People v. Batista
| Citation | 454 N.Y.S.2d 1009,115 Misc.2d 1048 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Francisco BATISTA, Curtis Jackson and Steve Wilson. |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1982 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Defendants Batista, Jackson and Wilson were indicted for robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree. Prior to trial defendants made Sandoval motions as to their past criminal records, which were granted on a limited basis. The issue herein raised is whether the court can grant the People's motion to limit cross-examination as to the complaining witness' prior bad acts which resulted in an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) for a marijuana possession arrest.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right " * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him," and this substantial right is made applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923). The right of confrontation encompasses the right to cross-examine (Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 13 L.Ed.2d 956; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 ). The value of cross-examination lies in its use to expose falsehood and bring out the truth (Texas v. Pointer, supra ). It is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested (Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 rehearing denied 386 U.S. 940, 87 S.Ct. 970, 17 L.Ed.2d 880 ).
However, the right to confront and cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process (Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 ). But the denial or significant diminution of a defendant's rights calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the competing interest be closely examined (United States v. Fatico, 441 F.Supp. 1285, 1296 revd. on other grounds, 2 Cir., 579 F.2d 707).
The New York State Court of Appeals, in a landmark decision, determined that under certain circumstances the right of cross-examination could be limited. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413 sets down criteria for limiting the cross-examination of a defendant witness with respect to past criminal or immoral conduct. It enumerates a doctrine which balances the probative worth of cross-examination concerning previous convictions, weighed against the probability of unfair prejudice being created in the minds of the jurors. The heart of this test centers around whether or not the past conviction relates materially to the witness' truthfulness, veracity and credibility. (Sandoval, supra, at 377, 856, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413). A Sandoval motion then has as its main function the prevention of discarding the presumption of innocence in the minds of the jurors. It appears to be "a jury's natural tendency to conclude, despite limiting instructions, that a defendant who has committed previous crimes is either the kind of person likely to have committed the crime charged or is deserving of punishment in any event" (People v. Ocasio, 47 N.Y.2d 55, 58-59, 416 N.Y.S.2d 581, 389 N.E.2d 1101; People v. Mayrant, 43 N.Y.2d 236, 401 N.Y.S.2d 165, 372 N.E.2d 1; People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294, 297, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754, 366 N.E.2d 843; People v. Fiore, 34 N.Y.2d 81, 356 N.Y.S.2d 38, 312 N.E.2d 174; People v. Termini, 65 A.D.2d 825, 410 N.Y.S.2d 338).
People v. Sandoval (supra ) dealt specifically with limiting the cross-examination of a defendant. Judge Fuchsberg articulated the reasoning of the court in People v. Ocasio when he wrote: "Thus, in explaining why a prospective determination of the permissible scope of cross-examination on such matters was desirable, we there spoke of how fear of the probable effect of the introduction of testimony of this character often will cause the defendant to hide behind his or her privilege not to take the stand, thereby blotting out what may be the only available source of material testimony in support of the defense" (People v. Ocasio, 47 N.Y.2d 55, 58, 416 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582, 389 N.E.2d 1101, 1102 ).
The Sandoval doctrine is one of balance. On one hand, the court must be mindful of the rights of the defendant. On the other, the court must try to elicit all of the facts and circumstances so that justice may be achieved. In Sandoval, the court reasoned that the chances were greater that the truth would come out if defendant was not discouraged from testifying for fear that his prior bad acts would be revealed. In order to elicit the truth, the Sandoval court decreed that the scope of cross-examination could be limited in the sound discretion of the trial judge.
In the case at bar, the trial court is faced with the question of whether the trial court in its discretion should limit the scope of the cross-examination of the complaining witness to encourage the elicitation of the truth, while protecting the rights of the complaining witness and that of the defendant.
The courts have made conflicting findings on this issue. The main thrust against the limitation of the scope of cross-examination against a witness other than the defendant is that such limitation may violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
The mere fact that defendant has not been afforded complete and total cross-examination of all the witnesses is not automatically a prejudicial denial of defendant's rights. We return to the balancing test. The trial judge must determine if, under the entirety of the situation, the defendant was prejudicially denied his rights.
It is well established in New York that if a defendant is limited in his cross-examination of a witness by that witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment, that limitation in and of itself is insufficient to indicate a prejudicial denial of defendant's right. The court must look at the totality of the circumstances.
In United States v. Cardillo, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, stated: (United States v. Cardillo, 2 Cir., 316 F.2d 606, 611 ). (Emphasis supplied.)
The New York courts have held the credibility of a witness to be a collateral issue to the direct evidence as to the facts of the crime. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in People v. Farruggia, 77 A.D.2d 447, 452, 433 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 noted: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Batista
...credibility, was outweighed by the witness' right to be protected from undue humiliation and embarrassment (see, People v. Batista, 115 Misc.2d 1048, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1009). During the trial, the witness (a native of England) was asked on cross-examination whether he had a green card; the witne......
-
People v. Samuels
... ... Batista, 115 Misc.2d 1048, 454 ... N.Y.S.2d 1009). Nor did the court err in refusing to allow defense counsel to see a laboratory report bearing the name of the undercover officer, after the court read the contents of that report to him and determined that the information contained therein was not ... ...