People In Interest of C. B.
Decision Date | 10 October 1978 |
Docket Number | No. C-1422,C-1422 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, In the Interest of C. B., and concerning M. B., Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., David K. Rees, Asst. Atty. Gen., Appellate Section, Denver, for petitioner.
John A. Purvis, Acting Colo. State Public Defender, Paula K. Miller, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.
In October, 1975, the juvenile respondent, C. B., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on probation for a term not to exceed two years. Additionally he was given a suspended commitment to the Department of Institutions and ordered to pay restitution.
Subsequently the People filed a petition for modification or revocation of probation alleging that C. B. had conspired to commit 1 and had committed 2 third-degree assault. At the hearing on this petition, the court employed a burden of proof standard requiring "convincing" evidence. It found that the juvenile had committed acts which, if done by an adult, would have constituted the above-stated crimes. The court sustained the revocation petition, fined C. B. $150, and continued the suspension of the prior order which had committed him to the Department of Institutions on condition that he attend school and obtain a summer job.
The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred in not requiring proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," rather than merely "convincing evidence" as the standard of proof to support its finding that C. B. had engaged in conduct which if done by an adult would have constituted a crime. People in the Interest of C. B. and Concerning M. B., Colo.App., 572 P.2d 843 (1977). We agree.
Section 16-11-206(3), C.R.S. 1973, sets forth an Adult probationer's procedural rights regarding the burden of proof at a revocation hearing:
(Emphasis added.)
Thus in Colorado an adult charged with a probation violation which constitutes a criminal offense has the right to demand that the People's case be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt." The question here is whether this weightier standard of proof should apply in juvenile probation revocation proceedings when the alleged violation of probation arises from conduct which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime. We hold that the same standard of proof which governs adult probation revocation applies to juvenile proceedings.
The General Assembly in section 16-11-206(3) expressed the policy of this state that before probation can be revoked for criminal acts, the factfinder must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the probationer actually committed the crime relied upon as a violation of probation. The legislature thus recognized the crucial role that this high standard of proof plays in the truth-finding process. As the United States Supreme Court has declared:
"The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.'
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970).
From its inception the juvenile court system has permitted wide differences in the treatment of children and adults who have violated the law. The juvenile court system was created to ensure the care and guidance for the errant child that will ultimately "best serve his welfare and the interests of society." Section 19-1-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. These purposes of the juvenile justice system will not be served by affording juveniles lesser procedural protections than adults against the revocation of probation for allegedly criminal conduct. The same considerations that motivated the General Assembly to require a high degree of caution in findings of fact for the protection of adults apply as well to the child. See In re Winship, supra.
The stigma that attaches to a juvenile upon the finding that he has committed acts which would constitute a criminal offense if done...
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