People v. Ryff
| Decision Date | 08 August 1979 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Craig RYFF, Defendant. |
| Court | New York City Court |
Mario Merola, Dist. Atty., by Harry Glick, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bronx County, for the People.
Leon Polsky, The Legal Aid Soc., by Rowan Peter Kirchheimer, New York City, for defendant.
The defendant was arrested on July 13, 1978. He appeared before the Court on a felony complaint, Docket #X822678, charging him with violations of P.L. § 120.25, 205.30, 170.70 & 140.35 (McKinney's 1975). A preliminary hearing was conducted on September 18, 1978, resulting in the reduction of the felony charges to misdemeanor level and the retention of all initial misdemeanor charges.
On April 24, 1979, the defendant filed an omnibus motion which included a motion to dismiss Docket #X822678, with the reduced and retained misdemeanor charges of P.L. § 120.00, 205.30, 170.20 and 140.35 (McKinneys 1975), pursuant to CPL § 170.30 (1)(e) (McKinneys 1971), for failure to grant him a speedy trial within the meaning of the applicable provisions of CPL § 30.30 (McKinney's 1978-1979). This prosecutors readiness rule defines a time matrix, depending on a constellation of variables, in which the people must be prepared for trial.
On May 24, 1979, the people filed an information. Between July 13, 1979 and April 24, 1979 numerous adjournments occurred. Several of these postponements were attributable to the defendant, others to the prosecution, and some unattributable due to the incompleteness of the defense's, people's and court's records.
C.P.L. § 30.30 mandates a literal construction "in favor of the defendant." People v. Wrightstone, 88 Misc.2d 824, 389 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1976). The allegation of actual prejudice to the defendant flowing from the delay is neither necessary nor pertinent to a statutory C.P.L. § 30.30 determination. People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932, 933, 415 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209, 388 N.E.2d 345, 346 (1979), People v. Saunders, 84 Misc.2d 467, 376 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1975). In addition the defendant need not express his readiness to proceed to trial. People v. Hamilton, supra. The gravamen of defendant's argument is quite simply that the People were never procedurally prepared for trial within the mandatory time periods because the office of the D. A. had failed to file a sufficient accusatory instrument as a predicate for prosecution.
An analysis of the issue in this case rests squarely in the procedural framework created by the interplay of C.P.L. §§ 100.10 (1), 170.65, 180.50 (3) and 30.30.
C.P.L. § 100.10 defines the substance, function and limitation of a misdemeanor complaint which was essentially the status of the felony complaint subsequent to the preliminary hearing. A misdemeanor complaint is not designed to support the basis of an actual prosecution unless the defendant knowingly consents to this procedure. At the preliminary hearing the defendant specifically did not waive his statutory right to prosecution by information and so instructed the Court (P. H. minutes p. 81).
Indeed, in the absence of a valid waiver of prosecution by information, a defendant need not even plead to a misdemeanor complaint. The statutory source of defendant's right to compel the state to proceed by information is found in C.P.L. § 100.10 and § 170.65 (1). See People v. Weinberg, 34 N.Y.2d 429, 358 N.Y.S.2d 357, 315 N.E.2d 434 (1974).
Crucial distinction may exist between a misdemeanor complaint and an information. The former, for example, may include hearsay allegations. The function of an information is to provide to the defendant adequate notice of the alleged crime enabling the preparation of a defense and to define carefully the offense charged to preclude reprosecution. People v. McGuire, 5 N.Y.2d 523, 186 N.Y.S.2d 250, 158 N.E.2d 830 (1959).
C.P.L. § 180.50 (3) delineates the three legislatively prescribed methods to convert a misdemeanor complaint which originated as a felony complaint to an information. The twin modalities pertinent to the case at bar are 1. an instruction by the judge to the People to file an information C.P.L. § 180.50 (3) (a) (1) and 2. the conversion by the judge at the hearing of the complaint into an information provided the former is prima facie sufficient to constitute a valid information. C.P.L. § 180.50 (3) (a) (iii). The defense concedes the complaint did not contain hearsay and could have undergone an immediate transformation.
The People argue that the complaint was a priori metamorphosed into an information at the preliminary hearing. The A.D.A. seizes on the phrase "is deemed to have been converted" evidenced in § 170.65 (1). This phrase is ambiguous. It does not define on its face the necessity of an actor, i.e. a judge, to activate the conversion process. The People would have us believe that the transformation assumes a mystical dimension. C.P.L. § 170.65 (1) also does not directly deal with the conversion of a felony complaint but rather with the statutory prerogative of the defendant to plead only to an information or to waive prosecution by information and permit the People to advance on the basis of a complaint. Naturally, if the waiver had occurred the complaint "is deemed" an information pursuant to C.P.L. § 340.10 (McKinney's 1971).
Therefore C.P.L. § 170.65 (1) must be read in the context of C.P.L. § 180.50 (3). Only then is the legislative and statutory scheme crystalline. C.P.L. § 180.50 (3) specifically addresses the modes of conversion of a felony complaint to an information and defines three mechanisms. C.P.L. § 180.50 (3) (a) (iii) indicates the court may convert the complaint by appropriate notation and change on the instrument. This subsection implicitly presupposes an active and conscious conversion by the Judge. At the preliminary hearing the judge did not undertake this action. Although § 170.65 (1) merely states the complaint "is deemed" converted, read in conjunction with § 180.50 (3) (a) (iii) the transformation is not automatic, assuming the sufficiency of the underlying accusatory instrument, but must be actively initiated by the Court.
To hold otherwise would permit C.P.L. § 170.65 (1) to render C.P.L. § 180.50 (3) a virtual nullity in this type of situation and deny a judge the options provided by the latter section. The three alternative mechanisms of conversion would have no impact since a sufficient complaint, irrespective of a judge's order...
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...In this they err because the time must be measured to the date of filing, not execution, of any curing document. People v. Ryff, 100 Misc.2d 505, 509, 419 N.Y.S.2d 845; cf. 100.20).7 Discussion of this issue in no way should be taken as an acceptance of the proposition that any of the excep......
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...for trial in view of the "defective" prosecutorial information filed on March 3rd, 1980. Relying principally on People v. Ryff, 100 Misc.2d 505, 419 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1979) and People v. Phillips, N.Y.L.J. 5/6/81, pp. 11-12, Col. 6 defendant contends that in view of the "defective information" ......
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...the conversion from a misdemeanor complaint to a misdemeanor information is chargeable to the People finds support in People v. Ryff, N.Y.City Cr.Ct., 419 N.Y.S.2d 845. In Ryff, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint in July, 1978. At the conclusion of a preliminary hearing in Se......
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