People v. Billi
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New York) |
| Writing for the Court | LUIGI R. MARANO; Furthermore, in making his finding |
| Citation | 395 N.Y.S.2d 353,90 Misc.2d 568 |
| Decision Date | 20 May 1977 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Anthony BILLI, John Bonamassa, Ralph Esposito and Dennis Wilson, Defendants. |
Page 353
v.
Anthony BILLI, John Bonamassa, Ralph Esposito and Dennis
Wilson, Defendants.
Page 354
Eugene Gold, Brooklyn (John A. Cianci, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kings County, Brooklyn, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Murray Cutler, Brooklyn, for defendant Billi.
Martin Light, Brooklyn, for defendant Bonamassa.
Leon Port, Brooklyn, for defendant Esposito.
Leonard Fusfield, Brooklyn, for defendant Wilson.
LUIGI R. MARANO, Justice.
This is a motion for an evidentiary hearing to determine:
1. Whether cocaine is a narcotic drug as described in the Penal Law and Public Health Law of the State of New York.
2. To hear evidence, scientific and otherwise, to determine the true propensities, proper classification and legal definition of the substance known as cocaine.
3. To determine whether or not the Legislature erred in listing cocaine as a narcotic drug.
4. To determine that if the Legislature has in fact erred in its classification of cocaine, what the proper classification of cocaine should be.
5. If cocaine is determined not to be a narcotic drug, to determine whether the court should, on its own motion, declare that the laws fixing the definition of cocaine as a narcotic drug, and fixing the penalties thereof, are unconstitutional.
6. To determine whether the court has the power, after hearing and determining evidence, to supersede the Legislature in making a determination that the Legislature's definition and prescribed penalties are in error and that to apply them would be unconstitutional and a denial of the rights of the accused, and for such other and further relief as to this court may seem just and proper.
The defendant contends that the question is whether or not this court should place itself in the position of deciding for itself whether the Legislature was correct in passing the law listing cocaine as a narcotic substance and whether the court has the power to second guess the Legislature.
The defendant states that: (1) a public interest must exist in the control of cocaine, and (2) the law must have a rational basis. Also, he contends that the law is unconstitutional substantively, and that the penalties are also as applied to cocaine.
This court will concede for the purpose of this motion that cocaine is not medically a narcotic drug, but a central nervous system stimulant.
The issue then, is whether the Legislature can rationally classify a non-narcotic central nervous system stimulant as a narcotic for penalty and regulatory purposes.
The defendant has submitted an affidavit, magazine articles, and a lengthy memorandum of law in support of the principal ground on which his motion to dismiss rests, viz., the arbitrary and irrational classification of cocaine as a narcotic drug.
Page 355
Cocaine is not a narcotic drug in a medical or pharmacological sense, but in law the Legislature has defined it as such. The Legislature has listed cocaine as a narcotic drug because it considered cocaine a dangerous drug which required control in the public interest. The Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the Drug Laws made many studies and conducted public hearings before determining that cocaine was dangerous and that its illegal distribution and use must be regulated. The commission so advised the Legislature in its interim report N.Y. Legislative Doc., 1972 No. 10. The commission also noted that physiological dependence can develop with intravenous use.
The abuse potential of cocaine may result in: (1) possible overdose death; (2) severe non-fatal acute poisoning from sniffing; (3) chronic psychological effects: cases of demoralization and general deterioration with periodic psychoses. One expert calls cocaine abuse "the most severe of all forms of toxicomania and the most difficult to cure." (Bejerot, Addiction and Society, pp. 66-67.) Some experts state that if cocaine were more easily available, or if more people took to using it intravenously, there might be considerable serious abuse. A cocaine abuser may want to go on taking the drug even though he knows that it is making him paranoid (Joel & Frankel, Der Cocainismus, p. 44). The delusions that sometime accompany cocaine abuse resemble paranoid states (Maier, Der Kokainismus, pp. 118-119).
The Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 1085 (1970), states that cocaine "should be classified as a dangerous drug because it may precipitate acute anxiety and psychotic episodes, and there is a strong possibility that such episodes may involve aggressive or violent behavior." The Legislature was advised by the Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the Drug Laws, through its interim report (N.Y.Legis.Doc. 1972, No. 10, p. 67) that, "Although cocaine is a stimulant, rather than a narcotic, it has been generally considered as a narcotic for purposes of regulating its non-medical use. The abuse patterns and potential are somewhat different; however, the differences are not sufficient to warrant separate or different treatment of cocaine in the penal provisions." The Legislature found that cocaine has a high potential for abuse both psychologically and physically.
The public interest requires that legislative enactments be given recognition and be enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people (Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 172, 100 N.E.2d 463, 467, affd. 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954).
A legislative enactment carries a strong presumption of constitutionality (Wasmuth v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 391, 397, 252 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69, 200 N.E.2d 756, 758). "So it is the duty of courts to adopt a construction of a statute that will bring it into harmony with the Constitution and with legislative intent, and no narrow construction of a statute may thwart the legislative design." (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, # 92.) Statutes are presumed to be valid unless they bear no...
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People v. McCarty, No. 54745
...Erickson (Alaska 1978), 574 P.2d 1, 15; State v. Stitt (1979), 24 Wash.App. 260, 262, 600 P.2d 671, 672; People v. Billi (Sup.Ct.1977), 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353, Because of the legislature's power to redefine terms, one of defendant's basic premises is refuted. Defendant assumes tha......
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People v. Kirchoff, Docket No. 58014
...260, 600 P.2d 671 (1979); State v. Vernon, 283 N.W.2d 516 (Minn., 1979); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska, 1978); People v. Billi, 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup.Ct., 1977); Canal Zone v. Davis, 592 F.2d 887 (CA 5, 1979); United States v. Stieren, 608 F.2d 1135 (CA 8, 1979); Uni......
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State v. Kainz, Cr. N
...600 P.2d 671; State v. Vernon (Minn.1979), 283 N.W.2d 516; State v. Erickson (Alaska 1978), 574 P.2d 1; People v. Billi (Sup.Ct.1977), 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353; Canal Zone v. Davis (5th Cir. 1979), 592 F.2d 887; United States v. Stieren (8th Cir. 1979), 608 F.2d 1135; United States ......
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State v. Cianelli, Nos. 12927
...F.Supp. 444 (D.Mass.1975); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978); Cardwell v. State, 575 S.W.2d 682 (Ark.1979); People v. Billi, 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup.1977); State v. Stitt, 24 Wash.App. 260, 600 P.2d 671 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that the classification of cocaine ......
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People v. McCarty, No. 54745
...Erickson (Alaska 1978), 574 P.2d 1, 15; State v. Stitt (1979), 24 Wash.App. 260, 262, 600 P.2d 671, 672; People v. Billi (Sup.Ct.1977), 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353, Because of the legislature's power to redefine terms, one of defendant's basic premises is refuted. Defendant assumes tha......
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People v. Kirchoff, Docket No. 58014
...260, 600 P.2d 671 (1979); State v. Vernon, 283 N.W.2d 516 (Minn., 1979); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska, 1978); People v. Billi, 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup.Ct., 1977); Canal Zone v. Davis, 592 F.2d 887 (CA 5, 1979); United States v. Stieren, 608 F.2d 1135 (CA 8, 1979); Uni......
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State v. Kainz, Cr. N
...600 P.2d 671; State v. Vernon (Minn.1979), 283 N.W.2d 516; State v. Erickson (Alaska 1978), 574 P.2d 1; People v. Billi (Sup.Ct.1977), 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353; Canal Zone v. Davis (5th Cir. 1979), 592 F.2d 887; United States v. Stieren (8th Cir. 1979), 608 F.2d 1135; United States ......
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State v. Cianelli, Nos. 12927
...F.Supp. 444 (D.Mass.1975); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978); Cardwell v. State, 575 S.W.2d 682 (Ark.1979); People v. Billi, 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup.1977); State v. Stitt, 24 Wash.App. 260, 600 P.2d 671 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that the classification of cocaine ......