People v. Begay
| Decision Date | 27 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 14SA18 |
| Citation | 325 P.3d 1026 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Bradley BEGAY, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court, Boulder County District Court Case No. 13CR1504, Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiff–Appellant: Stanley L. Garnett, District Attorney, Twentieth Judicial District, Sean P. Finn, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Nicole A. Mor, Deputy District Attorney, Boulder, Colorado.
Attorneys for Defendant–Appellee: Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Eric Zale, Deputy State Public Defender, Boulder, Colorado.
En Banc
¶ 1 In this interlocutory appeal, the People challenge the trial court's order suppressing statements made by defendant Bradley Begay in response to police questioning without a Miranda advisement. Because the trial court conflated the standards governing seizure under the Fourth Amendment and custody under the Fifth Amendment, we reverse.
¶ 2 At approximately 10:30 p.m. on September 6, 2013, police officers responded to reports that a man called “Rabbit” tried to strangle two people in what is known as “Aids Park” in Boulder. The victims were familiar with their attacker and described him to Officer Anthony DiGiovanni as a six-foot Native American male, with shoulder-length black hair and tattoos on both arms, wearing a blue shirt and shorts. Witnesses told Officer DiGiovanni that the alleged assailant had walked off with another male called Bo. Officer DiGiovanni radioed this description to dispatch.
¶ 3 Soon after, three plainclothes officers in an unmarked patrol car observed two men matching the report who were crossing a bridge west of Aids Park. Officer Joel Burick exited the car, approached the men, and called out “Hey Rabbit.” One of the men responded by approaching Officer Burick in a friendly manner and “almost hugged him as if he knew him.” Officer Burick identified himself as law enforcement and asked the man to sit down for officer safety reasons. Noting that the man matched Officer DiGiovanni's description, Officer Burick asked for identification and learned that “Rabbit” was Bradley Begay. The officers alerted dispatch that they had located a possible suspect.
¶ 4 While Begay was seated on the ground, Officer Bryan Parch, one of the three officers at the scene, asked him, “What is it that you might have done that someone might confuse you with an individual who had been involved in a strangulation?” Begay admitted to being present during an altercation at Aids Park, but he claimed that his companion Bo had been attacked and that he had intervened, ending the conflict. Bo, however, denied that any fight took place.
¶ 5 While Begay talked with Officer Parch, one or two other officers stood nearby. Begay was not handcuffed. The officers had firearms but never drew them; it is unclear from the record whether they were visible. Officer Parch testified that he made no threats or promises to Begay. The officers did not tell Begay that he was under arrest, nor did they say that he was free to leave. Begay never tried to stand or leave during their conversation. Approximately 20 minutes after he received the initial dispatch call to Aids Park, Officer DiGiovanni arrived at the scene with one of the alleged victims, who identified Begay as his assailant. Officers then read Begay his Miranda rights and arrested him.
¶ 6 Begay was charged with two counts of assault. Before trial, he moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest as the product of custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning.
¶ 7 After testimony from Officers DiGiovanni and Parch, the court issued a bench ruling suppressing the statements. The court noted that whether a defendant is in custody is an objective assessment, but then stated, “[I]f Mr. Begay had tried to leave on that day, my guess is he would not have been able to.” The court concluded, “I do think that under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed that they were free to leave that situation and, therefore, I do find specifically that Mr. Begay was under arrest even if those words were not spoken at that time.” The trial court followed up with a written order to the same effect.
¶ 8 The People appeal.
¶ 9 Determining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Elmarr, 181 P.3d 1157, 1161 (Colo.2008). We defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by the record. Id. But we review the custody determination de novo. People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo.2002). Our analysis is not limited to the factual findings which form the basis of the trial court's order; we may also consider undisputed facts evident in the record. People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 16, 298 P.3d 228, 232; Elmarr, 181 P.3d at 1161.
¶ 10 The People concede that Begay's questioning constitutes interrogation, but they contend that he was not in custody until he was formally arrested. They argue that the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard when it analyzed whether Begay felt “free to leave” instead of whether a reasonable person in Begay's position would have believed himself to be deprived of his freedom to a degree associated with a formal arrest. We agree.
¶ 11 We begin by addressing the standard for determining whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes—a standard that differs from the seizure standard under the Fourth Amendment. After discussing the nature of “show-up” identifications, we apply the correct standard, determine that Begay was not in custody, and reverse the trial court's suppression order.
¶ 12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by requiring police to provide an advisement before custodial interrogation. Accord Matheny, 46 P.3d at 462.
¶ 13 A suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda if “under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would consider himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
¶ 14 Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when “a reasonable person would not have felt ‘free to leave’ or otherwise terminate an encounter with law enforcement.” People v. Barraza, 2013 CO 20, ¶ 17, 298 P.3d 922, 926.
¶ 15 Thus, what constitutes “custody” for Miranda is narrower than what constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Hughes, 252 P.3d 1118, 1121 (Colo.2011) () (internal quotations omitted); People v. Polander, 41 P.3d 698, 705 (Colo.2001) .
¶ 16 A trial court errs by applying the “free to leave” standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under Miranda doctrine. See Barraza, ¶ 18, 298 P.3d at 926 (); People v. Pittman, 2012 CO 55, ¶ 1, 284 P.3d 59, 60 (); Hughes, 252 P.3d at 1122 (same).
¶ 17 In determining whether a defendant is in custody, courts should consider the following non-exclusive factors, none of which is determinative:
(1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer's response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the defendant's verbal or nonverbal response to such directions.
¶ 18 The Miranda custody determination is an objective reasonable person standard. Id. at 465. “[B]ecause the test of custody is an objective one, unarticulated thoughts or views of the officers and suspects are irrelevant.” Elmarr, 181 P.3d at 1162; accord Hughes, 252 P.3d at 1121 (); Matheny, 46 P.3d at 457 ().
¶ 19 In conducting a typical “show-up” identification, as here, patrol officers responding to a 911 call detain a suspect in the field for one-on-one viewing by the alleged victim. Under these circumstances, the police have unquestionably focused suspicion on the suspect. Multiple police officers are usually present, and a reasonable suspect may very well not feel free to leave. And, yes, if such a suspect tried to leave, he would almost certainly be stopped (although decades of cases have made clear that the subjective intentions of the officers are irrelevant to the custody analysis).
¶ 20 Is such a suspect seized under the Fourth Amendment? Typically, yes. Does that mean he is in custody under the Fifth...
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