People v. Am. Contractors Indem. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | E074469 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY CO., Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. PSC1907297. Burke Strunsky, Judge.
Law Office of John Rorabaugh, John Mark Rorabaugh and Crystal L Rorabaugh for Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, Tiffany North, Kelly A Moran and Eric L. Stopher, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FIELDS J.
Defendant and appellant American Contractors Indemnity Co. (surety) executed a bail bond to secure the release from custody of criminal defendant Pedro Castellanosleon (P.C.), promising to guarantee P.C.'s appearance in court or pay the $100, 000 bail amount. When P.C. failed to appear, the bond was ordered forfeited, and summary judgment was entered against surety on the bond. Surety moved to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 (section 473) on the ground the trial court “lacked jurisdiction to enter a summary judgment.” The trial court denied the motion, and surety appeals from the order denying its motion to set aside the judgment.
On appeal, surety advances various arguments directed at alleged error in the underlying bail proceedings and contractual grounds that purportedly entitle it to set aside the underlying forfeiture, but it offers no explanation why any of these errors render the subsequently entered judgment subject to being set aside under section 473. In the absence of any argument directed at error in the actual order subject of this appeal, we affirm the order.
In September 2017, the People charged P.C. in a criminal complaint, and the trial court set bail in the amount of $100, 000, based upon the charged offense, without an inquiry into P.C.'s ability to pay.
In July 2017, Bretz Bail Bonds, an agent for surety, executed a bail bond. In exchange for the People's release of P.C. from custody, surety agreed to pay $100, 000, if P.C. failed to appear as required by order of the court, and further agreed that judgment could be summarily entered against it under such circumstances.
On September 10, 2018, when P.C. failed to make a required court appearance, the trial court ordered bail forfeited, and a notice of forfeiture was mailed to the parties. Surety sought an extension of time to seek vacation of the forfeiture and exoneration of the bond pursuant to Penal Code section 1305.4, and it was granted an extension until October 7, 2019. The record suggests, at some point, surety filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond but withdrew the motion prior to the hearing.[1] The trial court entered summary judgment on the bond on October 8, 2019, and the notice of entry of judgment was mailed to the parties the following day.
On October 25, 2019, surety filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to section 473. Surety argued the underlying bond was void because the bail amount was set without consideration of P.C.'s ability to pay in violation of P.C.'s constitutional rights. In its reply to the People's opposition, surety injected an additional argument that the underlying bail bond constituted an unenforceable contract because it was unconscionable. However, surety did not explain why either of these arguments would constitute grounds for setting aside a judgment under the provisions of section 473.
On November 22, 2019, the trial court called the matter for hearing. No parties appeared to offer oral argument on the motion, and the trial court denied surety's motion. Surety appeals solely from the order denying its motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to section 473.
“ ” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 405, 411 (Financial Casualty 2021).)
When a bond is forfeited, Penal Code section 1305 generally provides an exoneration period of 180 days within which an interested party may seek to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond for a variety of reasons. (Pen. Code, § 1305.) The exoneration period may be extended at the discretion of the court for a time not exceeding an additional 180 days. (Pen. Code, § 1305.4.)
However, after the exoneration period has lapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the trial court is mandated by statute to enter summary judgment in the amount of the bond plus costs. (Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (a); County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg National Ins. Co. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 944, 950, 954 (County of Los Angeles).) Entry of summary judgment in this context is (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1047.)
As a preliminary matter, we are required to clarify the scope of our review. “While a notice of appeal must be liberally construed, it is the notice of appeal which defines the scope of the appeal by identifying the particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967.) “ ‘ “Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from”' ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75), and we lack jurisdiction to consider alleged errors in the trial court proceedings that fall outside the scope of the order identified in the notice of appeal (see Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 564, 580 [appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider challenge to rulings not part of order identified in notice of appeal]).
On appeal, surety advances several arguments directed at the validity of the underlying bond or forfeiture. However, the only order identified in surety's notice of appeal is the trial court's order denying its motion to vacate the judgment. Surety did not appeal from the bail-setting order, the order declaring forfeiture, any order pertaining to a motion to set aside the underlying forfeiture, [2] or the judgment. Thus, the scope of this appeal is limited to consideration of error in the trial court's denial of surety's motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to section 473. Surety is not entitled to use this appeal as an open platform to raise claims of error with respect to other orders or the judgment.
We acknowledge that, generally, “ ‘[t]he nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it' ” (see Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 193), and that surety attempted to use its motion in the trial court to advance arguments related to vacating the underlying forfeiture. Surety's notice of motion explicitly stated the motion was made “on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a summary judgment” and, as a result, the judgment should be set aside under section 473. But, it proceeded to argue its motion as if it were a motion to vacate forfeiture, without any effort to explain why the purported reasons that might have entitled surety to vacation of the forfeiture should have entitled surety to vacation of a subsequently entered judgment under section 473.[3] However, as we explain, surety's motion here cannot be deemed a motion to vacate the underlying forfeiture to expand the issues reviewable on appeal. This is because, by the time surety filed its motion in the trial court, it was statutorily barred from seeking vacation of the forfeiture; and the trial court was equally without jurisdiction to consider such a motion.
“[A] trial court may not vacate the forfeiture of a bond on a theory the surety did not assert and did not support with evidence during the appearance period.” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 863, 873.) Once the statutory time to set aside a forfeiture has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the trial court is mandated by statute to enter summary judgment. (Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (a); People v. Western Ins. Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1030.) Given this statutory mandate, “[a]fter the exoneration period expires-and no timely filed motion to vacate forfeiture or extend the exoneration period is pending-the court lacks jurisdiction to do anything but enter summary judgment.” (County of Los Angeles, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 954; see People v. Lexington National Ins. Co. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 370, 373 [].)
Thus regardless of surety's intent, its motion to vacate the subsequently entered judgment could only be granted based upon recognized grounds for vacating a judgment and could not have been used to attack the underlying forfeiture. The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301 is...
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