People v. Hyatt

• Decision Date: 21 July 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 325741.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HYATT.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

316 Mich.App. 368

891 N.W.2d 549

PEOPLE

v.HYATT.

Docket No. 325741.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 18, 2016, at Lansing.

Decided July 21, 2016, at 9:10 a.m.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, David S. Leyton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael A. Tesner and Joseph F. Sawka, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for the people.

Ronald D. Ambrose, for defendant.

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and MARKEY, METER, BECKERING, STEPHENS, M.J. KELLY, and RIORDAN, JJ.

BECKERING, J.

Pursuant to MCR 7.215(J), this Court convened a special conflict panel to resolve the conflict between the previous opinion issued in this case in People v. Perkins, 314 Mich.App. 140, 885 N.W.2d 900 (2016),¹ and the decision issued in People v. Skinner, 312 Mich.App. 15, 877 N.W.2d 482 (2015). The issue involves whether a juvenile, whom the prosecution seeks to subject to a sentence of life without parole under MCL 769.25, is entitled under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to have a jury determine whether life without parole is warranted. As evidenced by the existence of this special conflict panel, we recognize that this is a difficult issue. Also not lost on this panel is the understanding that juveniles who commit a heinous offense, while undoubtedly deserving of punishment, are categorically less culpable than their adult counterparts and are less deserving of the maximum punishment available under the law. As the United States Supreme Court has made unmistakably clear, it is only the truly rare juvenile who will be deserving of the harshest penalty available under the laws of this state, and a life-without-parole sentence is an unconstitutional penalty for all juveniles but those whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. For this reason, while we conclude that a judge, not a jury, is to make this determination, the sentencing judge must honor the mandate that was made abundantly clear in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and other recent Eighth Amendment caselaw: a sentence of life without parole is to be reserved for only the rarest of juvenile offenders so as to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally disproportionate life-without-parole sentence on a transiently immature offender. This mandate necessarily affects not only the way a trial court is to exercise its discretion when meting out punishment, but also the way an appellate court is to review a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile offender. In short, youth matters when it comes to sentencing, and to avoid an unconstitutional sentence, our courts, at sentencing and on appeal, must carefully take this into account when going about the exceedingly difficult task of determining whether a juvenile is irreparably corrupt—meaning incapable of rehabilitation for the remainder of his or her life.

I. FACTS

The facts of this case are fully set forth in the prior opinion and do not bear repeating, save for a few pertinent details. Following trial, a jury convicted defendant Kenya Hyatt of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.529, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1). At a sentencing hearing conducted pursuant to MCL 769.25(6), the trial court sentenced defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, to life without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction. The prior panel reversed his sentence because the trial judge, not a jury, was the sentencer, and because it was bound to follow the decision reached by the majority in Skinner, 312 Mich.App. 15, 877 N.W.2d 482. Perkins, 314 Mich.App. at 165–179, 885 N.W.2d 900. Nevertheless, the prior panel in the instant case noted that but for Skinner, it would have affirmed the sentence because it concluded that a judge, not a jury, was to determine a juvenile's eligibility for a life-without-parole sentence under MCL 769.25. Id. Because it disagreed with Skinner on this point, the prior panel declared a conflict with Skinner, and the Court of Appeals ordered a special conflict panel convened. People v. Perkins, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 12, 2016 (Docket Nos. 323454, 323876, and 325741).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Resolution of the conflict in this case requires us to construe MCL 769.25 and to examine defendant's constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We review de novo these issues of law. People v. Humphrey, 312 Mich.App. 309, 314, 877 N.W.2d 770 (2015) (statutory construction); People v. Al–Shara, 311 Mich.App. 560, 567, 876 N.W.2d 826 (2015) (constitutional law).

III. ANALYSIS

As was recognized in Skinner and by the prior panel in this case, the instant case involves the confluence of Sixth Amendment and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. We begin by briefly touching on the pertinent Eighth Amendment caselaw.

A. RECENT EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASELAW

1. MILLER V. ALABAMA

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders in homicide cases and concluded that "[b]y making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence [life without parole], such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment." The Court emphasized that the unique characteristics of youth warranted treating juveniles differently from adults for purposes of sentencing. In particular, drawing on past Eighth Amendment precedent in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (imposing a categorical ban on capital punishment for all juvenile offenders), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (banning life-without-parole sentences for juveniles in nonhomicide cases), the Court noted that juveniles have "lesser culpability" and a greater capacity for reform and thus "are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing." Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2463–2464. Specifically, the Court explained that Roper and Graham recognize "three significant gaps between juveniles and adults":

First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Second, children are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers; they have limited contro[l] over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child's character is not as well formed as an adult's; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity]. [Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2464 (citations and quotation marks omitted; alterations in original).]

In addition to noting that the characteristics of youth warranted treating juveniles differently, the Court recognized the severity of a life-without-parole sentence for juveniles. Particularly, the Court took notice of the idea that the majority in Graham "likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself...." Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. See also Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–71, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Graham majority did so by noting that life without parole was especially harsh for a juvenile offender, who will "almost inevitably serve ‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.’ " Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2466, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 70, 130 S.Ct. 2011. And given that Roper categorically banned the death penalty for juvenile offenders, life without parole became the "ultimate penalty for juveniles...." Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2466. Because Graham likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty, the Court reasoned that Graham made death-penalty caselaw—which imposed the requirement of individualized sentencing through consideration of the offender's character and record, along with the circumstances of the offense and other mitigating or aggravating factors—relevant to the issue at hand. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2467.

In light of the characteristics of youth and pertinent Eighth Amendment precedent, the Court concluded that mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes for juveniles, "by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it." Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2467. "And still worse," continued the Court, "each juvenile (including these two 14–year–olds) will receive the same sentence as the vast majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses—but really, as Graham noted, a greater sentence than those adults will serve." Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2468. Accordingly, the Court barred mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders in homicide cases and provided a number of nonexhaustive factors² that a sentencer should consider before imposing a life-without-parole sentence:

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for

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