People v. Baxter

• Decision Date: 29 June 2016
• Citation: 34 N.Y.S.3d 505,140 A.D.3d 1180,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05162
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Andrew BAXTER, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

140 A.D.3d 1180

34 N.Y.S.3d 505

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05162

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Andrew BAXTER, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

June 29, 2016.

William J. Reddy, New City, N.Y., for appellant.

Thomas P. Zugibe, District Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Itamar J. Yeger of counsel of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), rendered July 22, 2013, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record supports the hearing court's determination that the police were justified in stopping his vehicle based on their reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (see People v. Ocasio, 85 N.Y.2d 982, 984, 629 N.Y.S.2d 161, 652 N.E.2d 907 ; People v. Mitchell, 143 A.D.2d 947, 948, 533 N.Y.S.2d 401 ). Since the stop of the vehicle was lawful, the hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the physical evidence recovered from the vehicle (see People v. Mitchell, 125 A.D.3d 790, 3 N.Y.S.3d 124 ).

Also, the hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials, as the statements were made after the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ; People v. Santos, 38 A.D.3d 574, 575, 832 N.Y.S.2d 582 ) and were not the product of coercion (see People v. Cooper, 36 A.D.3d 828, 830 N.Y.S.2d 181 ). We reject the defendant's related contention that his statements should have been suppressed based on a violation of his right to counsel because they were obtained following his arrest on a valid parole violation warrant. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the issuance of a parole violation warrant does not constitute the commencement of a criminal proceeding to which the indelible right to counsel attaches (see People v....