People v. Ballentine
| Decision Date | 07 July 1952 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 5307 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. BALLENTINE. |
Callaghan, Giannini & Anello and Raymond G. Callaghan, San Jose, for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Wallace Colthurst, Deputy Atty., Gen., for respondent.
Robert Thomas Ballentine, without representation by counsel, pleaded guilty to having committed the crimes of murder and robbery. After hearing evidence, the court determined that each crime was of the first degree. Upon the count charging robbery, Ballentine was sentenced to imprisonment for the period prescribed by law. On the charge of murder, the death penalty was imposed. The principal question presented upon the appeal, which is before this court pursuant to the provisions of section 1239(b) of the Penal Code, concerns the rights of Ballentine under section 1018 of that code relating to pleas of guilty.
When he appeared for arraignment, Ballentine was accomplanied by an attorney. A continuance of one week was granted. At the next hearing, the attorney informed the court that he was 'withdrawing from the case, Mr. Ballentine has no objection'. To the court's question, 'That is correct?' Ballentine replied, 'Yes.' The judge then said: Ballentine answered: 'I don't wish to have an attorney, I waive it.' He was then asked: 'Do you object to the Court appointing one?' He replied: Ballentine said that he realized the seriousness of the charge against him and knew he could be sentenced to death. He stated that, before the magistrate for preliminary examination, he was advised of all of his rights, including the right to representation by an attorney.
Commenting that, 'I can't force anything on you, Ballentine', the judge then informed him in detail concerning all of his legal rights. After stating that he was entitled to be represented by an attorney at all stages in the proceedings, the judge told Ballentine that if he was unable to employ counsel the court would appoint one for him.
Following Ballentine's pleas of guilty to each count of the information and his admission of two prior convictions of felonies, the judge again inquired: 'You still don't want an attorney?' Ballentine answered, 'No.' The judge asked: 'Did you talk with Mr. Chargin, who was advising you in the meantime, have you?' Ballentine said: 'Yes, I talked to him.' To the question, 'He has given you such advice ' Ballentine replied, 'No, he hasn't given me any advice.' Ballentine said that he understood that he could have an attorney. Thereupon the court ordered his guilty pleas and admissions entered by the clerk. At the commencement of the hearing to determine the degree of the crimes charged, the judge again inquired: 'You still have no Counsel?' Ballentine answered: 'No, I haven't.' To the court's question, 'You still don't want one?' he replied, 'No.'
Ballentine contends that the trial judge was without authority to receive and act upon his plea of guilty entered without representation by counsel. The position of the attorney general is that the acceptance of the plea did not constitute prejudicial error because Ballentine intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
Section 1018 of the Penal Code reads in part: 'No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death * * * shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel'. The state relies upon Article I, section 13, of the Constitution which guarantees to one accused of crime the right to 'appear and defend, in person and with counsel.' The attorney general argues that the code provision should not be construed to abrogate Ballentine's right to represent himself.
The statute, however, does not prevent a defendant from waiving his right to the aid of counsel and defending himself. It merely prohibits the court from receiving a plea of guilty to a felony for which the maximum punishment is death made by a defendant not represented by counsel. Should a defendant waive his right to counsel and refuse to answer the charge against him by an acceptable pleading, the court must enter a plea of not guilty for him. Pen.Code, § 1024. The cause would then proceed to trial and the defendant might represent himself, subject to the requirement that his waiver of the right to counsel was made understandingly, competently, and voluntarily in the exercise of a free choice. Cf. In re James, 38 Cal.2d 302, 313, 240 P.2d 596; People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d 815, 822, 178 P.2d 761.
Although a defendant has the right to defend himself in person in a criminal prosecution, Const., Art. I, § 13, he is not guaranteed the right to plead guilty to a charge of a felony punishable with death. In...
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People v. Asher
...442, 445, 402 P.2d 130, 133. See also, People v. Lilliock, supra. 265 A.C.A. 465, 477, 71 Cal.Rptr. 434, and cf. People v. Ballentine (1952) 39 Cal.2d 193, 197, 246 P.2d 35.) Defendant's contention also fails to distinguish the precise issue presented by the homicide charge from other offen......
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People v. Henderson
...a plea of guilty after the court had ordered defendant's counsel discharged on defendant's motion. (Pen.Code, § 1018; People v. Ballentine, 39 Cal.2d 193, 196, 246 P.2d 35.) Defendant admitted in open court that he killed the deceased, Mrs. Joyce Lovett, in a motel in Pinole, and that he in......
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People v. Massie
...140, 709 P.2d 1309, quoting People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 755, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837; People v. Ballentine (1952) 39 Cal.2d 193, 197, 246 P.2d 35.) Defendant contends that his trial for murder, following his plea of guilty to robbery (Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 ......
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People v. Chadd
...(Ibid.) Finally, the question now before us is not new to this court, but was answered in effect by our decision in People v. Ballentine (1952) 39 Cal.2d 193, 246 P.2d 35. There a defendant charged with a capital murder appeared with counsel at his arraignment, and obtained a continuance. A......