People v. Baltes

• Decision Date: 01 July 2010
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. George BALTES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

904 N.Y.S.2d 554
75 A.D.3d 656

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
George BALTES, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 1, 2010.

904 N.Y.S.2d 555

G. Scott Walling, Queensbury, for appellant.

Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh, for respondent.

Before: CARDONA, P.J., ROSE, STEIN, McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ.

STEIN, J.

75 A.D.3d 657

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (Ryan, J.), rendered February 25, 2008, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of driving while intoxicated, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest, and the traffic infraction of unsafe lane movement.

On January 13, 2007, defendant and his friend Darren Barcomb were involved in a one-car accident in a vehicle registered to Barcomb. Upon arriving at the scene, State Trooper Joshua Jenkins observed a vehicle nose-first in a ditch; no one was in the vehicle. As Barcomb approached Jenkins, he advised Jenkins that he had slid off the road. Jenkins questioned Barcomb because Jenkins smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from him, and Barcomb admitted

904 N.Y.S.2d 556

that he had consumed a "couple beers."

Believing Barcomb to have been the driver of the vehicle, Jenkins began administering field sobriety tests, but was repeatedly interrupted by defendant, who came increasingly closer to Jenkins and Barcomb and continued to interfere, despite admonitions to remain calm and quiet. Meanwhile, State Trooper Scott Santor arrived on the scene to assist Jenkins and, after learning of defendant's conduct, first verbally instructed him to move away from Barcomb and Jenkins and, when that failed, attempted to physically remove him from the area. When defendant allegedly struck Santor in an effort to resist, he was placed under arrest, handcuffed-after resisting the officers' efforts to place handcuffs on him by struggling and tucking his

75 A.D.3d 658

arms underneath himself while lying on his stomach-and ultimately taken to the State Police barracks.

In the interim, Jenkins completed the field sobriety tests on Barcomb and, determining Barcomb to be under the influence of alcohol, arrested him for driving while intoxicated (hereinafter DWI), at which point Barcomb stated that he was not the driver of the vehicle. Nevertheless, Barcomb refused to identify the actual driver and was charged with DWI. Two months later, defendant gave a sworn written statement to State Trooper Sean Finn indicating that it was he, and not Barcomb, who had been driving Barcomb's vehicle on the date of the accident. Accordingly, defendant was arrested on the additional charge of DWI and the charge against Barcomb was dismissed. Thereafter, a grand jury handed up a five-count indictment against defendant for the events occurring on January 13, 2007. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of DWI, unsafe lane movement, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest.¹ Defendant now appeals.

Defendant contends that none of the convictions was supported by legally sufficient evidence and, alternatively, that they were all against the weight of the evidence. In determining legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v. Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d 417, 420, 626 N.Y.S.2d 20, 649 N.E.2d 1164 [1995]; People v. Roberts, 63 A.D.3d 1294, 1296, 881 N.Y.S.2d 520 [2009] ) and give them the benefit of every favorable inference ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]; People v. Scanlon, 52 A.D.3d 1035, 1038, 861 N.Y.S.2d 426 [2008], lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 741, 864 N.Y.S.2d 399, 894 N.E.2d 663 [2008] ). We "will not disturb the verdict if the evidence demonstrates a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury" ( People v. Maricevic, 52 A.D.3d 1043, 1044, 860 N.Y.S.2d 666 [2008], lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 790, 866 N.Y.S.2d 617, 896 N.E.2d 103 [2008]; see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672; People v. Owens, 45 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 845 N.Y.S.2d 563 [2007] ). When we conduct a weight of the evidence review, if we are satisfied that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we independently assess the " 'relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony' " ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672, quoting

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People ex rel. MacCracken v. Miller, 291 N.Y. 55, 62, 50 N.E.2d 542 [1943] ), viewing the evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the jury's credibility determinations ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672; People v. Owens, 45 A.D.3d at 1059, 845 N.Y.S.2d 563; People v. Davis, 260 A.D.2d 726, 729, 687 N.Y.S.2d 803 [1999], lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 968, 695 N.Y.S.2d 54, 716 N.E.2d 1099 [1999] ).

75 A.D.3d 659

With respect to the convictions of DWI and unsafe lane movement, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence that he was the driver of Barcomb's vehicle, as his admission to that effect was not sufficiently corroborated ( see CPL 60.50). "[CPL 60.50] does not require corroboration of confessions or admissions in every detail, but only 'some proof, of whatever weight,' that the offense charged has in fact been committed by someone" ( People v. Booden, 69 N.Y.2d 185, 187, 513 N.Y.S.2d 87, 505 N.E.2d 598 [1987], quoting People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629, 376 N.Y.S.2d 436, 339 N.E.2d 139 [1975] ). "The necessary additional evidence may be found in the presence of defendant at the...