People v. Andujar

• Decision Date: 24 October 2017
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John ANDUJAR, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

30 N.Y.3d 160

88 N.E.3d 309

66 N.Y.S.3d 151

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.John ANDUJAR, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 24, 2017.

Seymour W. James, Jr., The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Karen M. Kalikow and Cheryl Williams of counsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Catherine M. Reno and Nancy D. Killian of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RIVERA, J.

Defendant, a tow truck operator, was charged under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 397, which provides,

"[a] person, not a police officer or peace officer, acting pursuant to his special duties, who equips a motor vehicle with a radio receiving set capable of receiving signals on the frequencies allocated for police use or knowingly uses a motor vehicle so equipped ... without having first secured a permit so to do ... is guilty of a misdemeanor" ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 397 ).

This case presents a discrete statutory construction question regarding whether the statute's prohibition on equipping a motor vehicle with a police radio scanner, or knowingly using a vehicle so equipped, applies in the case of a freestanding device found on a defendant driver's person. We conclude the statute does not require that the prohibited device be physically attached to the motor vehicle.

The initial charging instrument alleged that while the deponent officer was "responding to a radio call of a motor vehicle accident ... he observed defendant seated behind the driver's seat and operating" a pickup truck bearing the name of a tow truck company. The officer claimed that defendant stated, "I received a radio call for an off duty officer in an accident." The officer "observed defendant to have on his person, inside his front left jacket pocket, one (1) scanner, which was on and receving signals on the frequencies allocated for police use.... [D]efendant could not produce a permit to operate and or possess said scanning device." The prosecution subsequently filed a superseding accusatory instrument which added that the officer had been trained in radio receivers capable of receiving police frequencies, and that when he turned on the receiver he heard frequencies from the particular police precincts, as indicated on the receiver's display panel.

Criminal Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that the superseding information lacked allegations that the motor vehicle was equipped with the scanner, as there were "no allegations that the scanner was specifically prepared to be used with a vehicle, either by having a particular power cord or otherwise." The Appellate Term reversed, concluding that the accusatory instrument was sufficient for pleading purposes because the factual allegations were adequate to put defendant on notice of the charge and that the statute does not require the scanner to be attached to or otherwise installed in the motor vehicle ( People v. Andujar, 49 Misc.3d 36, 37–38, 18 N.Y.S.3d 259 [App.Term, 1st Dept. 2015] ). According to the court, because "the scanner was in defendant's jacket pocket, where it could be accessed and operated in the vehicle, within seconds, the accusatory instrument was sufficient for pleading purposes, to satisfy the ‘equips a motor vehicle’ element of the charge" ( id. at 38, 18 N.Y.S.3d 259 ). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal ( People v. Andujar, 26 N.Y.3d 1085, 23 N.Y.S.3d 642, 44 N.E.3d 940 [2015] ).

Our analysis begins with the language of the statute. Neither the Vehicle and Traffic Law nor the Penal Law defines "equips" or any derivation of that word. Absent a statutory definition "we must give the term its ‘ordinary’ and ‘commonly understood’ meaning" ( People v. Ocasio, 28 N.Y.3d 178, 181, 43 N.Y.S.3d 228, 65 N.E.3d 1263 [2016], citing People v. Versaggi, 83 N.Y.2d 123, 129, 608 N.Y.S.2d 155, 629 N.E.2d 1034 [1994] ; see People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247, 958 N.Y.S.2d 660, 982 N.E.2d 580 [2012] ; People v. Quinto, 18 N.Y.3d 409, 417, 941 N.Y.S.2d 8, 964 N.E.2d 379 [2012] ). To that end, "[i]n determining the meaning of statutory language, we ‘have regarded dictionary definitions as useful guideposts' " ( Ocasio, 28 N.Y.3d at 181, 43 N.Y.S.3d 228, 65 N.E.3d 1263, quoting Yaniveth R. v. LTD Realty Co., 27 N.Y.3d 186, 192, 32 N.Y.S.3d 10, 51 N.E.3d 521 [2016] ).

