People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 30 June 1976
• Docket Number: Cr. 2159
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.3d 831,131 Cal.Rptr. 104
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Willie Peter ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 104

131 Cal.Rptr. 104

59 Cal.App.3d 831

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Willie Peter ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 2159.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

June 30, 1976.

Allen R. Crown, Concord, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eddie T. Keller and Joel Carey, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

GEO. A. BROWN, Presiding Justice.

Upon appellant's pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of murder (Pen.Code, § 187), the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found him guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and sane at the time of the commission of the offense. He was sentenced to state prison.

The offense occurred on January 26, 1971. The three-week trial at which he was convicted did not commence until June 3, 1974. The reason for the long delay was appellant's interim commitments to Atascadero State Hospital and to Patton State Hospital for treatment as a mental patient.

Though appellant did not expressly admit that he shot and killed the victim, the evidence was overwhelming that he had done so, his principal defenses being diminished capacity due to mental defect and the ingestion of drugs and alcohol and that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. It is apparent that the trial judge found appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder based upon the defense of diminished capacity. Six doctors (five psychiatrists and one psychologist) testified at the guilt phase of the trial; all of them concluded appellant suffered diminished capacity, but they did not agree upon the degree or extent of his impairment.

On the sanity phase, two of the psychiatrists concluded appellant was legally sane at the time of the offense, while three psychiatrists and one psychologist testified in substance that appellant was suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, that he had 'dull normal' intelligence, and that he was incapable of harboring malice aforethought, of forming the requisite intent for murder or of appreciating the nature and quality of his act or of distinguishing right from wrong. Accordingly, the latter four concluded that he was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

While there is some conflict in the record regarding the details of the events which preceded and surrounded the killing, is sum the record shows that appellant spent the night of January 25, 1971, at the apartment of Lily Timmons (also known as Lily Maiden) on Brundage Lane in Bakersfield. It appears he had not had much, if any, sleep for a couple of days and had been ingesting alcohol and drugs. Shortly after 9 a.m. on the morning of January 26, 1971, Leroy Shiver gave appellant a ride to a bank where he cashed a check and then returned to Lily Timmons' apartment. As they arrived, another car was leaving the apartment. 'Buddy' Wilkins, the victim, was driving and Travis Williams was a passenger. Appellant wanted to talk to Williams so he got out of Shiver's car and walked to Wilkins' car and approached Williams, Wilkins became annoyed over the delay and engaged appellant in an argument during which Wilkins made a move as if reaching for a weapon under the seat. Appellant told Wilkins that 'if he came up with anything he better use it.' Both man made threats to each other. No weapons were found. Shiver left and appellant went into Lily's apartment.

Sometime later that morning a neighbor, Shirley Hines, came to Lily's apartment and appellant was introduced to her as Lily's new boyfriend. Wilkins came into the apartment, gave Lily some money to buy liquor, argued with Lily, and then left. Appellant was still there but no words were exchanged between him and Wilkins. Wilkins left. He said he didn't feel well and was going to take a nap.

A little later appellant went to Williams' apartment where he talked to Williams' wife, Seabelle, and told her he was 'going to blow the mother-fucker's ass off' (referring to Wilkins).

Later, the same day, appellant along with Lily, Claudia Docks, JoAnne Jones and Vera Jones, went to Walter Sanders' place where appellant purchased a .12 gauge pump shotgun from Sanders which he had sold to Sanders a day or two before.

The group then went to Dale Wood's pool hall where they met Shiver and Willie Burton. Appellant, while there, told Shiver and Burton that he was going to beat up a guy who lived on Cottonwood Road and wanted Burton and Shiver to go with him. They left the pool hall in Burton's car and followed the women in the other car to Claudia Docks' house. About 30--40 minutes later Shiver, Burton, Vera Jones and Lily went to Lily's apartment in Burton's car along with appellant. On arrival all got out of the car and everyone, except appellant, started for Lily's apartment. Appellant went to Wilkins' apartment with his shotgun.

