People v. Alotis
Decision Date | 28 January 1964 |
Docket Number | Cr. 7462 |
Citation | 36 Cal.Rptr. 443,60 Cal.2d 698,388 P.2d 675 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 388 P.2d 675 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Geraldine W. ALOTIS, Defendant and Respondent. |
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., William B. McKesson, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood, Robert J. Lord and Harry B. Sondheim, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.
Harold J. Ackerman and William Drake, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court was prohibited from granting probation to defendant under the provisions of section 1203 of the Penal Code. For reasons hereafter stated, we are of the opinion that the trial court had such power, and that its order so providing should be affirmed.
Defendant was charged with assault with the intent to commit murder (Pen.Code, § 217), which is a felony. She pleaded not guilty, and waived a jury trial. During the trial the district attorney, by stipulation, filed an amended information charging, in a second count, assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen.Code, § 245). That section provides, in the alternative, that such offense 'is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding 10 years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine * * * or by both such fine and imprisonment.' Thus the very section creating the crime makes it a felony or misdemeanor, dependent solely upon the sentence imposed.
Defendant pleaded guilty to the second count, and the first count was dismissed. The court, thereupon, sentenced the defendant to one year in the county jail and suspended that sentence. After the court had thus, by its sentence, determined that the offense was a misdemeanor, it imposed three years probation, subject to conditions. The district attorney moved to vacate the probation order, admitting that the court could have sentenced defendant to one day in the county jail, and/or imposed a one dollar fine, but contended that the court had no power to grant probation under the facts of this case. The record shows that had the trial court believed it had no power to grant probation it would have imposed a one-day sentence, but since it believed it had such power, determined that it would be best for defendant and for society if that power were exercised. It denied the motion to vacate. The People appeal, contending that, since defendant was admittedly armed with a deadly weapon, the trial court was without power to grant probation under the terms of section 1203 of the Penal Code.
The record shows that defendant is the sister-in-law of the victim of the assault, whose name is Christ Alotis. Christ is the eldest of several brothers, and was the dominant and dominating member of that family. A few months after the marriage of defendant to Christ's brother, Christ forcibly seduced her. Thereafter, an intimate relationship developed between Christ and defendant. The defendant did not discourage this relationship (it continued for some 14 years), until she discovered that Christ was involved with several other women. In order to 'settle' her relationship with him defendant arranged a meeting with Christ at a motel. She armed herself with a loaded gun, which she claimed was necessary because it was the only was to make Christ 'just sit still long enough to give me a yes or no.' It is quite apparent that Christ had fully intimidated defendant.
In the motel room defendant stayed in a corner of the room holding the gun, and Christ sat on the bed drinking vodka. They carried on an apparently calm discussion for over an hour when, according to defendant's uncontradicted testimony, Christ took off his belt, made a crude and highly insulting remark to her, and began to move threateningly toward her. She fired a single shot past him into the headboard, but Christ continued to move toward her, and in the ensuing struggle Christ was shot five times. Christ's wounds were at widely scattered points on his body. Defendant sustained various bruises in the struggle.
Defendant immediately professed regret at what she had done. Christ, badly injured but coherent, ordered defendant to clean up the motel room and to drive him to a hospital. In order, apparently, to protect defendant, Christ entered the hospital alone and told defendant to leave.
Both the victim and defendant's husband candidly admitted to the probation officer that they were the ones really responsible for what had occurred. It is apparent that Christ was an uncooperative prosecution witness. He was not called at the trial, and was called during the preliminary hearing only to answer several questions concerning ownership of a certain car.
The trial court requested a probation report. The probation officer recommended against probation. The trial judge refused to follow the recommendation, imposed the light sentence, and granted probation. The trial court's reasons for imposing the light sentence and for granting probation were stated as follows:
The judge then sentenced her to one year in the county jail, suspended that sentence, and then granted probation. Before granting probation the court orally found that the gun with which defendant was shot five times 'was not used as a deadly weapon,' apparently believing that this finding was sufficient to take the case out of section 1203 of the Penal Code.
That section provides (numbers have been placed in front of each paragraph for ready reference):
(1)
(2) 'In every misdemeanor case, the court may, at its option refer the matter to the probation officer for investigation and report or summarily deny probation or summarily grant probation.'
(3) 'The Legislature hereby expresses the policy of the people of the State of California to be that, except in unusual cases where the interest of justice demands a departure from the declared policy, no judge shall grant probation to any person who shall have been convicted of robbery, burglary or arson, and who at the time of the perpetration of said crime or any of them or at the time of his arrest was himself armed with a deadly weapon (unless at the time he had a lawful right to carry the same), nor to a defendant who used or attempted to use a deadly weapon upon a human being in connection with the perpetration of the crime of which he was convicted, nor to one who in the...
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