People v. Arimont

• Decision Date: 30 August 1983
• Citation: 120 Misc.2d 976,467 N.Y.S.2d 24
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. John ARIMONT, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. John HAMILTON, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Leo COOPER, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 24

467 N.Y.S.2d 24

120 Misc.2d 976

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. John ARIMONT, Defendant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. John HAMILTON, Defendant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Leo COOPER, Defendant.

Criminal Court of the City of New York Kings County.

Aug. 30, 1983.

Caesar Cirigliano and Richard Reich, New York City, Barry Goldstein and Lee Cross, Brooklyn, for defendants.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Melinda Pollard, Joseph P. Harkins and Robert Lawless, Brooklyn, of counsel), for plaintiff.

DECISION and ORDER

MICHAEL L. PESCE, Judge.

These three dockets, all motions to dismiss for want of a speedy trial, are the first of many cases whose outcomes turn upon the interpretation given to the case of People v. Colon, 110 Misc.2d 917, 443 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Cr.Ct.N.Y.County 1981), rev'd, 112 Misc.2d 790, 450 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App.Term, 1st Dept.1982), rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d 921, 466 N.Y.S.2d 319, 453 N.E.2d 548, 1983. In Colon, the Court of Appeals upheld the Criminal Court position that the People's failure to convert a misdemeanor complaint to an information within the trial readiness limits set forth by CPL section 30.30 would be charged against them. Violation of these limits mandated dismissal of the case, unless the People were "excused from those deadlines" by the terms of the statute. 110

                Misc.2d at p. 921, 443 N.Y.S.2d 305.   Relying on the principles of People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625, 381 N.Y.S.2d 860, 345 N.E.2d 331 (1976), the court held that the periods of time specifically excluded by subdivision (4) of the statute were not to be subtracted unless those events caused the People's preparation of their case to be delayed.  Id, at p. 921, 443 N.Y.S.2d 305.   The District Attorney's office, as well as the numerous defendants potentially affected by this rule, now await the next step in its implementation, i.e., whether this principle is to be applied retroactively or merely prospectively
                

I FACTS

The three cases decided today involved protracted delays in the filing of the supporting depositions required to convert a misdemeanor complaint to a jurisdictionally sufficient instrument. See, CPL section 170.65(2). In the case of the first defendant, John Arimont, no supporting deposition has ever been filed. Arimont, charged initially with felony assault & possession of a weapon, was arraigned on October 10, 1982, and the charges were finally reduced to misdemeanor status on January 5, 1983. Based on the rules set forth in CPL sections 30.30(1)(b) and (5)(c), the period allowed the People for bringing the case to trial was 90 days from the reduction of the charges (January 5). ¹ A total of 133 days elapsed from that point to the date of this motion, far in excess of statutory limits.

The second defendant, John Hamilton, was initially arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint on November 3, 1982. After a long series of adjournments most of which were granted for the defense to serve motions, a supporting deposition was filed by the People on April 7, 1983. This task took them 155 days, far in excess of the statutory limit of 90 days. (The People's dilemma herein is slightly different than in the other cases decided today, inasmuch as a large portion of the time elapsed might otherwise be excludable if the rule in Colon were not applied on a retroactive basis.)

In the third case, defendant Cooper was arraigned on a felony complaint on February 3, 1983. The charges were reduced to misdemeanor status on February 8. As of July 22, 1983, the date of this motion to dismiss, no supporting deposition had been filed, although 170 days had elapsed. The complaint was finally converted to an information on August 1st, 181 days after speedy trial time began to run. (As in its two companion cases, the outcome of this motion depends upon how the rule enunciated in Colon is applied).

II THE LAW

Reversals and modifications of existing principles of law have often led the U.S. Supreme Court to consider their prospective or retroactive application. Since its 1965 decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, in which the Supreme Court concluded "that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires" retroactive application of changing rules, the courts have attempted to organize an otherwise confusing array of cases into a number of general principles. In a recent decision, the court outlined the manner in which new rules of constitutional or statutory intrepretation would be applied. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), designated The People argue strenuously that it is, in fact, an unexpected development. Such argument is based on their claim that no cases existed on an appellate level automatically charging to the People the time they require to obtain a supporting deposition. The past decisions of the Appellate Term, both First and Second Department, they note, had afforded the People a "reasonable time" within which to convert the misdemeanor complaint to an information, reasoning that a failure to convert did not necessarily impede the People's ability to prepare for trial. See, People v. Callender, 112 Misc.2d 28, 448 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App.Term 1st Dept.1981); People v. Jared, 54 N.Y.2d 761, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1054, 426 N.E.2d 778 (App.Term 2nd Dept.1981), lv. to app. den. 8/31/81 by Wachtler, J.; and the Appellate Term decision in People v. Colon, supra. The Second Department in Jared, in fact, specifically declined to follow the rule of People v. Ryff, 100 Misc.2d 505, 419 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Crim.Ct.Bronx Cty 1979). In Ryff, it was held that the excludable periods set out in CPL section 30.30(4) could not be applied if conversion had not occurred within speedy trial limits, as the People could not be ready for trial as a matter of law. The People submit that they properly relied upon the law as it had been shaped by appellate decisions. In all fairness, they claim, the new standard set forth by the Court of Appeals in Colon should be considered a clear break with precedent and applied prospectively. The defendants argue that the decision in Colon was merely an application of the principles set forth in People v. Sturgis, supra. In that landmark case, the Court of Appeals declined to exclude the period of defendant's absence where the People had not obtained an indictment within the six-month statutory period in which they must declare their readiness to try a felony. The court was of the belief that, as the defendant's absence had not affected their ability to indict, the People could not use it to excuse the delay. The position of the defendants in the cases at bar is that, in Colon, the Court of Appeals merely addressed the same question with regard to misdemeanors as was addressed in Sturgis for a felony. They argue that the Court of Appeals in Colon applied the same reasoning in reinstating the Criminal Court dismissal, noting that the Colon court cited Sturgis as precedent.

                three categories of cases where retroactivity might be in issue.  First, in cases where the Court "merely ... applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations ...", rules set forth in those cases would be applied retroactively.  Id., 102 S.Ct. at 2587.   The same result would occur when the Court determined "that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place", in which case retroactivity merely recognizes that any earlier prosecution or sentence was a nullity.  Id.  It is only where the Court has "expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be 'a [120 Misc.2d 979] clear break with the past' " that its application will be prospective.  Id., citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct.

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