People v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 08 December 2021
• Docket Number: 2019–01160,Ind. No. 173–18
• Citation: 200 A.D.3d 790,159 N.Y.S.3d 102
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Frank L. ALEXANDER, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

200 A.D.3d 790
159 N.Y.S.3d 102

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Frank L. ALEXANDER, appellant.

2019–01160
Ind. No. 173–18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—November 15, 2021
December 8, 2021

159 N.Y.S.3d 103

Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Anju Alexander of counsel), for appellant.

Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Karla Lato of counsel), for respondent.

CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., BETSY BARROS, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (William J. Condon, J.), rendered January 7, 2019, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him, on the conviction of robbery in the first degree, to a determinate term of imprisonment of 18 years, to be followed by a period of 5 years of postrelease supervision, and on the conviction of robbery in the second degree, to a determinate term of imprisonment of 15 years, to be followed by a period of 5 years of postrelease supervision, with the sentences to run concurrently. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing pursuant to a stipulation in lieu of motions (Mark Cohen, J.), of the suppression of certain of the defendant's statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence imposed on the conviction of robbery in the first degree to a determinate term of imprisonment of 14 years, to be followed by a period of 5 years of postrelease supervision, and reducing the sentence imposed on the conviction of robbery in the second degree to a determinate term of imprisonment of 14 years, to be followed by a period of 5 years of postrelease supervision, with the sentences to run concurrently; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, in connection with an August 2017 gunpoint robbery in a pawn shop located in Melville.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court properly determined that the defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause. "Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed or that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place" ( People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 ). "The legal conclusion is to be made after considering all of the facts and circumstances together. Viewed singly, these may not be persuasive, yet when viewed together the puzzle may fit and probable cause found" ( id. at 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 ). Here, viewed in its totality, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant was one of the two perpetrators

159 N.Y.S.3d 104

of the robbery (see People v. Nerys, 181 A.D.2d 921, 921, 581 N.Y.S.2d 847 ).

Nor did the County Court err in denying suppression of certain statements made by the defendant while in a police vehicle that was in transit to the police station. "An individual taken into law enforcement custody for questioning must be informed of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v. Crawford, 163 A.D.3d 986, 986, 82 N.Y.S.3d 68, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ). While a defendant's statements made in response to police interrogation, or its functional equivalent, are inadmissible in the absence of Miranda warnings (see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 ; People v. Crawford, 163 A.D.3d at 986, 82 N.Y.S.3d 68 ), "volunteered statements, meaning those that are self-generated and made without apparent external cause, are admissible even if the defendant was in custody and unwarned" ( People v. Tavares–Nunez, 87 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 930 N.Y.S.2d 589 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, after the defendant asked the arresting detectives the reason for his arrest, one of the detectives answered that the defendant was the suspect of a robbery committed with an individual named Sykim Johnson, to which the defendant responded that he did not know Sykim Johnson. Because the detective provided a succinct and accurate answer to the defendant's question, the defendant's response to the information provided was not prompted by...