People v. Alaire

Citation148 A.D.2d 731,539 N.Y.S.2d 468
PartiesThe PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Michael ALAIRE, Appellant.
Decision Date27 March 1989
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Hayward, Parker & Martens, Middletown (Guy J. Hayward, of counsel), for appellant.

Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty., White Plains (Robert K. Sauer and Maryanne Luciano, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and THOMPSON, RUBIN and SULLIVAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Cowhey, J.), rendered March 13, 1984, convicting him of murder in the second degree, arson in the second degree and assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress statements made by him.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, that branch of defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to the police prior to the administration of Miranda warnings is granted, and a new trial is ordered.

In the early morning hours of July 9, 1982, a fire broke out in a cottage housing 14 children, including the defendant, at the Leake and Watts Children's Home (hereinafter the Home), a residential treatment center for emotionally disturbed children. The fire resulted in the death of one resident, and caused serious physical injury to another.

The defendant, who was then 16 years old, had been diagnosed a chronic schizophrenic, with a borderline-retarded intelligence quotient in the lowest 6% of the population. He had not progressed beyond the third grade level and possessed only a rudimentary knowledge of the outside world. The police interviewed the defendant on the morning of the fire, but his comments at that time were entirely exculpatory in nature. He explained that he escaped the fire by opening his bedroom door and crawling down the hallway to safety.

On July 14, 1982, after learning from arson investigators that the fire had two points of origin, one in the defendant's room and the other in an adjoining room occupied by a resident called Willie, Detective Ryan, who had been assigned to investigate the case, sought and obtained permission of officials at the Home to take both the defendant and Willie to the station house for questioning. The two boys, accompanied by Lynn Millheiser, an administrator of the Home, were driven to the station house by two detectives. Millheiser instructed the youths to cooperate with the police in discussing the events on the night of the fire. Although Detective Ryan explained his reasons for wanting to speak with the youths on the way to the station house, he did not ask whether they had voluntarily agreed to come to headquarters or tell them that they did not have to come to headquarters.

Upon his arrival at the precinct, the defendant was taken into the detective squad room, while Willie was directed to wait in a separate office. As he was escorted into the squad room, the defendant observed several detectives, some of whom were armed, walking around. Millheiser and three officers were present during the defendant's interview which lasted for about one and one-half hours. At no time during the course of the interview was the defendant administered Miranda warnings, advised that he might refuse to answer questions, or that he was free to leave. The questioning was conducted primarily by Detective Ryan with the assistance of Millheiser, who rephrased questions which the defendant was unable to understand.

For over an hour, the defendant adhered to the exculpatory version of the events which he had previously related to the police on the morning of the fire, repeatedly stating that he had observed flames only in the hallway and outside of his window. Nevertheless, Detective Ryan persisted in questioning the defendant because he believed that the defendant was not being truthful in omitting reference to the fact that there had been a fire in his room. As the interview progressed, the defendant evinced a clear awareness of his status as a suspect, demonstrated by a number of hypothetical questions he raised concerning the fate of the arsonist. Specifically, the defendant asked whether the arsonist would have to go to jail and was assured by Detective Ryan that "everything would be done to help the person responsible". The defendant also asked whether Detective Ryan believed that he had set the fire and noted that he sometimes did things, like walking in his sleep, without realizing it. The defendant repeatedly stated that he was unhappy at the Home and asked whether he would be returned there if he set the fire. Millheiser indicated that she would make inquiry about alternate living arrangements. The defendant then asked whether he would be considered responsible for the murder of the youth who died in the fire, if in fact he had set the fire. Both Millheiser and Detective Ryan assured him that the person who set the fire did not intend to kill anyone, but that it was an accident.

At approximately 1:00 P.M., the defendant stated that he was hungry. Sergeant Bianco left the room to purchase lunch, closing the door behind him, while Detective Ryan continued the questioning. Ryan then confronted the defendant with the fact that there had been two fires in the cottage that morning and asked him to attempt to recall whether he had observed a fire in his room. The defendant denied the presence of a fire in his room, asserted that the fire had started in Willie's room, and again asked Detective Ryan whether he was a suspect. Detective Ryan responded that he "thought that anyone who was upset enough and who wanted to draw attention to himself could possibly start a fire without intending to hurt anyone else" and urged him to "get it off his chest". The defendant then stated: "I didn't mean to hurt anybody". Detective Ryan bluntly asked him if he had set the fire, eliciting the defendant's affirmative response. At that point, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and placed under arrest.

Sometime after the defendant made his statement to Detective Ryan, Joanne Fentor, the social worker assigned to the defendant, arrived at the police station and was taken into the room where the defendant was seated with Millheiser. Fentor had been the defendant's counsellor since he arrived at the Home. When Sergeant Bianco returned with the lunches at about 1:30 P.M., Detective Ryan advised him that the defendant had made admissions and was under arrest. Sergeant Bianco entered the office where the defendant was seated with Fentor and Millheiser, gave them their lunches, and sat at his desk to eat his lunch. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Bianco heard a banging sound. He turned and saw the defendant, who was about four feet away from him banging his fist on the table. Sergeant Bianco then heard the defendant say "I killed George, I killed George by setting the fire".

Millheiser did not recall this incident or statement. She only recalled that the defendant denied any involvement in the incident while speaking to Fentor. Fentor, on the other hand, testified that the defendant did admit his involvement in the fire, but then denied it, saying that he did not mean to hurt George or John, although she did not recall the specific words that he used.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the hearing court erred in denying those branches of his omnibus motion which were to suppress the statements he made during the police interrogation, since, at the time those statements were made, the defendant was in custody and had not received the benefit of preinterrogation warnings as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. We agree. Under the totality of the circumstances presented by this case, we find that the interrogation of the defendant was custodial, since a reasonable person of 16 years of age, innocent of any crime, and in the position of the defendant, would have believed that "his freedom had been infringed upon in a significant way" (see, Matter of Chad L., 131 A.D.2d 760, 761, 517 N.Y.S.2d 58; People v. Bodner, 75 A.D.2d 440, 447, 430 N.Y.S.2d 433). The defendant, along with one other youth, was singled out from among his peers at the Home and removed to the police station by two detectives and an administrator of the Home for the express purpose of interrogation. At the station house, the defendant was separated from his young companion and taken into a room where he was questioned in the presence of several detectives with the active participation of the administrator. The defendant was compelled to repeat his exculpatory version of the facts and repeatedly asked to search his memory for additional details concerning that fateful evening. Even when the defendant announced that he was hungry, the questioning did not cease, nor was he excused. Rather, Bianco indicated that he would bring lunch to the interrogation room and went to purchase food, closing the door behind him. Detective Ryan chose this moment to confront the defendant with the fact that he knew that there had been a fire in defendant's room. The removal of the defendant from his familiar environment to the police station, where he was questioned without respite for more than an hour, most certainly created a coercive atmosphere from the viewpoint of this mentally disturbed and mentally deficient, 16-year-old youth and would have substantially indicated to a reasonable person innocent of any crime, in the defendant's position, that he was a suspect and was not free to simply stop answering questions and leave (see, People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172; People v. Hall, 125 A.D.2d 698, 700, 509 N.Y.S.2d 881).

We cannot accept the People's claim that the defendant was not a suspect and therefore not in custody at the time of the police...

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