People in Interest of R. G.
Decision Date | 05 February 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 79CA0189,79CA0189 |
Citation | 630 P.2d 89 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of: R. G., a child, Appellant, and concerning, C. G. and J. G., Respondents. . II |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Susan P. Mele-Sernovitz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner-appellee.
Jake R. Valdez, Mark T. Angelos, Denver, for child appellant.
R.G., a minor child, appeals an adjudication of delinquency entered by the district court based upon acts which if committed by an adult would have constituted the crime of second degree assault. We affirm.
This case involves a fist fight on February 18, 1978, between two teenagers at a skating rink in Adams County. The evidence disclosed that R.G. concluded the fight by stabbing the victim three times, with one of the wounds proving fatal.
A petition in delinquency was filed alleging that R.G. was delinquent for having violated § 18-3-103(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 ( ), and also alleging that under § 19-3-113.1(1), C.R.S. 1973 , he was a "violent juvenile offender." After a trial to a jury, a verdict was returned sustaining both allegations of the petition and judgment was entered thereon.
Subsequent to trial, it was discovered that the subsection of the second degree murder statute upon which the petition was based, supra, had been repealed. This had occurred prior to the commission of the acts charged. Accordingly, the court set aside that portion of its original judgment based on violation of the repealed statute and re-entered the judgment based on R.G.'s commission of acts which would constitute the lesser offense of second degree assault, § 18-3-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 .
R.G. first contends that the petition in delinquency was not sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction to decree his delinquency based upon his having committed acts which would constitute second degree assault, when its sole substantive allegation concerned murder in the second degree. He also contends, in essence, that having entered an erroneous judgment and decree, the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the same and enter another based on criminal acts not originally charged.
R.G. contends that the petition in delinquency was not sufficiently in compliance with the requirements of C.R.J.P. 7(b)(2) to support the decree ultimately entered. We disagree. C.R.J.P. 7(b)(2) states:
In pertinent part, the petition in delinquency alleged that:
"In the county of Adams, State of Colorado, at or near 8370 York Street, and on about February 18, 1978, R.D.G. did feloniously and unlawfully, with intent to cause serious bodily injury to Daniel Bernard Martinez, Jr., cause the death of Daniel Bernard Martinez, Jr.; contrary to C.R.S. 1973, 18-3-103(1)(b), as amended SECOND DEGREE MURDER."
The criminal law analog to the petition in delinquency is the information. An information is sufficient if it advises the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, so that he can adequately defend himself. Section 16-5-202, C.R.S. 1973 ; Crim.P. 7(c); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972). It need not specify lesser included offenses which may have been committed in commission of the described acts. See People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 P. 152 (1917). Moreover, a specific statutory reference is an immaterial part of an indictment. People v. Marion, 182 Colo. 435, 514 P.2d 327 (1973); and its incorrect citation is not grounds for reversal, absent substantial prejudice. Lucero v. People, 164 Colo. 247, 434 P.2d 128 (1967).
This is not a case where the accused was inadequately apprised of the acts charged which constitute his delinquency. There is no showing that R.G. was prejudiced, surprised, or unable to defend himself as to the facts charged as constituting delinquent behavior. Furthermore, since the facts set forth in the petition and those incorporated by reference to the second degree murder statute, albeit repealed, adequately informed the accused that he was charged with having committed acts which if done by an adult would have been a crime, the repeal of the pertinent statute before the petition was filed is without significance vis a vis the question of the adequacy of the information contained in the petition. And, as to that issue, we hold that R.G. was responsible for knowing that intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another whether or not it resulted in death was a crime prohibited by law.
R.G. contends that the trial court could not set aside its original determination and re-enter a judgment based upon a lesser offense arising out of the same acts. We disagree.
In resolving this issue we rely upon the cases of Till v. People, 196 Colo. 126, 581 P.2d 299 (1978). People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); and People v. Webb, 189 Colo. 400, 542 P.2d 77 (1975).
In these cases, juries convicted the defendants of violating statutes which were subsequently held to be unconstitutional. However, the respective trial courts in each instance, were authorized to enter a judgment of conviction based upon a lesser included, but non-charged, offense. The rationale for that rule is that the jury must have found all of the elements of the lesser offense present in order to have returned a guilty verdict on the greater, albeit invalid charge. Therefore, although normally the lesser would merge into the greater, when the greater is removed, the lesser stands.
That is precisely the case here. R.G. was charged with, and was found to have committed, acts constituting second degree murder under § 18-3-103(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (repealed Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, Ch. 224, at 971). That crime was defined as follows "A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if: ... with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a person other than himself, he causes the death of that person...."
The jury was instructed as to the elements of this offense and, after deliberation, concluded that they had been proven. When it was discovered that this statute had been repealed, the trial court vacated its previous judgment and entered its decree of delinquency based upon R.G.'s commission of the second degree assault, § 18-3-203, C.R.S. 1973 . That statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
A parallel reading of these two statutes demonstrates that second degree assault was a lesser included offense within the second degree murder charge that was proven. Section 18-1-408(5) , C.R.S. 1973, provides in applicable part:
Accordingly, the trial court properly ruled, that the determination of delinquency based upon the repealed statute must be set aside. Having done so, it was also correct in entering a new decree of delinquency, based upon R.G.'s having committed acts constituting second degree assault.
Even though the jury was not instructed as to the lesser included offense, R.G. had been given his day in court. All of the elements of the lesser included offense were included in the more serious offense, which he faced before the jury. The fact of his having committed the lesser included offense is implicit in, and thus a part of, the jury's verdict. People v. Patterson, 187 Colo. 431, 532 P.2d 342 (1975).
R.G. next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a knife found at the skating rink at the approximate location of, and immediately after, the incident. He asserts that its connection with the crime was not established.
The test for determining the relevancy of real evidence was set out in Washington v. People, 158 Colo. 115, 405 P.2d 735, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 953, 86 S.Ct. 1217, 16 L.Ed.2d 215 (1966), in which the court stated that such evidence "must only be connected in some manner with...
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ARTICLE 3
...1980); People v. Tijerina, 632 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1981); Richardson v. District Court, 632 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1981); People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. District Court, 652 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1982); People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hamilton, 662......
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ARTICLE 2 THE COLORADO JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
...a treating physician when that statement is not the result of an interrogation by a law enforcement official. People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981). Under Miranda and former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)), the decisive stage for the warnings is custodial inter......
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Rule 403 EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
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ARTICLE 3 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
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