People v. Arredondo

• Decision Date: 26 February 2016
• Docket Number: H040980
• Citation: 245 Cal.App.4th 186,199 Cal.Rptr.3d 563
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Marcus ARREDONDO, Defendant and Appellant.

245 Cal.App.4th 186

199 Cal.Rptr.3d 563

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Marcus ARREDONDO, Defendant and Appellant.

H040980

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Filed February 26, 2016

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 24, 2016

Sidney S. Hollar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Appellant, Attorney for Defendant and Appellant Marcus ArredondoKamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Karen Z. Bovarnick, Deputy Attorney General, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent The People

RUSHING

, P.J.

Marcus Arredondo pleaded no contest to drunk driving after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test. The chief question in the case is under what circumstances may authorities seize a blood sample from an unconscious person suspected of drunk driving without offending the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court found that a blood extraction was permissible, without a warrant or a showing of exigent circumstances, by virtue of California's "implied consent" law, which declares that one who drives a motor vehicle in this state is "deemed" to consent to blood alcohol testing. We hold that the consent imputed to drivers under such a law cannot by itself justify a seizure without a duly issued warrant. We find no error, however, in the trial court's ruling that the officer here reasonably relied on the statute in seizing defendant's blood without a warrant, bringing the case within the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. On that basis we will affirm the conviction.

BACKGROUND

Testimony at the preliminary hearing established that shortly before 11:00 p.m. on April 29, 2013, defendant drove his Jeep Cherokee away from a social gathering at which he and some of his six passengers had been drinking. One of the passengers testified that after visiting a liquor store, defendant began to "drive crazy," ultimately causing the vehicle to flip over. Three passengers immediately left the scene. At least two of the remaining passengers were injured, one with a brain injury

. Defendant was also injured, and was taken to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center where he was ultimately arrested and where a blood sample was drawn, disclosing a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent. Defendant was unconscious when these events occurred.

Defendant was charged with one felony count of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, causing injury; one felony count of driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent, causing injury; and a misdemeanor count of driving without a license. Several enhancements were charged on the basis of the bodily injuries suffered by two passengers.¹

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless extraction of his blood at the hospital. The prosecutor argued that the extraction was justified by (1) exigent circumstances, (2) statutorily implied consent, (3) the officer's good faith belief that the extraction was lawful in light of longstanding practice under prior caselaw; and (4) good-faith reliance on the implied consent statute.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress it was stipulated that no warrant had been issued. Officer Valverde testified that he had been dispatched to the scene of the accident at 11:05 p.m. to assist officers already there. He arrived at about 11:15 p.m. At least four or five other officers were already questioning potential witnesses, taking measurements, and so on. After Valverde had been on the scene for about 15 minutes, the officer in charge sent him to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center to keep track of defendant. Defendant had not yet been identified as the driver of the Jeep.

Officer Valverde testified that he arrived at the hospital around 11:39 p.m. Defendant was being treated in the trauma room for what were then considered life-threatening injuries. Valverde and another officer, who was there to assist him, stood by while medical personnel worked on defendant in the trauma room for about 45 minutes. During this time Valverde learned from other officers that defendant had been the driver. He was also told that a passenger had been seriously injured and that other passengers said defendant may have been drinking.

Around 12:23 a.m., defendant was transferred out of the trauma center into a room. Valverde testified that he arrested defendant at about 12:30 a.m. "for a felony DUI" based on reports by other officers that "another subject ... had some injuries." When arrested, and throughout the time of Valverde's contact with him, defendant appeared to be unconscious.

After the arrest, Valverde's chief objective was to secure a blood draw. Around 12:30 a.m. he requested that a phlebotomist be dispatched to the hospital for that purpose. The phlebotomist arrived at about 1:05 a.m. Defendant was still unconscious. At this time Officer Valverde executed a form from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) containing admonitions that would ordinarily be read to the arrestee if he or she were conscious. The phlebotomist drew defendant's blood, filled out a form attesting to the regularity of the extraction, and gave the blood to Valverde. He booked it into evidence, thereby completing his assignment in the case.

Officer Valverde testified that it was impossible to conduct a blood test during the 90 minutes following the accident "because of the medical situation that was going on." Further delay after the arrest presented the risk that defendant's blood alcohol level could subside below the legal limit. Valverde had never before sought a search warrant by affidavit or telephone.

On March 14, 2014, defendant submitted a supplemental motion to suppress based mainly on dispatch records contradicting Officer Valverde's testimony concerning the time of arrest and of his first learning that defendant had been the driver. Specifically, Valverde's entries on a DMV form indicated that he arrested defendant at 11:30 or 11:35 p.m. This was consistent with radio transcripts indicating that at 11:36 p.m., a dispatcher broadcast that defendant was the driver of the Jeep. Valverde did not recall hearing this broadcast, or learning of defendant's driver status before 12:23 a.m., when he himself apparently reported on the police network that "Driver Arrendondo['s] [sic ]" injuries were not life-threatening.

On March 20, 2014, the court denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that defendant had consented to the blood draw pursuant to California's implied consent statute, specifically Vehicle Code section 23612

(§ 23612 ), subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (a)(5), and that even if this consent was not itself sufficient to excuse the lack of a warrant, Officer Valverde had relied in good faith on the statute. The court expressly rejected the prosecution contentions that the warrantless blood draw was justified by exigent circumstances and by reasonable reliance on judicial precedent that had only recently been abrogated when the blood draw occurred.

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of injurious driving with a blood alcohol content of .08, as well as to the misdemeanor charge of driving without a license. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation on the condition, among others, that he serve a jail sentence exceeded by custody credits he had already earned. Defendant filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Introduction

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The extraction of blood or other materials from a person's body for purposes of chemical testing constitutes a search and seizure for purposes of this guarantee. (People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 727, 224 P.3d 55

; see Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (Schmerber ).) The extraction here was conducted without a search warrant. The "basic rule" is that " ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ " (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485, quoting Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576.) In other words, a warrantless search, if not shown to fall within an exception, is "presumptively unreasonable" and hence violative of the constitutional guarantee. (People v. Toure (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 857.) The state bears the burden of establishing the constitutionality of a search conducted without a warrant. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 454–455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 ; Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23.) Thus, the burden here fell on the prosecution to establish an exception to the warrant requirement.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to that court's findings of fact insofar as they are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review its selection of applicable rules and its application of those rules to the facts. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364–365, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 185, 334 P.3d 573

.)

II. Statutory Implied Consent

The trial court found that the warrantless search here was justified on grounds of consent. This is one of the "established exceptions" to the warrant requirement. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854

(Schneckloth ); see id. at p. 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041 ["a search authorized by consent is wholly valid"]; People v. Michael (1955) 45 Cal.2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852 ["if [defendan...