People v. Alaniz

• Decision Date: 25 June 1986
• Citation: 182 Cal.App.3d 903,227 Cal.Rptr. 575
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel ALANIZ, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. B016615.

Page 575

227 Cal.Rptr. 575

182 Cal.App.3d 903

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel ALANIZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. B016615.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

June 25, 1986.

Jeffery Kolling, Sepulveda, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Gary R. Hahn, Robert R. Anderson, Supervising Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

YEGAN, Associate Justice. ^*

Daniel Alaniz was convicted by plea of possessing heroin. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350.) Prior thereto, he unsuccessfully brought a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. He appeals contending: "I. There was no compliance with Penal Code section 1531, and non-compliance was not excusable. II. The seizure of the balloon was incident to an illegal arrest."

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the order denying suppression as is required by the familiar rule governing appellate review (e.g., People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, 174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961) but recognize that, where, as here, the facts are undisputed, "... the ultimate responsibility of this court [is] to measure the facts as found by the trier against constitutional standards. [Citation.]" (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240.) Prior to the police procedures here challenged, appellant had demonstrated that he was a thorn in the side of "law enforcement" and the justice system as well. Apparently not content with Fourth Amendment principles, appellant and his cohorts conspired to create their own "do-it-yourself" exclusionary rule. On three separate occasions, appellant unequivocally demonstrated that he had no intention of ever complying with lawful orders given by the police and in fact was committed to the destruction of evidence. On a fourth occasion, a cohort in appellant's residence displayed similar tendencies. ¹

On March 23, 1982, Detective John Ellis of the Ventura County Sheriff's office was attempting to arrest appellant when he dropped heroin to the ground, allowing another suspect to destroy it.

On November 8, 1983, Detective Gary Marshall went to appellant's residence to execute search terms as a condition of probation previously granted. After the police announced their presence and entered, they found appellant attempting to flush heroin-filled balloons down a toilet.

On January 17, 1985, narcotics officers were commanded to search appellant's residence by a magistrate. After complying with Penal Code section 1531 and giving the occupants over 30 seconds to allow peaceful entry, the officers forced entry. They had difficulty in doing so because appellant was pushing the door the opposite way. Inside the residence one of his cohorts was attempting to swallow 23 heroin-filled balloons.

On March 7, 1985, with yet another search warrant for appellant's residence, another person at appellant's residence attempted to physically prevent the police from entering. The police immediately entered and found heroin in the bathroom sink before it could be destroyed.

With this history in mind, Detective Marshall and fellow officers went to appellant's residence to execute yet another search warrant on April 30, 1985. Approximately 20 minutes before executing it, an informant advised Marshall that appellant possessed an automatic pistol.

Keenly aware of appellant's penchant for flushing toilets even when nature did not call, the officers immediately forced entry after first loudly announcing, " 'Sheriff's Department. We have a search warrant.' " When asked why he did not wait a reasonable time before forcing entry, Detective Marshall said: "Based on these previously described incidences, my training and experience, both personally with Mr. Alaniz and in general, I believed that Mr. Alaniz would attempt to destroy evidence upon our entry." ²

Detective Marshall's prediction proved correct. He found appellant near a bedroom window looking out. Marshall ordered him to lie down. When appellant refused, Marshall forced him to the ground, handcuffed him, and found a heroin-filled ballon in his hand. When asked why he had "... [taken] Mr. Alaniz to the ground ...," Marshall said: "For reasons of officer safety. It's common practice to do so, and also especially since we had information that he may now be in possession of a firearm."

Appellant's first contention is without merit. In denying the suppression motion, the court said, inter alia, that "... the officer conscientiously and reasonably entertained the belief that the defendant would destroy the evidence." "[W]here officers have obtained particular information which leads them to reasonably conclude that the occupants of an apartment or residence have specifically resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intrusion or have made specific preparations in that regard ... an unannounced entry may be justified." (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 28-29, 76 Cal.Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353; see also People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 877-878, 109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208.) A man's home may be his castle, but it is not a sanctuary for the destruction of evidence.

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