People v. Arreguin

• Decision Date: 14 June 2022
• Docket Number: A162718
• Citation: 79 Cal.App.5th 787,295 Cal.Rptr.3d 195
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher ARREGUIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

79 Cal.App.5th 787

295 Cal.Rptr.3d 195

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Christopher ARREGUIN, Defendant and Appellant.

A162718

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Filed June 14, 2022

Office of Attorney General, Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine R. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Allen R. Crown, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

First District Appellate Project, Megan Hailey-Dunsheath, Berkeley; Law Office of Randall Conner, Randall Conner, Oakland, for Defendant and Appellant.

Petrou, J.

On September 27, 2016, defendant Christopher Arreguin pleaded guilty to human trafficking (case No. SCR681736-2) and second degree robbery (case No. SCR678994-1) in separate, unconsolidated cases. On December 1, 2016, the trial court imposed an aggregated sentence of six years, comprised of the principal term of five years for the human trafficking offense plus a consecutive subordinate term of one year for the robbery offense. The execution of the sentence was suspended, and Arreguin was placed on probation for 60 months in both cases.

On May 21, 2019, the court summarily revoked probation in both cases for eight months and probation was reinstated on November 25, 2019. On January 27, 2021, the court again summarily revoked probation in both cases. On April 20, 2021, the court held a contested hearing and found Arreguin had violated probation in both cases based on conduct underlying a January 15, 2021 arrest. On May 21, 2021, the court formally revoked probation in both cases and put into effect the previously suspended aggregate sentence of six years.

The sole question before us, which we answer in the affirmative, is whether the trial court erred in denying Arreguin's motion to dismiss the violation of probation (VOP) filed in the human trafficking case.

The 60-month probation term in the human trafficking case was imposed on December 1, 2016, and hence was originally set to expire on December 1, 2021. However, effective January 1, 2021, the maximum probation term for many offenses, including the human trafficking offense at issue in this case, became limited to two years by statute ( Pen. Code,¹ § 1203.1, former subd. (a), as amended by Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2; "AB 1950"² ). As of January 1, 2021, Arreguin had served significantly more than two years of probation, and therefore his probation terminated as a matter of law. His probation having terminated, the court lacked jurisdiction to order summary revocation. While the court erred in denying Arreguin's motion to dismiss the VOP filed in the human trafficking case based on AB 1950, it retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the VOP filed in the robbery case as the term of probation for the robbery offense was statutorily exempt from the two-year probation limitation in AB 1950.

Accordingly, in case No. SCR681736-2 (human trafficking) we reverse the May 19, 2021 sentence and remand that case to the trial court with directions to vacate its order denying Arreguin's motion to dismiss the VOP, enter a new order granting the motion to dismiss the VOP, and conduct further proceedings consistent with our opinion. In case No. SCR678994-1 (robbery), we reverse the May 19, 2021 sentence and remand that case to the trial court with directions to conduct further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In case No. SCR678994-1, Arreguin was charged with the felony offenses of second degree robbery and dissuading a witness by force or threat based on a gunpoint robbery (robbery case). In case No. SCR681736-2, Arreguin was charged with the felony offenses of pandering and human trafficking of a minor for a sex act concerning two victims (human trafficking case). The cases were not consolidated.

On September 27, 2016, Arreguin appeared before the trial court to resolve both cases. He pled guilty to human trafficking ( § 236.1, subd. (a) ) in case No. SCR681736-2, and second degree robbery ( §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c) ) in case No. SCR678994-1. He signed a separate plea agreement in each case, acknowledging his plea would be an "open plea" with "a maximum possible sentence of 6 years."

At sentencing on December 1, 2016, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of six years, comprised of the principal term of five years (the lower term) for the human trafficking offense, plus a consecutive subordinate term of one year (one-third of the middle term) for the robbery offense. The execution of the aggregate sentence was suspended and Arreguin was placed on probation for 60 months in each case, with the terms of probation "to run concurrent with each other."³

Thereafter, Arreguin's probation term in both cases was tolled for approximately eight months (266 days) from March 5, 2019, when the court summarily revoked probation, until November 25, 2019, when the court reinstated probation. ( § 1203.2, subd. (a) ["[t]he revocation [of probation], summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the period of supervision"].)

