sanity examination. After receiving the CMHIP sanity evaluation, it then held a hearing, during which the prosecution stipulated that defendant was insane on the date of the commission of the alleged offense. Defense counsel asked the court to accept the stipulation. Defendant objected, stating that he hoped “to prove that [he] didn't do this in trial.”
Characterizing the hearing as a trial to the court, the court entered a finding that defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to the CMHIP until he was restored to sanity. Following proceedings not relevant here, defendant obtained new counsel and filed this direct appeal.
Defendant contends that he had a constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial and that the trial court erred by entering a judgment of NGRI over his objection and without obtaining a personal jury trial waiver from him. We agree.
Defendant's contention regarding his right to a jury trial presents an issue of law, which we review de novo. People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158, 177 (Colo.App.1999). Statutory interpretation is also a question of law, warranting de novo review. People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588, 590 (Colo.2009).
We must give effect to the General Assembly's purpose or intent in enacting the statute. Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 851 (Colo.2001). When construing a statute, we look to the plain and ordinary language of the statute and if the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the provisions as written. People v. Gallegos, 240 P.3d 882, 884 (Colo.App. 2009). We give effect to every word so as not to render any term superfluous. People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 458 (Colo.2005).
For offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995, when insanity is raised as a defense to a criminal charge, Colorado follows a unitary trial scheme, in which the issues of sanity are tried at the same time that criminal responsibility is determined. § 16–8–104.5(1), C.R.S.2009 (); People v. Bielecki, 964 P.2d 598, 601–02 (Colo.App.1998). The plea of NGRI includes the plea of not guilty. § 16–8–103(1.5)(a), C.R.S.2009; People v. Vanrees, 125 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo.2005).
Under section 16–8–103(2), C.R.S.2009, defense counsel may, as she did here, raise the defense of insanity over the objection of the defendant. See Hendricks v. People, 10 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Colo.2000); People v. Bergerud, 203 P.3d 579, 584 (Colo.App.2008), ( that Hendricks held “unique” the Colorado statute allowing defense counsel to suggest, and a trial court to interpose, an insanity defense over a defendant's objection), rev'd on other grounds, 223 P.3d 686 (Colo. 2010).
A court may accept an insanity plea from counsel over a defendant's objection, as it did here, after it conducts a “just determination” inquiry, in which it balances the public's interest in not holding criminally liable a defendant lacking criminal responsibility, and the defendant's interest in autonomously controlling the nature of his or her defense. Hendricks, 10 P.3d at 1241.
Every person is presumed to be sane, but once any evidence of insanity is introduced, the People have the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. § 16–8–106(2), C.R.S.2009.
After a court orders and receives a sanity evaluation, the court must “immediately set the case for trial.” § 16–8–105.5(2). The statute then directs the procedure a court must follow at trial. In pertinent part, it states:
(3) When the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity has been raised, the jury shall be given special verdict forms containing interrogatories. The trier of fact shall decide first the question of guilt as to felony charges that are before the court. If the trier of fact concludes that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more of the felony charges submitted for consideration, the special interrogatories shall not be answered. Upon completion of its deliberations on the felony charges as previously set forth in this subsection (3), the trier of fact shall consider any other charges before the court in a similar manner; except that it shall not answer the special interrogatories regarding such charges if it has previously found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to one or more felony charges. The interrogatories shall provide for specific findings of the jury with respect to the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. When the court sits as the trier of fact, it shall enter appropriate specific findings with respect to the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. (4) If the trier of fact finds the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the department of human services until such time as the defendant is found eligible for release.
Section 16–8–105.5(3)–(4), C.R.S.2009.
Accordingly, after the case proceeds to trial, the jury receives special verdict forms and must first decide a defendant's guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charges. If the jury finds a defendant guilty of one or more of those charges, it does not consider whether the defendant is insane or not. The rationale appears to be that the jury's determination on the underlying mens rea element of a felony crime necessarily answers the question whether a defendant had the capacity to form and did in fact form the necessary mens rea. See§ 16–8–101.5(1)(a)–(b), C.R.S.2009 (); Vanrees, 125 P.3d at 408 (); People ex rel. Juhan v. Dist. Court, 165 Colo. 253, 265, 439 P.2d 741, 747 (1968) ().
If the jury finds a defendant not guilty, it then must answer special interrogatories and explain whether it found the defendant NGRI. If it did, the court must then commit the defendant to the custody of the Department of Human Services until the defendant is found eligible for release. If, however, the jury has found the defendant not guilty for a reason other than NGRI, the defendant then is discharged from custody.
Accordingly, here, had defendant proceeded to trial, the fact finder would have first considered his guilt on the underlying charges of attempted sexual contact under section 18–3–404(1)(a), C.R.S.2009. This is consistent with the statutory provision stating that the plea of NGRI includes a plea of not guilty. Only if the jury had found defendant NGRI would he then have been committed to the Department of Human Services. If the jury found he did not commit the act charged, or the prosecution failed to prove another element of the offense charged for a reason other than insanity, he then would have been discharged from custody.
A defendant facing a serious criminal charge has a constitutional right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 23; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Austin v. City & County of Denver, 170 Colo. 448, 454, 462 P.2d 600, 603 (1969)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Walker
...must personally waive his or her right to a jury trial, and a statement by defense counsel does not operate as a waiver. People v. Laeke, 280 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo.App.2009) ( cert. granted Sept. 13, 2010). In Colorado, a colloquy, which is not constitutionally required, serves as a “procedural d......