People v. Adams

• Decision Date: 05 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-3361,85-3361
• Citation: 108 Ill.Dec. 786,509 N.E.2d 482,156 Ill.App.3d 444
• Parties: , 108 Ill.Dec. 786 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 482

509 N.E.2d 482

156 Ill.App.3d 444, 108 Ill.Dec. 786

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-3361.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Second Division.

May 5, 1987.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1987.

Steven Clark, Deputy Defender, Barbara Kamm, Asst. Appellant Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Paula M. Carstensen, Joanne M. Roddy, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant appeals his convictions of two counts of armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 33A-2; 95 1/2, par. 4-103a), one count of armed violence based on possession of a stolen motor vehicle (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 33A-2; 95 1/2, par. 4-103a possession of a stolen motor vehicle (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-103a(1)), and theft (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 16-1a(1)). Defendant also appeals his sentences for concurrent terms of imprisonment for 20 years on the two counts of armed robbery, 10 years for armed violence, and 5 years for theft. ¹

Defendant Michael Adams and seven other codefendants were indicted for several offenses. Adams' case was severed and a jury convicted him of the enumerated offenses.

On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) his case must be remanded for a hearing on whether the State improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury; (2) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) he was denied a fair trial; (4) the armed violence conviction was improperly predicated upon the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle; (5) he was improperly sentenced; and (6) the court erred in appointing assistant public defenders to represent him on his post-trial motions because a conflict of interest existed.

The evidence showed that on January 26, 1985, at about 7 p.m., Ernestine Roseman (Roseman), age 57, and Cyrus Wooldridge (Wooldridge), age 73, returned to Wooldridge's home after grocery shopping. Roseman was driving Wooldridge's 1978 Buick. They parked, locked the car and activated the burglar alarm. While they were crossing the street, they saw a group of five to seven youths walk towards them. The group encircled them, one pointed a shotgun at them and announced: "[T]his is a stickup. Stand still, if you don't I'll kill you. Give us your money." Roseman saw three handguns and Wooldridge saw one handgun. One of the youths took approximately $65 from Wooldridge's pocket. Roseman's ring, purse containing about $30, and the keys to Wooldridge's car were also taken. The group got into Wooldridge's car and drove away.

The victims immediately phoned the police and gave a description of the car. Wooldridge's car was found parked in a lot within 45 minutes and was kept under surveillance. About an hour later, a group of youths got into the car and drove away. The police followed the car, saw it pull over and observed a female and a child leave the car and walk across the street. Two officers pulled the car over and saw the driver turn and drop a handgun into the back seat of the car as they approached. The officers identified Adams as the driver. After the youths were arrested, a gun and Roseman's cosmetics were recovered from the back seat of the car.

Roseman identified the gun recovered from the car as being similar to one used in the robbery. A shotgun was recovered from another codefendant.

Roseman and Wooldridge viewed separate lineups later that evening at the police station. Wooldridge identified Adams as resembling one of his assailants. Roseman identified Adams and another suspect from the lineup as resembling two of her assailants.

Marcus Skipper, 14 years old, knew the defendant for about four years. He testified that on January 26, 1985, at about 6 p.m., Adams and the codefendants were at his house when one said, "Let's go make some money." The group, including the defendant, left Skipper's house and walked through a field. Skipper testified that one defendant had a shotgun and another had a handgun. The group saw Roseman and Wooldridge, and another defendant announced the stick-up. Skipper testified that he and another youth stood across the street and observed the robbery. He saw one defendant give the car keys to Adams and saw Adams driving the car away from the scene. Shortly thereafter, Skipper saw the group of defendants, including Adams, and was shown the money they had taken from Wooldridge and Roseman.

Defendant's only witness at the trial was Adams' girl friend who testified that she was with Adams that evening. Adams now appeals his convictions and sentence.

I.

Adams' first contention on appeal is that this cause should be remanded for a hearing on whether the State improperly used their peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury under the recent case of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. The trial court made no inquiry into the State's use of peremptory challenges. Illinois law has been clear on this controversial issue. Our supreme court has repeatedly held that a defendant's right to an impartial jury is impaired only when blacks are systematically excluded from the jury in case after case. (People v. Mack (1984), 105 Ill.2d 103, 85 Ill.Dec. 281, 473 N.E.2d 880, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1074, 107 S.Ct. 1266, 94 L.Ed.2d 127; People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill.2d 135, 75 Ill.Dec. 643, 457 N.E.2d 1202, cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 447, 83 L.Ed.2d 372; People v. Davies (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 69 Ill.Dec. 136, 447 N.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 101, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697.) Defendant has presented no evidence that any such practice occurred here.

However, while the defendant's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant need not show that the State has engaged in systematic racial discrimination in jury selection in case after case. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.) Rather, under Batson, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race, and a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination by citing facts concerning jury selection at his own trial. Once a defendant has demonstrated circumstances from which one could infer that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude persons from the jury because of their race, the burden shifts to the State to present a neutral explanation for its conduct. (106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723.) The court declined to rule on the retroactive application of its decision.

Recently, however, in Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, the United States Supreme Court held that the ruling on Batson is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or Federal, pending on direct review or not yet final at the time Batson was decided.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for a hearing on the present record and any additional record to determine whether, under Batson, the prosecutor purposefully discriminated against blacks in the use of peremptory challenges. If the circuit court finds that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated against blacks in exercising peremptory challenges, the court is directed to order a new trial. In the event the circuit court finds that the prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate, the court is directed to affirm the judgment and sentence.

II.

Next, defendant contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no positive identification by the complaining witnesses and he was denied a fair trial by the admission of the identification testimony. Defendant maintains that the identification evidence was used as a substitute for a positive in-court identification to bolster the State's weak accomplice testimony and circumstantial evidence. We find this argument unpersuasive.

When the identity of the accused is at issue, the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even though such testimony is contradicted by the accused, provided that the witness is credible and was able to view the accused under such circumstances as would permit a positive identification. (People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill.2d 564, 578, 10 Ill.Dec. 547, 367 N.E.2d 1313, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 937, 98 S.Ct. 1513, 55 L.Ed.2d 533.) In this case, Roseman and Wooldridge viewed a lineup independently from each other within a short time after the robbery. They both selected Adams as resembling one of their assailants. Roseman testified that although it was dark outside, the area was well-lighted. At trial, both victims identified defendant from a photograph and made in-court identifications. In addition to the identifications, there is meaningful corroboration of defendant's identification and circumstantial evidence of his guilt. The officers and Skipper testified about defendant's participation in the robbery. Defendant was arrested driving the stolen car, and a gun, also identified by the victim, was recovered from the car.

Defendant contends that Skipper was not a credible witness because he agreed to cooperate with the police. Defendant's claim is without merit. Whether accomplice testimony, corroborated or uncorroborated, is a satisfactory basis for convictions goes to the weight of the evidence and is, therefore, within the province of the jury. (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill.2d 346, 349, 5 Ill.Dec. 820, 362 N.E.2d 291.) In this case, Skipper's testimony is strongly corroborated and this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury on questions involving the weight of the evidence and the credibility of all witnesses. People v. Sanders (1st Dist.1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 457, 475, 41 Ill.Dec. 453, 407 N.E.2d 951.

A reviewing court will not reverse a...