Effective January 1, 2021, AB 1950 was enacted to limit the maximum probation term a trial court could impose for most felony offenses (including the human trafficking offense in this case) to "a period of time not exceeding two years, and upon terms and conditions as it shall determine." ( § 1203.1, former subd. (a); Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) AB 1950 provided that the two-year probation limitation did not apply to certain exempt felonies, including "any violent felony offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c)," which exemption applied to the robbery offense in this case.

( § 1203.1, former subd. (m)⁴ ; Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) As to the exempt felonies, "the court, or the judge thereof, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence and under conditions as it shall determine." (Ibid .)

On January 27, 2021, the trial court summarily revoked Arreguin's probation in both cases based on separate, albeit identical, VOPs filed in each case. The VOPs requested revocation based on conduct that took place on January 15, 2021, for which Arreguin was arrested that same day.⁵

Arreguin moved to dismiss solely the VOP filed in the human trafficking case on the basis he had served over two years on probation for that offense and probation was terminated by retroactive application of AB 1950. The court denied the motion to dismiss, held a contested hearing, and found Arreguin had committed the conduct underlying his January 15, 2021 arrest. The court specifically found Arreguin violated the following terms of his probation: failing to be of good conduct and obeying all laws; possessing drug paraphernalia and a weapon; and possessing and using alcohol. On May 19, 2021, the court formally revoked probation in both cases and directed the execution of the previously suspended aggregate sentence of six years.

Arreguin's timely appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

Arreguin seeks reversal and remand for further proceedings in both cases based on his contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the January 27, 2021 VOP filed in the human trafficking case. We agree. Since, by operation of law, Arreguin could not be on probation in the human trafficking case at the time the January 27, 2021 VOP was filed, and the court revoked his probation based on conduct that took place on January 15, 2021 (when he was not on probation), we shall reverse and remand for further proceedings.

We begin our discussion by noting that at the 2016 sentencing the trial court was required to calculate an aggregate term of imprisonment for both offenses, exercised its authority to suspend execution of the aggregate term of imprisonment, and placed Arreguin on probation in both cases for an initial period of 60 months, which resulted in nonfinal judgments in both cases.⁶ While Arreguin was serving his probation in both cases, the Legislature enacted AB 1950, effective January 1, 2021, which significantly changed the law governing probation. "As explained in the Legislative Counsel's Digest, whereas previous law had authorized courts to grant a period of probation ‘not exceeding the maximum term for which the person could be imprisoned,’ [AB 1950] instead ‘authorize[s] a court to impose a term of probation not longer than 2 years, except as [otherwise] specified.’ [Citations.] This change in the law bars the imposition of more than two years of probation for a felony offense unless the offense is a violent felony listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c), or is subject to a specific probation length, or is specifically excluded from the statute's two year-limit. ( § 1203.1, former subds. (a), (m), added by Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2, now subds. (a), (l ).)" ( People v. Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738, 743, fn., 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 omitted ( Faial ), petn. for review granted May 18, 2022, S273840⁷ .)

We conclude (as have all other appellate courts so far) that AB 1950 "applies retroactively to defendants who were serving a term of probation when the legislation became effective on January 1, 2021; in such cases, the courts have acted to reduce the length of their probation terms." ( Faial, supra , 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 743, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 [cases cited therein]; see Kuhnel v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 726, 732, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 ( Kuhnel ), petn. for review granted June 1, 2022, S274000⁸ ; People v. Butler (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 216, 220–221, 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, petn. for review granted June 1, 2020, S273773⁹ .)

While the cases enumerate various reasons for the retroactive application of AB 1950, we conclude, as have other courts, that retroactive...