Appellant kicked in Wilkins' apartment door and said something like, 'You think you can't die? I am going to blow your mother-fucking ass away.' A shot was heard and a 'thud, real hard against the floor.' Appellant then jumped into Burton's car along with Burton and Shiver, who drove. At least three persons witnessed and heard these events. Lily ran out of her apartment shouting, 'he shot Buddy,' and called the police.

As they drove away appellant admitted to Burton and Shiver that he 'shot the guy.' Burton took the gun and left it at his house. About 6 or 7 p.m. appellant was dropped off on King Street. He was located and arrested that evening.

Appellant, after being advised of his Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) rights, agreed to give a statement to the police, in which he admitted the shooting and took the position that he acted in self-defense.

At the police station that evening, after again being advised of his Miranda rights, appellant gave a statement to the police which was recorded. He stated that the shooting had been in self-defense; that on several occasions the victim had pulled a gun on him, including twice earlier the same day, once that morning in the drive-way by the two cars and later the same morning at Lily's apartment; that he believed Wilkins was trying to 'beaugard' his girlfriend, Lily; that he went over to Wilkins' apartment and pushed in the door; that as he did so, Wilkins 'picked up his shotgun'; that the two men struggled, the gun went off, and Wilkins fell; that he (appellant) panicked and ran.

At the trial appellant, testifying in his own behalf, acknowledged a vague recollection of getting out of a car with a gun on the day in question and of going to someone's apartment and shooting him. At the same time he told of delusions he saw such as people coming at him and threatening him. He told of a long drug history starting with glue suffing even before he entered the military service, of taking a substantial number of 'whites' every day, of his experience and injuries in the military service, of having been the victim of a shotgun and handgun shooting some months before the crime charged, and of his experience since the crime in Atascadero and Patton State Hospitals. He testified he was only somewhat friendly with Lily and denied knowing the victim, Wilkins, at all.

Appellant raises three claims of error which we shall consider seriatim.

THE ERRONEOUS COMMITMENT UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION 1026

The cause was first set for trial on April 19, 1971, which date was continued in order to have a present sanity hearing. On May 4, 1971, appellant was found not presently sane and committed to Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1370. ¹ On March 28, 1971, the medical director of Atascadero State Hospital certified appellant as presently sane (see Pen.Code, § 1372) and he was returned to court for trial.

The cause was again set for trial on June 26, 1972, but on May 2, 1972, Judge John M. Nairn adjourned the proceedings for the purpose of further examination and hearing to determine whether or not appellant was presently sane. The order appointing two psychiatrists expressly stated the psychiatrists were 'appointed to examine defendant and report whether or not defendant Is presently sane.' (Emphasis added.) As this point, the first error occurred. The doctors each stated in the introductory paragraph of their respective reports that the examination and report was 'in accordance with Section 1027 of the Penal Code' ² The reports themselves, however, focus upon the question of appellant's present sanity only, and each concludes in the classic definition of present sanity (see fn. 1, Ante) that appellant was Not presently sane. Moreover, at the sanity hearing on May 11, 1972, Judge Nairn said, '. . . this is the time set for the hearing on the medical examiners' reports who heretofore made an examination provided for by Section 1027 ³ of the Penal Code, and that is to determine the Defendant's sanity at this time.' (Emphasis added.) During the same colloquy defense counsel admitted that the psychiatrists determined the question of present sanity. In the court's order following that colloquy the court said, 'It will be the order and judgment of this court, based upon reports of Dr. Samler and Dr. Badgley, that the defendant, Willie Peterson Anderson, Is incompetent at this time, and he is remanded to . . . custody. . . .' (Emphasis ours.)

Notwithstanding the above facts and the judicial determination of present sanity made by Judge Nairn, the forms which were used and the commitment itself indicated that the commitment was made pursuant to Penal Code sections 1026 and 1027. Thus the form minute order by way of the boxes which were checked indicated that the medical reports of the examining physicians, Doctors Samler and Badgley, had been for the purpose of determining ap...