People v. Aranda, S214116

• Decision Date: 04 April 2019
• Docket Number: S214116
• Citation: 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 150,437 P.3d 845,6 Cal.5th 1077
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brian Michael ARANDA, Defendant and Respondent.

6 Cal.5th 1077
437 P.3d 845
245 Cal.Rptr.3d 150

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Brian Michael ARANDA, Defendant and Respondent.

S214116

Supreme Court of California.

April 4, 2019

Paul E. Zellerbach, District Attorney, Jeff Van Wagenen, Assistant District Attorney, Elaina Gambera Bentley and Kelli M. Catlett, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Mitchell Keiter as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Blumenthal Law Offices, Virginia M. Blumenthal and Brent F. Romney, Riverside, for Defendant and Respondent.

Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender (Los Angeles), Albert J. Menaster and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

6 Cal.5th 1081

245 Cal.Rptr.3d 152

Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809 ( Stone ) concluded that a court must accept a partial verdict of acquittal as to a charged greater offense when a jury has expressly indicated it has acquitted on that offense but has deadlocked on uncharged lesser included offenses. The question here is whether the Stone rule has been abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blueford v. Arkansas (2012) 566 U.S. 599, 132 S.Ct. 2044, 182 L.Ed.2d 937 ( Blueford ), which concluded that federal double jeopardy principles do not require a court to accept a partial verdict. We conclude the Stone rule survives as

437 P.3d 847

an interpretation of the state Constitution’s double jeopardy clause. The trial court’s failure here to receive a partial acquittal verdict on first degree murder rendered the declaration of a mistrial on that charge without legal necessity. Accordingly, defendant may not be retried on that allegation. As the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion, we affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Evidence was introduced that, on the night of December 1, 2009, defendant received texts from his girlfriend, 15-year-old Alexis C.,¹ asking for help because she feared her father was going to rape her as he had done before. Defendant went to her home and found her asleep in bed with her father. As defendant tried to take her out of the house, the father awakened and a fight

6 Cal.5th 1082

ensued. During that confrontation, defendant fatally stabbed the father with an ice pick he had brought with him.

Defendant was charged with a single count of murder.² At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter.³ The jury received "guilty" verdict forms for each offense and a single "not guilty" form.

On the third day of deliberations, the jury reported discussions had become hostile. After consulting with counsel, the court asked the foreperson "how things are going" and if the court could do anything to assist. The foreperson reported the jury was "at a stalemate" and explained: "So we’ve basically ruled out murder in the first degree. So then we moved to murder in the second degree. ... [¶] So we worked down to voluntary manslaughter, but there’s still a couple that are still stuck on second degree." The foreperson later repeated that some jurors "are stuck on second degree and then went down to

245 Cal.Rptr.3d 153

voluntary," but they were "working through it." Deliberations continued.

The next court day, defense counsel asked the jury be given a "not guilty" verdict form for first degree murder. The prosecutor objected. The foreperson asked to speak with the court and again reported the jury was at an impasse, explaining that one juror "thinks it’s second degree," "[a]nd then we’ve got two that are on the side of voluntary. And then we’ve got nine that are not guilty." Outside the foreperson’s presence, the prosecutor expressed his view that the jury was "hopelessly deadlocked." Defense counsel urged the jury was frustrated but not deadlocked. The court brought the panel into the courtroom to ask if anything would assist them. As they waited for the jury, counsel debated the defense request for a "not guilty" verdict form on first degree murder. The court denied the request, stating: "I don’t want to change horses in midstream. We sent it in a certain way, and to change anything makes it seem like we’re directing them as to which way to think, and I don’t want to do that." After answering some questions about jury instructions, the court ordered the jury to deliberate for the remainder of the day, about 40 minutes. After that time expired, the jury returned, and the foreperson said they were "still at the same spot." The court asked whether "it’s still basically nine to two to one," and the foreperson replied it was. The court concluded the jury was deadlocked and declared a mistrial.

The defense moved to dismiss the first degree murder allegation on double jeopardy grounds. Relying on Stone , defendant argued the court’s failure to

6 Cal.5th 1083

allow the jury to acquit him of first degree murder barred a retrial on that charge. Defendant also argued double jeopardy barred a trial on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as well. The court⁴ ultimately dismissed the first degree

437 P.3d 848

murder charge but declined to dismiss the lesser offenses. The People unsuccessfully sought reconsideration based upon Blueford , which had recently been decided.

The People, represented by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, appealed the dismissal of the first degree murder charge. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We likewise affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background

Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a person may not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This double jeopardy principle bars a second prosecution for the same crime after an acquittal or conviction. ( People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 103-104, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 77, 211 P.3d 584 ( Anderson ).) Even if a jury returns no verdict on a particular charge, retrial is only permitted in limited circumstances. " ‘Retrial after discharge of a jury without "manifest" (in federal terminology) or "legal" necessity violates the protections afforded under both’ the federal and state constitutional double jeopardy clauses." ( People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 298 P.3d 835 ( Carbajal ), quoting People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 425, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512 ( Halvorsen ).) Although "the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict is an instance of ‘manifest necessity’ permitting retrial of the defendant"

245 Cal.Rptr.3d 154

( Anderson , at p. 104, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 77, 211 P.3d 584 ), "granting an unnecessary mistrial bars retrial" under double jeopardy principles ( People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 8, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 514, 64 P.3d 800 ).

Stone held that "the trial court is constitutionally obligated to afford the jury an opportunity to render a partial verdict of acquittal on a greater offense when the jury is deadlocked only on an uncharged lesser included offense. Failure to do so will cause a subsequently declared mistrial to be without legal necessity." ( Stone , supra , 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809.) Stone was charged with a single count of murder. The jury was instructed on, and received guilty verdict forms for, first and second degree murder, and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. It was given a single verdict form

6 Cal.5th 1084

for acquittal on all charges, as well as a verdict form for "justifiable homicide." ( Id . at p. 507, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809.) After seven days of deliberations, the foreman reported in open court that there were no votes for first or second degree murder but various votes for both forms of manslaughter and justifiable homicide. Each juror, in response to court inquiry, stated a belief that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. ( Ibid . ) The court denied defense counsel’s request to accept a partial verdict of acquittal on murder and ordered further deliberations. After another day and a half of deliberations, the foreman again indicated that there were no votes for first or second degree murder and various votes for manslaughter and justifiable homicide. The court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. ( Id . at pp. 508-509, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809.)

Stone reasoned there was no legal necessity for a mistrial as to murder and a partial verdict of acquittal could have been taken. ( Stone , supra , 31 Cal.3d at pp. 514-519, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809.) The court initially observed that, under our statutory scheme, the prosecutor has discretion to separately charge all lesser included offenses (see Pen. Code, § 954 ) or to charge only the greater offense (see Pen. Code, § 1159 ). ( Stone , at...