People v. Arroyo

• Decision Date: 14 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. S219178.,S219178.
• Citation: 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 122,62 Cal.4th 589,364 P.3d 168
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Isaias ARROYO, Defendant and Respondent.

62 Cal.4th 589

364 P.3d 168

197 Cal.Rptr.3d 122

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Isaias ARROYO, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S219178.

Supreme Court of California

Jan. 14, 2016.

Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Stephan Sauer, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Frank Davis, Alternate Defender, and Antony C. Ufland, Deputy Alternate Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d), adopted as part of Proposition 21, the "Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998," allows prosecutors the option of filing charges against certain juveniles accused of specified offenses, directly in criminal court. Here we determine whether this provision allows prosecutors to charge such juveniles in criminal court by grand jury indictment. We conclude it does, and thus affirm the Court of Appeal.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Because the issue before us is a purely legal one, the factual and procedural context in which the case arises may be summarized briefly. As set forth in defendant's demurrer, on the evening of October 19, 2012, police officers saw a car drive slowly along West Myrtle Street in Santa Ana. Officers believed occupants of the car were Los Compadres gang members. Police ultimately stopped the car, found a loaded revolver, and arrested the occupants, including defendant Isaias Arroyo.

The district attorney presented the case to the Orange County grand jury. The grand jury returned an indictment against defendant Arroyo and six codefendants on charges of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen.Code §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a) ) (count 1) and active participation in a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2), with an allegation that defendant engaged in the conspiracy for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang, Los Compadres, with the intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by members of that gang. The grand jury specifically found reasonable cause to believe defendant came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(4) (hereafter section 707(d)(4) ).

Defendant was arraigned and initially pleaded not guilty. He later demurred to the indictment on the ground that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) requires the prosecution to proceed by way of a preliminary hearing and information when filing criminal charges against a minor in adult court, and because he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses the grand jury had no legal authority to inquire into the offenses charged. (Pen.Code § 1004, subd. 1 [demurrer challenging grand jury's authority].) The trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his plea; sustained his demurrer, agreeing with him that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4)"requires a magistrate's determination that [a] juvenile" qualifies for prosecution in adult court; and dismissed him from the indictment.

The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.

ANALYSIS

We review de novo the Court of Appeal's decision on the purely legal question before us. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54.) " ‘In interpreting a voter initiative’ " such as Proposition 21, " ‘we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, [1] "we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning." [Citation.] [2] The statutory language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme [in light of the electorate's intent]. [Citation.] [3] When the language is ambiguous, "we refer to other indicia of the voters' intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet." ’ " (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900–901, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951.) "In other words, our ‘task is simply to interpret and apply the initiative's language so as to effectuate the electorate's intent.’ " (Id. at p. 901, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951.)

In adopting Proposition 21 at the March 7, 2000, primary election, voters expanded prosecutorial authority to file charges against minors in adult court. Before Proposition 21 became law, a minor could not be prosecuted in a court of criminal jurisdiction unless a juvenile court first found the minor unfit for treatment under juvenile court law. Exceptions existed for minors who were alleged to have committed certain very serious offenses enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (b), and were consequently required to be charged in adult court, and for minors who had previously been found unfit. (Welf. & Inst.Code, former § 602, as amended by Stats.1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, pp. 7560–7561; Welf. & Inst.Code, former § 707, subds. (a)-(c), as amended by Stats.1998, ch. 936, § 21.5, pp. 6912–6918; Welf. & Inst.Code, former § 707.01, subd. (a)(5), (6).)

As amended by Proposition 21, section 707 gives prosecutors discretionary authority to file charges against minors directly in criminal court for specified offenses and under specified circumstances. The provisions of subdivision (d)(1) through (3) set out those offenses and circumstances. (§ 707, subd. (d).) Section 707, subdivision (d)(4) provides: "In any case in which the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer has filed an accusatory pleading against a minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to this subdivision, the case shall then proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case. In conjunction with the preliminary hearing as provided in Section 738 of the Penal Code, the magistrate shall make a finding that reasonable cause exists to believe that the minor comes within this subdivision. If reasonable cause is not established, the criminal court shall transfer the case to the juvenile court having jurisdiction over the matter." (Italics added.)

Penal Code section 738 provides that "[b]efore an information is filed there must be a preliminary examination of the case against the defendant and an order holding him to answer made under Section 872. The proceeding for a preliminary examination must be commenced by written complaint, as provided elsewhere in this code." In turn, Penal Code section 872, among other things, specifies that when it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant is guilty, the magistrate must hold the defendant to answer. Sections 738 and 872, which apply to all prosecutions initiated by information, read together articulate the applicable requirements for proceeding against a defendant by way of information; they do not limit the prosecutor's options for commencing a prosecution.

Defendant contends section 707(d)(4) entitles him to a preliminary hearing. He first focuses on the language of the statute, in particular the sentence italicized above. He observes that the Court of Appeal in People v. Superior Court (Gevorgyan) (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 602, 610–611, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 668, found this language unambiguously provides such a right and concluded that because there is no right to a postindictment preliminary hearing under California law (see Cal. Const. art. I, § 14.1 ), the prosecution of a juvenile in criminal court cannot be initiated by indictment. In support, he notes that while Proposition 21 eliminated the express right to a preliminary hearing formerly conferred by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (c), it at the same time added the reference to a preliminary hearing in section 707(d)(4).

The People acknowledge that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) requires the magistrate, at the preliminary hearing, to make a finding "that reasonable cause exists to believe the minor comes within" the provisions of the statute, but they contend the requirement of a magistrate's finding comes into play only if prosecution of the minor is commenced by information; the statute does not itself require that a prosecution be initiated by information. As the People soundly point out, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4), provides that in any case in which the district attorney has exercised discretion to file against a juvenile in criminal court, "the case shall then proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case." The Penal Code defines the initial pleading in a felony case as "the indictment, information, or the complaint in any case certified to the superior court under Section 859a." (Pen.Code § 949.) Consequently, as the People contend, a prosecution that is commenced by indictment "proceed[s] according to the laws applicable to a criminal case." (Welf. & Inst.Code § 707(d)(4).)

Defendant's reading takes in isolation a single sentence of the statute—i.e., that in conjunction with the preliminary hearing "the magistrate shall make a finding that reasonable cause exists" (§ 707(d)(4) )—contrary to long-standing principles of interpretation by which "we look to ‘the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision.... [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ "in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute...." [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ " (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907–908, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265.)

The People's reading of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) better accounts for the statutory language as a whole. Had the provision's drafters intended that prosecutions under this statute be commenced only by way of information, they would have so...