People v. Anderson
| Docket Number | B320367 |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2023 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEOPOLD ANDERSON, JR., Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA081797 Emily J. Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan L. Ferguson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey Senior Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Leopold Anderson, Jr. (defendant) appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm that underlies his conviction for being a felon in possession (Pen. Code § 29800, subd. (a)(1)).[1] Because we conclude that the denial was correct, we affirm.
A little before 8 p.m. on July 9, 2021, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department deputies responded to a report of domestic violence and pulled up to a residence in Palmdale, California. When they arrived, defendant was in the backseat of a car parked at the residence. He had scratches on his face. The responding deputies detained defendant, placed him in handcuffs, and read him his Miranda rights. Defendant agreed to talk, but denied hitting his girlfriend. The deputies placed defendant in the rear seat of their patrol car.
The deputies then spoke with Qiana Crawford (Crawford) on the porch of the residence. The deputies were wearing bodycams, so their interactions were recorded.
In response to questions, Crawford reported that she and defendant had been "together" for 20 years and had five children in common (four of whom were still minors); that defendant "had been drinking"; that he said offensive things to "push[ her] buttons"; that they "got in each other's faces"; that defendant pushed Crawford and she pushed defendant back; that defendant then "socked" Crawford five or six times; and that she "probably" scratched his face during the incident.
The deputy who interviewed Crawford asked if there were any "firearms in the house." Crawford's answers changed over time: She initially said, "I don't know"; then she said defendant "has them, but . . . he hasn't been living here for a while"; and then she said there was a gun "[m]aybe [in] the hall closet," which she explained is "where he's been known to keep it." When the deputy looped back to this topic a few minutes later by asking, "How many firearms are in th[e] house?" Crawford started to go into the house to retrieve them before the deputy interjected, Then they had the following exchange:
[Deputy]: "Do you want to walk us in to retrieve that gun that does not belong to you [and belongs to defendant]?"
[Crawford]: "I don't know if there's one in there is what I'm saying" ...
[Deputy]: "So are we able to retrieve that firearm then with your consent?"
[Crawford]: "If there's one in here, yeah."
The deputy offered Crawford a written consent to search form, but she said she needed to get her glasses from inside the house. When she told the deputies that she needed to go back into the house to retrieve them, the deputy said, "We'll go in with you."
Crawford then walked into the house with the deputies behind her. She "le[d] the way" and "made a beeline" to the hall closet, where she explained, Crawford opened the closet door and pulled down a box; when the box tipped, out tumbled a Colt .45 handgun from inside a bag.
The deputy subsequently asked Crawford again to sign the written consent form. The deputy reminded Crawford that they had followed her into the house so she could get her glasses, but she directed them to the hall closet. The deputy explained that she was "under no pressure" to sign the form. Although Crawford evinced some "hesiten[ce]" to sign, she ultimately did so and went on to tell the deputies that defendant had put the gun into the hall closet "[that] morning" after he "clean[ed] it."
The People charged defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and alleged his 2011 burglary conviction and 2006 possession of an illegal weapon conviction as the prior convictions.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the entry into the home, the search of the home, and the firearm. At the evidentiary hearing, the People stipulated that the search of Crawford's residence was conducted without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning, as pertinent here, that (1) "there was an oral consent even before the written consent to search the house when [Crawford] opened up the closet door and showed them the gun," and (2) the deputies acted "reasonabl[y]" in "following her" back into the house for "officer safety" reasons.
Defendant subsequently entered a no contest plea to the felon-in-possession count, and was sentenced to two years of formal probation.
This timely appeal followed.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We independently review such denials, but review subsidiary questions of fact-including whether a person has consented to a search-for substantial evidence. (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212 [de novo]; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924 [applying substantial evidence review to finding of consent]; People v. Rowland (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109 [setting forth this "well established" standard of appellate review].)
(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 (Ovieda).) "'[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness."'" (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 381.) A defendant may move to suppress "any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result" of an unreasonable search or seizure. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Where, as here, a search is conducted without a warrant, it is deemed to be "'"unreasonable"'" "'"per se"'" and the People bear the burden of proving that one or more exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. (Ovieda, at p. 1041.) Consent is just such an exception. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219 (Schneckloth).) Although the home is the epicenter of Fourth Amendment privacy (Oliver v. United States (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 178; Kyllo v. United States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, 31), there is no Fourth Amendment violation if a person voluntarily gives their consent for law enforcement officers to enter and to conduct a search. Consent to enter or to search "may be express or implied." (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 990, overruled on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; United States v. Turbyfill (8th Cir. 1975) 525 F.2d 57, 59 [].) "Words may imply consent as well as express it." (People v. Superior Court (Henry) 41 Cal.App.3d 636, 639 (Henry).) So can conduct, although consent "may not be implied merely from a person's failure to object to [entry or a search]." (People v. Timms (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 86, 90; People v. Nelson (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1209, 1215; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991, 995 [], superseded on other grounds by constitutional amendment, as stated in People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 116-117.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Crawford consented to the deputies' entry into her residence and their search of the hall closet for the firearm. Although Crawford initially equivocated on whether there was a gun in the house, she eventually admitted that "maybe" there is a gun "in the hall closet"; when asked by the deputies if they were "able to retrieve that firearm . . . with [her] consent," Crawford responded, "If there's one in here, yeah." She then entered the house with the deputies in tow with the initial plan to get her reading glasses, but she changed her mind and made a "beeline" for the hall closet. And once at the closet, Crawford told the deputies, "you're free to take the stuff out." That is when the gun tumbled out of the closet. This sequence of events constitutes substantial evidence that Crawford implicitly consented to the deputies entering her residence and searching the closet. (Accord, Henry, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at pp. 638-640 [defendant said a gun was located in a drawer and that she would "go with" officer and "show" officer where gun was located; although defendant was taken directly to police station, officers had consent to go in alone and search dresser drawer]; People v. Wright (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 35, 40-41 []; People v. Smith (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 572, 575, 577 ...
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