A review of recent sources and those available at the time the statute was enacted in 1933 indicates that "equips" does not necessitate physical attachment or a special adaptation. For example, Merriam–Webster classifies "equip" as a transitive verb defined as, "to furnish for service or action by appropriate provisioning," or "to make ready" (Merriam–Webster Collegiate Dictionary [10th ed. 1997] ).¹ The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines the word as "to furnish or provide with whatever is needed for use or for any undertaking; fit out, as a ship or army" (2d ed. 1987). Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines it as "to provide with what is necessary, useful, or appropriate" or "to make ready or competent for service or action or against a need" (1981).² This definition has remained largely unchanged in Webster's since at least 1913. The definition in Black's Law Dictionary is nearly identical, providing that the word means, "[t]o furnish for service or against a need or exigency; to fit out; to supply with whatever is necessary for efficient action" (10th ed. 2014 [the definition from the 1951 edition is nearly identical] ).

Under these definitions "equip" means to provide something with a particular feature or ability. None states or implies any need for the object's physical attachment to the thing equipped. To the contrary, the essential quality or meaning of the word is the act of outfitting to prepare for the ready, irrespective of whether an item or device has permanent or temporary connection to the object equipped. As the District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded after canvassing dictionaries to determine the "ordinary everyday meaning" of the word "equipped" as used in a federal statute prohibiting certain firearms "equipped" with a silencer, "[w]hat is key to these definitions is not whether items are attached to one another, as urged by defendant, but whether the items stand in a relation one to the other that makes them ready for efficient service to meet a particular need or exigency" ( United States v. Rodriguez, 841 F.Supp. 79, 83 [E.D.N.Y.1994], affd. 53 F.3d 545 [2d Cir.1995], citing People v. Verdino, 78 Misc.2d 719, 721, 357 N.Y.S.2d 769 [Suffolk Dist.Ct.1974] ). Giving "equip" its commonly understood meaning, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 397 applies regardless of whether the prohibited device is physically attached to the motor vehicle, so long as the device is ready for efficient service.

Other sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law use the terms "fastened," "mounted," "affixed," or "attached" in combination with the term "equipped" to describe the physical location of the object in the motor vehicle, which supports our construction of section 397. For example, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (10–a) provides that a motor vehicle must be "equipped with an adjustable side view mirror which shall be affixed to the left outside," and section 375(9) provides that an omnibus must be "equipped with one hand fire extinguisher ... mounted in a place readily accessible for use." If the legislature intended "equip" to mean that the object must be physically attached, the terms "affixed" and "mounted" would be unnecessary. It would have been straightforward enough to draft these sections to read that "the mirror be equipped on the left outside," or that an omnibus must be "equipped with one hand fire extinguisher in a place readily accessible for use." The legislature's word choice illustrates that when the legislature intends the law to encompass a device or object attached to a motor vehicle, it generally uses terms that require a physical connection and reserves the terms "equips" and "equipped" for a broader category of circumstances. Had the legislature only intended to prohibit scanners affixed to or mounted within the motor vehicle, it would have used those specific words.³

This interpretation effectuates the legislative purpose of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 397. "When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ " (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660, 827 N.Y.S.2d 88, 860 N.E.2d 705 [2006], quoting Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 [2000] ). While "the words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's intent," legislative history may also be relevant as an aid to construction of the meaning of words ( Riley, 95 N.Y.2d at 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 ). Contrary to the dissent's assertion, letters in support of the legislation do indeed shed light on the legislative intent (dissenting op. at 170, 66 N.Y.S.3d at 157–58, 88 N.E.3d at 315–16). The bill sought to "make it difficult for criminals to receive [p]olice emergency broadcasts" and " prevent lawbreakers from obtaining police radio information" while operating a motor vehicle (Letter from Syracuse Chief of Police and Letter from Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, Bill Jacket, L. 1933, ch. 405 at 6, 7). The statute addresses the unique harm posed by police scanners used in conjunction with motor vehicles—for instance, in the case of vehicles "equipped with police radios for lookout purposes when crimes are committed," or "tow trucks equipped with police radios for the purpose of securing towing business at [the] scene of automobile accidents" (Letter from Office for Local Government, Bill Jacket, L. 1966, ch. 620 at 11). Overall, there is nothing in the plain language of the statute or the legislative history that suggests the...