People v. Benton

• Decision Date: 22 September 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 296721.
• Citation: 817 N.W.2d 599,294 Mich.App. 191,282 Ed. Law Rep. 655
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BENTON.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

294 Mich.App. 191

817 N.W.2d 599

282 Ed. Law Rep. 655

PEOPLE

v.BENTON.

Docket No. 296721.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 15, 2011, at Detroit.

Decided Sept. 22, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, David S. Leyton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Vikki Bayeh Haley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Michael A. Faraone, P.C., Lansing (by Michael A. Faraone), for defendant.

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and MARKEY and KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC–I), MCL 750.520b(a)(1), for which she was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 25 to 38 years. She appeals by right. We affirm.

Defendant, a former elementary school teacher, was convicted of engaging in sexual intercourse with a 12–year–old former student from her sixth grade class. The victim had academic and behavioral problems and was suspended from school for fighting with another student at the beginning of the 2007–2008 school year. Defendant intervened on the victim's behalf and persuaded the school principal not to expel the victim from school. After the victim returned to school, defendant invited him to religious activities at her masjid (mosque) and to her home, purportedly to offer him guidance and help him with his anger and academic problems. The victim was subsequently expelled from school after a second fighting incident. After his expulsion, he spent more time with defendant at her home, with his mother's permission.

According to the victim, he and defendant progressed from hugging, to holding hands, to kissing, before eventually engaging in sexual intercourse. The victim testified that he and defendant had sexual intercourse on two different evenings in October 2007. After the second incident, the victim called defendant from his home and inadvertently recorded the call. During the recorded call, the victim referred to defendant as his girlfriend and stated that he was proud to be involved with a grown woman. The victim's mother heard the recording and reported it to the school. The school board later terminated defendant from her teaching position and that decision was upheld by the tenure commission.

I. RAPE–SHIELD STATUTE

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her request to cross-examine the victim concerning statements he previously made during a forensic interview in which he related prior sexual experiences with a 13–year–old girl and a 14–year–old girl. The trial court ruled that the evidence was barred by the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j. Defendant contends that the exclusion of the evidence violated her constitutional right of confrontation.

This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v. Orr, 275 Mich.App. 587, 588, 739 N.W.2d 385 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court reaches a result that is outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. at 588–589, 739 N.W.2d 385. Preliminary issues of law, including the interpretation of the rules of evidence and the effect of constitutional provisions, are reviewed de novo. People v. Dobek, 274 Mich.App. 58, 93, 732 N.W.2d 546 (2007). The constitutional question whether defendant was denied her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her is reviewed de novo. People v. Breeding, 284 Mich.App. 471, 479, 772 N.W.2d 810 (2009).

At trial, when describing the two acts of intercourse with defendant, the victim testified that defendant placed a condom on his penis and put his penis into her vagina because he did not know how. The trial court denied defendant's request to cross-examine the victim concerning statements he previously made during a forensic interview in which he related prior sexual experiences with a 13–year–old girl and a 14–year–old girl.

Michigan's rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j, provides:

(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted ... unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value:

(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.

(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.

(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).

MRE 404(a) similarly provides, in pertinent part:

Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

* * *

(3) In a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant and evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease[.]

In this case, the evidence of the victim's prior sexual experiences that defendant sought to introduce did not fit within the categories of evidence specified in MCL 750.520j(1)(a) or (b). Defendant contends, however, that the evidence was necessary to protect her constitutional right of confrontation.

In certain limited situations, evidence that is not admissible under one of the statutory exceptions may nevertheless be relevant and admissible to preserve a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 344, 348, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984). In Hackett, 421 Mich. at 348–349, 365 N.W.2d 120, our Supreme Court explained:

The fact that the Legislature has determined that evidence of sexual conduct is not admissible as character evidence to prove consensual conduct or for general impeachment purposes is not however a declaration that evidence of sexual conduct is never admissible. We recognize that in certain limited situations, such evidence may not only be relevant, but its admission may be required to preserve a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. For example, where the defendant proffers evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct for the narrow purpose of showing the complaining witness' bias, this would almost always be material and should be admitted. Moreover in certain circumstances, evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct may also be probative of a complainant's ulterior motive for making a false charge. Additionally, the defendant should be permitted to show that the complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past. [Citations omitted.]

When a trial court exercises its discretion to determine whether evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct not within the statutory exceptions should be admitted, the court “should be mindful of the significant legislative purposes underlying the rape-shield statute and should always favor exclusion of evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct where its exclusion would not unconstitutionally abridge the defendant's right to confrontation.” Id. at 349, 365 N.W.2d 120. When applying the rape-shield statute, trial courts must balance the rights of the victim and the defendant in each case. People v. Morse, 231 Mich.App. 424, 433, 586 N.W.2d 555 (1998).

Defendant argues that she should have been permitted to cross-examine the victim concerning his prior sexual experiences because his trial testimony falsely portrayed him as a sexually innocent, inexperienced virgin, thereby appealing to the jury's sympathy for a sexually uninitiated victim. We conclude that the trial court did not err by excluding this evidence. The first flaw in defendant's argument is that the victim never stated, directly or indirectly, that his sexual contact with defendant was his first sexual experience. Indeed, when the prosecutor asked the victim why he needed defendant's assistance with the condom and with penetration the second time, the victim stated, “Cause every time I did ... the girl put my penis in her vagina for me.” (Emphasis added.) We disagree with defendant's contention that this statement could only be understood as referring to the victim's first sexual encounter with defendant. The phrase “every time” refers to more than one occasion, not a single prior incident. Further, the victim's reference to “the girl” suggested someone other than defendant, considering that defendant was a grown woman and that the victim referred to defendant as “Miss Allanah” throughout his testimony. Accordingly, defendant failed to show that the proffered evidence was necessary to impeach the victim's trial testimony.

Furthermore, the evidence was not otherwise relevant. “Evidence is relevant when it has a tendency to make a material fact more or less probable.” People v. McGhee, 268 Mich.App. 600, 610, 709 N.W.2d 595 (2005). “Relevance involves two elements, materiality and probative value. Materiality refers to whether the fact was truly at issue.” Id. The premise of defendant's argument is that a jury would view sexual relations with a 12–year–old virgin as being more egregious than sexual relations with a 12–year–old victim who has already had sexual relations, so it was necessary to place the victim's prior sexual experiences before the jury to defuse the prejudicial inference that defendant was the victim's first...