People v. Batashure
| Decision Date | 20 February 1990 |
| Citation | 552 N.E.2d 144,75 N.Y.2d 306,552 N.Y.S.2d 896 |
| Parties | , 552 N.E.2d 144 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Shimkon BATASHURE, Also Known as Shimkon Batoshvili, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
CPL 190.65(1) sets out standards for when a Grand Jury is authorized to indict a person for an offense, but the statute does not specify who is to determine whether those standards are satisfied--the Grand Jury itself, or the District Attorney (its legal advisor). This appeal, centering on the statutory standard of legal sufficiency, calls upon us to resolve that open question.
This case is before us on the People's appeal from an order affirming the dismissal of an indictment charging defendant with second degree grand larceny. 147 A.D.2d 994, 537 N.Y.S.2d 941. The indictment was dismissed on the ground that certain instructions given by the Assistant District Attorney concerning the grand jurors' role in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence were erroneous, and so tainted the integrity of the proceeding that dismissal was required.
The substance of the critical instructions (set out in full in the footnote) * was that determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence was for the Assistant District Attorney, not the concern of the grand jurors, and that the Assistant District Attorney deemed the evidence here to be legally sufficient. These instructions, given in response to two questions from grand jurors about the standard for voting an indictment and the elements of the crime, were repeated by the prosecutor several times in slightly varied form.
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the trial court and Appellate Division that the instructions were erroneous and require dismissal of the indictment.
CPL 190.65(1) provides that "a grand jury may indict a person for an offense when (a) the evidence before it is legally sufficient to establish such person committed such offense provided, however, such evidence is not legally sufficient when corroboration that would be required, as a matter of law, to sustain a conviction for such offense is absent, and (b) competent and admissible evidence before it provides reasonable cause to believe that such person committed such offense." (Emphasis added.) Although the statute authorizes the Grand Jury to indict only when both requirements are met, it does not state who is to determine that each standard has been satisfied.
A definition of "legally sufficient evidence" and "reasonable cause" is found in CPL 70.10:
As is apparent from these definitions, legal sufficiency and reasonable cause are analytically distinct concepts. Evidence can satisfy either standard without necessarily satisfying the other (see, Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 70.10, at 705, for examples).
Seizing on this distinction, the People urge that sufficiency is a "legal" question committed exclusively to the prosecutor as the legal advisor to the Grand Jury (CPL 190.30[7], and reasonable cause a "factual" question for the jurors as the triers of fact. The People analogize the role played by the prosecutor to that of a Trial Judge ruling on a motion for a trial order of dismissal: the Trial Judge determines whether the People have presented a prima facie case without submitting the question to the jury. The only question before the trial court is the legal sufficiency of the evidence, with the quality and weight of the proof reserved for the trier of fact (People v. Sabella, 35 N.Y.2d 158, 359 N.Y.S.2d 100, 316 N.E.2d 569).
The People are, of course, correct in asserting that in ruling on a motion for a trial order of dismissal, the Trial Judge alone determines the legal sufficiency of the evidence. But even assuming that the Trial Judge's role as arbiter of the law is equivalent to the prosecutor's function as the Grand Jury's legal advisor, the People's analysis fails, as is particularly evident in their efforts to sustain the instructions given in this case.
If a motion for a trial order of dismissal has been denied, the trial court may not then instruct jurors that it has found legally sufficient evidence against defendant, and that they are not to consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence. To the contrary, petit jurors are instructed that in order to convict, they must find that the People's evidence proves every element of the charged crime, which is the gravamen of the CPL 70.10 definition of legal sufficiency.
The instructions given in this case--as any instruction to the effect that the question of the legal sufficiency of the evidence has already been resolved adversely to the defendant--are so central and prejudicial as to require dismissal. It is simply not permissible for a District Attorney to inform grand jurors, who by statute and Constitution, have the unique responsibility to decide whether to vote an indictment, that as a matter of law the prosecutor has already determined that there is enough evidence to warrant that action. At the very least, such an instruction delivered to laypersons carries an unacceptably high risk that they might misconstrue or undervalue their own role in reviewing the evidence, or even assume that the defendant should be indicted.
Nor does it follow from the fact that sufficiency of the evidence is addressed as a matter of law at various points in a prosecution that it is not also a factual question which, under CPL 190.65(1), is to be determined by the Grand Jury not by the prosecutor. We do not agree with the People that "factual" and "legal" questions can be divided with surgical precision into discrete spheres--the first solely for the jurors, the second solely for their legal advisor. While it is difficult to posit a pure law question in an ongoing prosecution--where...
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