People v. Bailey

• Citation: 378 Ill.Dec. 591,4 N.E.3d 474,2014 IL 115459
• Decision Date: 06 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 115459.,115459.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Christopher B. BAILEY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2014 IL 115459

4 N.E.3d 474

378 Ill.Dec. 591

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Christopher B. BAILEY, Appellant.

No. 115459.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 6, 2014.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Jaime L. Montgomery, Assistant Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Retha Stotts, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this appeal, we are presented with an opportunity to clarify the parameters of the revestment doctrine that permits a court to be revested with jurisdiction despite the absence of a timely postjudgment filing. At the core of this dispute is whether a party may satisfy the doctrine's requirement that the subsequent proceeding be inconsistent with the prior judgment simply by failing to object on the basis of its untimeliness or the finality of the prior judgment. We conclude that the revestment doctrine requires more and that expressing opposition to alteration of the prior judgment bars application of the doctrine. Here, the State opposed the alteration of the prior judgment, precluding the circuit court from reacquiring jurisdiction over defendant's case under the doctrine of revestment. The circuit court should therefore have dismissed defendant's postjudgment motion to vacate his plea and sentence for lack of jurisdiction. Because the appellate court correctly concluded that revestment did not occur, we affirm its judgment, as modified herein.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In March 2007, the 17–year–old defendant pled guilty in the circuit court of Du Page County to criminal sexual abuse involving his 16–year–old girlfriend. He was sentenced to pay a $100 fine and serve 300 days in the county jail, with credit for time served. When asked whether there was “any sentence regarding [sex offender] registration?” the trial judge responded, “No.” More than three years later, in October 2010, defendant filed a motion to vacate the plea and sentence, arguing they were void because the trial court was required to order him to register. The State filed a written response to defendant's motion to vacate, arguing only that the trial court's actions did not render the plea and sentence void. The trial judge denied defendant's motion on the merits.

¶ 4 On appeal, defendant argued that remand was necessary because defense counsel failed to comply with the mandatory certification requirement in Supreme Court Rule 604(d). The appellate majority dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2012 IL App (2d) 110209, 367 Ill.Dec. 401, 981 N.E.2d 1129. The dissenting justice maintained that the majority erred by relying on cases that misconstrued the revestment doctrine and were factually distinguishable. 2012 IL App (2d) 110209, ¶ 44, 367 Ill.Dec. 401, 981 N.E.2d 1129 (McLaren, J., dissenting). This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 5 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Before this court, the parties raise three issues: (1) whether the appellate court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the revestment doctrine did not apply under the facts of the case; (2) alternatively, whether the appellate court properly dismissed his appeal for want of jurisdiction when his trial counsel failed to file the certification required under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); and (3) if the appellate court did err, whether the trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to vacate his plea and sentence and remand the cause for strict compliance with Rule 604(d) and a new post-plea hearing.

¶ 7 The Revestment Doctrine

¶ 8 The central issue urged by both parties is the continued validity and scope of the revestment doctrine. Under our usual rules, a trial court loses jurisdiction to hear a cause at the end of the 30–day window following the entry of a final judgment. The revestment doctrine acts as an exception to that general rule. Defendant raised the doctrine in the appellate court after the State argued that his motion to vacate, filed more than three years after the entry of his conviction and sentence, was untimely.

¶ 9 In People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill.2d 237, 240, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983), this court recognized the narrowness of the revestment exception and outlined its requirements. For the doctrine to apply, “the parties must actively participate without objection in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.” Kaeding, 98 Ill.2d at 241, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11. Defendant argues that because these requirements were met, the trial court was revested with jurisdiction.

¶ 10 Before addressing that question, however, the State suggests the abolition of the revestment doctrine, at least in the criminal law context, because it conflicts with both the established rule that the deadline for filing postjudgment motions is jurisdictional and the critical need for finality in criminal cases. While the application of the doctrine is undoubtedly in conflict with our otherwise strict jurisdictional standards, an exception is, by its very nature, always in conflict with the underlying rule. That conflict cannot be the sole reason to abolish the longstanding doctrine creating the exception.

¶ 11 Our state constitution broadly gives circuit courts “original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction * * *. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. In addition, this court possesses the constitutional authority both to “provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court, from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and “provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16). This court first applied the revestment doctrine in a criminal case as an exception to our usual jurisdictional rules in 1983. See Kaeding, 98 Ill.2d at 241, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11. Under the principle of stare decisis, we will not overturn longstanding precedent in the absence of a demonstration of “good cause” or the identification of “compelling reasons.” People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 53, 360 Ill.Dec. 293, 968 N.E.2d 1046. The inherent conflict between a rule and its exception does not meet that high standard.

¶ 12 Also, while we acknowledge the important role that finality plays in our criminal justice system, we note that at times that role must take a backseat to other fundamental considerations. As we have explained:

“[S]pecial circumstances may arise in which the interests of finality are lessened and the circuit court should be revested with jurisdiction over a previously determined matter. The subsequent imposition of a sentence in another jurisdiction is the type of circumstance that may warrant the expansion of the circuit court's jurisdiction. * * * The provision does not conflict with any of our own rules, nor does it encroach upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.” People v. Bainter, 126 Ill.2d 292, 304–05, 127 Ill.Dec. 938, 533 N.E.2d 1066 (1989) (recognizing several instances when the legislature has “purported to revest the circuit courts with jurisdiction over otherwise final judgments”).

It is also irrefutable that a void order is subject to either direct or collateral attack at any time, regardless of the length of time that has passed since its entry. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill.2d 291, 308, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174 (2003). Therefore, our jurisdictional rules are not without limited, but critical, safeguards, including the revestment doctrine. Although the doctrine has sometimes been dormant in this court's decisional law ( Kaeding, 98 Ill.2d at 241, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11), we have never expressly rejected it.

¶ 13 Indeed, we have applied the revestment doctrine in Sears,Kaeding, and People v. Bannister, 236 Ill.2d 1, 11, 337 Ill.Dec. 685, 923 N.E.2d 244 (2009), although we have not discussed it in any depth since enumerating its requirements in Kaeding( Kaeding, 98 Ill.2d at 241, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11). The State argues, however, that this court's decision in Flowers created uncertainty over the continued vitality of the doctrine, a point also raised by the three dissenting justices in Bannister, 236 Ill.2d at 23–24, 337 Ill.Dec. 685, 923 N.E.2d 244 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride and Burke, JJ.). Notably, however, in Flowers we were not directly presented with the application of the doctrine. Nonetheless, our general discussion of jurisdictional limitations in that case has raised some question in our appellate court about the continued validity of the doctrine. See People v. Price, 364 Ill.App.3d 543, 546–47, 301 Ill.Dec. 400, 846 N.E.2d 1003 (2006) (raising the issue of whether Flowers eliminated the revestment doctrine).

¶ 14 In Flowers, this court noted that “[t]he jurisdiction of trial courts to reconsider and modify their judgments is not indefinite,” generally expiring 30 days after entry of the judgment in the absence of a timely postjudgment motion. Flowers, 208 Ill.2d at 303, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174. We also recognized that “[l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver [citation] and cannot be cured through consent of the parties [citation].” Flowers, 208 Ill.2d at 303, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174. Because the State has now raised the language in Flowers to support the abolition of the revestment doctrine, we address the question.

¶ 15 The appellate court in People v. Minniti, 373 Ill.App.3d 55, 311 Ill.Dec. 251, 867 N.E.2d 1237 (2007) pointed out a basis for the perceived conflict...