People v. Ayala

• Decision Date: 30 December 1955
• Docket Number: Cr. 5478
• Citation: 291 P.2d 517,138 Cal.App.2d 243
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Roland AYALA, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 517

291 P.2d 517

138 Cal.App.2d 243

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Roland AYALA, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 5478.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 30, 1955.

Hearing Denied Jan. 25, 1956.

Robert Roland Ayala in pro. per.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Deputy Atty. Gen., Roy A. Gustafson, Dist. Atty., Ventura County; Burt M. Henson, Deputy Dist. Atty., Ventura County, Ventura, for respondent.

ASHBURN, Justice pro tem.

The instant appeal is another contribution to the swelling stream of applications for writ of error coram nobis which engage the attention of the courts. It is presented in propria persona.

Defendant was charged in count I of an amended information with violation of section 266h of the Penal Code, soliciting for a known prostitute, and in count II with violation of said section through receiving compensation for soliciting for a known prostitute. He was charged also with a prior conviction of a felony, violation of section 4573 of the Penal Code, namely, bringing narcotics into a penal institution. He pleaded guilty to count I of the information and count II was dismissed on motion of the district attorney. In due course he was sentenced to the state prison. No appeal was taken from the judgment. He soon filed in the superior court a petition for writ of error coram nobis, hearing thereon was had, the petition was denied and petitioner now appeals from the order of denial.

It would be a salutary thing if the applicants for this writ could be made to understand its narrow scope. It does not lie to correct errors of law made at the trial. 'Its purpose is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known it and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not then known to the court. [Citing cases.] The applicant for the writ 'must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ; otherwise he has stated no ground for relief.' (People v. Shorts, 1948, 32 Cal.2d 502, 513, 197 P.2d 330, 336.)' People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 326, 210 P.2d 13, 15. To the same effect are People v. Krout, 90 Cal.App.2d 205, 208 202 P.2d 635; People v. Knight, 73 Cal.App.2d 532, 535, 166 P.2d 899; People v. Martorana, 118 Cal.App.2d 332, 335, 257 P.2d 998; People v. Smith, 108 Cal.App.2d 696, 699, 239 P.2d 466. Coram nobis is not the proper vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights; that is a function of motion for new trial, appeal or habeas corpus. People v. Adamson, supra, 34 Cal.2d at page 327, 210 P.2d 13. Nor is this proceeding 'a catch-all by which those convicted may litigate and re-litigate the propriety of their convictions ad infinitum. In the vast majority of cases a trial followed by a motion for a new trial and an appeal affords adequate protection to those accused of crime. The writ of error coram nobis serves a limited and useful purpose. It will be used to correct errors of fact which could not be corrected in any other manner. But it is well-settled law in this and in other states that where other and adequate remedies exist the writ is not available.' People v. Martinez, 88 Cal.App.2d 767, 774, 199 P.2d 375, 379. Accord: People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 96, 257 P.2d 37.

The judgment of conviction is attended by a strong presumption of validity. People v. Martorana, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at page 334, 257 P.2d 998; People v. Smith, 109 Cal.App.2d 76, 80, 239 P.2d 903; People v. Thomas, 121 Cal.App.2d 754, 756, 264 P.2d 100. 'The care and solicitude of the state for justice continue unabated, always; but the presumption of innocence of the defendant ended with the verdict, and the final, affirmed judgment of conviction is conclusive unless set aside upon a ground amounting to, akin to, or in the nature of extrinsic fraud or some other lack of due process, or, as has often been said in substance, upon proof that a fact existed which could not in the exercise of due diligence by the defendant have been proved at the trial, and which, if known then, would have precluded the judgment from being entered. (See People v. Gilbert, 1944, supra, 25 Cal.2d 422, 442, 154 P.2d 657, and authorities there cited.) The defendant then, if he would set aside such judgment, must proceed as one who is at least prima facie guilty; he, now, is the attacker and has the burden of producing convincing proof of a fact which constitutes a legal ground for setting aside the judgment. The presumption that the judgment is valid in all respects is strong; the interests of justice and of humanity require that its terms be executed promptly if it be not set aside.' (People v. Shorts, supra, 32 Cal.2d 502, 508, 197 P.2d 330, 333.) A defendant's plea of guilty 'is an admission of every element of the offense charged, and constitutes a conclusive admission of defendant's guilt.' People v. Cooper, 123 Cal.App.2d 353, 356, 266 P.2d 566, 567.

The applicant must allege facts which establish a right to the writ within its recognized narrow confines. Mere conclusions or generalities will not suffice. People v. Thomas, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d 754, 756, 264 P.2d 100; People v. Martorana, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 332, 334, 257 P.2d 998; People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 260, 232 P. 457; People v. Shorts, supra, 32 Cal.2d 502, 513, 197 P.2d 330; People v. Adamson, supra, 34 Cal.2d 320, 328-329, 210 P.2d 13. And the petitioner must produce convincing proof in support of his application. People v. Smith, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 76, 80, 239 P.2d 903.

Appellant makes numerous claims which are loosely stated and consist mainly of broad conclusions. His principal points seem to be that he was placed in double jeopardy by dismissal of count II and conviction of count I of the amended information; also that that conviction, which rests upon a plea of guilty, was brought about through improper persuasion of his attorney.

The plea of double jeopardy raises the question of denial of constitutional rights, a matter which is reviewable upon appeal, Johnson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350, 353, 74 P.2d 243, 113 A.L.R. 1422, or motion for new trial, and may in appropriate circumstances be asserted through a habeas corpus proceedings, People v. Adamson, supra, 34 Cal.2d 320, 327, 210 P.2d 13, hence the matter is not one for coram nobis. If we were able to entertain this question, petitioner could not prevail, for no double jeopardy has been shown. Jeopardy does not attach until a defendant has been placed on trial before an impanelled jury or until the first witness has been sworn in a court trial, In re Harron, 191 Cal. 457, 466, 217 P. 728; People v. Thomas, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d 754, 757, 264 P.2d 100, or until he has pleaded guilty. People v. Goldstein, 32 Cal. 432, 433. When that occurred in this case the other count. was dismissed.

As a subsidiary proposition appellant claims 'triple jeopardy' because of an allegation in the amended information charging his prior conviction of a felony, which he admitted. Again, that is not a matter which arises upon an application such as the one at bar. People v. Whitton, 112 Cal.App.2d 328, 332-333, 246 P.2d 60; People v. McVicker, 37 Cal.App.2d 470, 473, 99 P.2d 1110; People v. Reid, supra, 195 Cal. 249, 253, 232 P. 457, 36 A.L.R. 1435. Of course there is no merit in the contention. In re McVickers, 29 Cal.2d 264, 270-271, 176 P.2d 40; People v. Frank, 134 Cal.App. 61, 63-64, 24 P.2d 905.

Most of petitioner's other contentions must depend upon the merit of his claim that the plea of guilty was improperly obtained from him. His petition avers that his attorney 'was incompetent and irresponsible let political and personal matters mingle with his clients case, and demonstrated an exhibition of plain stupidity;' that petitioner was 'forced under wrongful persuasions to plead guilty, under coerced deliberated, circumvented subverted deceptions, when he should have been given a pardon under the information;' that the attorney 'gave no preparation to his case, and was grossly incompetent. Worked hand in hand with the prosecution instead of representing him, on the impersonal authority of the law, he became personally embrolied, with the prosecution pleaced your Petitioner under contentions weggle, under an undignified leval which Petitioner was hurled under a swift reckless shabby swindle to plead guilty under...