People v. Bernasco

• Decision Date: 18 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 69035,69035
• Citation: 150 Ill.Dec. 155,138 Ill.2d 349,562 N.E.2d 958
• Parties: , 150 Ill.Dec. 155, 59 USLW 2289 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Brian BERNASCO, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 958

562 N.E.2d 958

138 Ill.2d 349, 150 Ill.Dec. 155, 59

USLW 2289

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Brian BERNASCO, Appellee.

No. 69035.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 18, 1990.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and William R. Haine, State's Atty., Edwardsville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris and Matthew E. Franklin, of the Office of the State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Mount Vernon, of counsel), for the People.

William C. Evers III, Collinsville, for appellee.

Justice STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

In the circuit court of Madison County, the 17-year-old defendant, Brian Bernasco, was charged by information with two counts of residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 19-3). That court suppressed his confession, finding that, though the confession was not coerced or otherwise the product of improper police conduct, and though the confession was preceded by Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694). Defendant's intelligence level was so low that his Miranda waiver and his confession were neither voluntary nor knowing.

The appellate court affirmed. (185 Ill.App.3d 480, 133 Ill.Dec. 563, 541 N.E.2d 774.) The appellate court held that, even though defendant's Miranda waiver and confession were voluntary within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; see Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473), his Miranda waiver was invalid because, as the trial court found, it was not knowing and intelligent (see Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421; People v. Turner (1973), 56 Ill.2d 201, 205-07, 306 N.E.2d 27). (185 Ill.App.3d at 490, 133 Ill.Dec. 563, 541 N.E.2d 774.) The appellate court acknowledged that in given cases the confessions of subnormally intelligent defendants have been held admissible, but the court observed that the question of intelligent waiver is a factual one that may depend in part on such circumstances as a defendant's background and conduct. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's finding in the present cause was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We then allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm.

The chief issue is whether a valid Miranda waiver must be knowing and intelligent in addition to being free from coercion or other misconduct. The secondary issue is whether the trial court's finding, that defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights or confess, was in accord with the manifest weight of the evidence.

The facts of this cause were fully set forth in the appellate court's opinion. We will refer to them as necessary. Briefly, defendant was of subnormal intelligence and was questioned by police outside his father's presence and on the assumption that he could understand Miranda warnings. At trial, his father testified that defendant had left school in the ninth grade and had had no prior police experience. A psychologist testified that defendant could not understand certain Miranda terminology and that he would probably have agreed to almost anything said to him if doing so would end his interrogation. Defendant testified that he had not been paying attention to his Miranda waiver form, had not understood it, and had been scared.

I

The State contends that, in Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the theory on which the appellate court relied and for which defendant argues: that a Miranda waiver and resulting confession must be knowing and intelligent as well as constitutionally "voluntary" in order to be admissible. In turn, the appellate court and defendant rest their view on Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410. We hold that the State's contention is not supported by Connelly and that Burbine's requirement of intelligent knowledge as well as of voluntariness continues to be the law.

Connelly involved a defendant who, while mentally ill, had confessed to a murder. He had first confessed spontaneously upon approaching a police officer in the street. He had then confessed twice more after being given Miranda warnings. No improper police coercion had accompanied his confessions.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that, as a matter of due process, voluntariness required that the first, spontaneous confession have been "the product of a rational intellect and a free will," regardless of whether there had been improper coercion; that, despite any lack of official coercive origin, the confession's very admission into evidence would have constituted State action implicating the fourteenth amendment's due process clause; and that, because of evidence that the defendant had been suffering from a serious mental disorder, the trial court correctly found that he had lacked a rational intellect and free will and that the confession had thus been involuntary. (People v. Connelly (Colo.1985), 702 P.2d 722, 728-29.) As for the subsequent confessions, the Colorado Supreme Court likewise held that, because of the evidence of the defendant's mental condition, the trial court correctly concluded that the State had failed to prove clearly and convincingly that the defendant's attempted waivers of Miranda rights were free and intelligent so as to be voluntary and thus effective. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d at 729.

On review, the United States Supreme Court held that, in order to satisfy the fourteenth amendment's due process requirements as to voluntariness, it is sufficient that a confession not be causally related to coercive police conduct. (Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. at 522, 93 L.Ed.2d at 484.) The Court rejected any conclusion that, "by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion," a defendant's mental condition might determine constitutional voluntariness. (Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. at 520, 93 L.Ed.2d at 482.) Accordingly, any voluntariness inquiries into a confessing defendant's state of mind, "inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State," should be left for resolution by State evidence rules pertaining to reliability; such matters are not governed by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67, 107 S.Ct. at 522, 93 L.Ed.2d at 484.

The Connelly Court explained that it was reversing the Colorado judgment in its entirety because the Court believed that the judgment's underlying analysis had been influenced by an erroneous view of constitutional voluntariness requirements. However, the Court explicitly noted that, on remand, the Colorado court could reconsider other issues not inconsistent with the Federal opinion (Connelly, 479 U.S. at 171 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. at 524 n. 4, 93 L.Ed.2d at 487 n. 4) issues that apparently could include the separate question whether defendant's Miranda waivers had been intelligent and knowing (see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 184 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. at 531 n. 5, 93 L.Ed.2d at 495 n. 5 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting)).

Though it is clear from the Connelly majority opinion and the cited dissent that a confession, made after a Miranda waiver, might still be suppressed on grounds that Miranda's protections had not been intelligently and knowingly waived, it is not perfectly clear from the Connelly majority opinion whether such suppression would have a constitutional basis. Nevertheless, defendant would ground suppression in the constitutional jurisprudence of Burbine, and we agree that Burbine has continuing vitality in this regard.

According to Burbine, an inquiry into Miranda waiver has "two distinct dimensions": (1) whether there was a free, uncoerced choice and (2) whether there was awareness of the right and the consequences of abandoning it. (Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421; accord Colorado v. Spring (1987), 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954, 965.) A valid Miranda waiver would thus require "both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension." (Emphasis added.) (Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421.) Burbine traced its requirements of voluntariness and intelligent knowledge to Miranda itself and beyond. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d at 420-21 (" 'provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently' "), quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707.

In Burbine, the police had failed to inform the respondent that an attorney, whom the respondent's sister had attempted to retain for him, had telephoned the police less than an hour before the respondent's interrogation and had been told by the police that the respondent would not be interrogated until the next day. (Burbine, 475 U.S. at 415-17, 106 S.Ct. at 1138-39, 89 L.Ed.2d at 417-18.) The Court found no doubt about the respondent's "comprehension of the full panoply of [Miranda ] rights * * * and of the potential consequences of a decision to relinquish them." (Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421.) The Court, viewing Miranda as establishing protections against the "compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation," reaffirmed that "full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process." (Burbine, 475 U.S. at 425, 427, 106 S.Ct. at 1143, 1144, 89 L.Ed.2d at 423, 424.) The unethical failure to inform the respondent of the attorney's call did not deprive him of "knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them." (Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423-24, 106 S.Ct. at 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d at 422.) Accordingly, "[b]ecau...