People v. Blackburn

• Decision Date: 17 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. S211078.,S211078.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bruce Lee BLACKBURN, Defendant and Appellant.

61 Cal.4th 1113

354 P.3d 268

191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Bruce Lee BLACKBURN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S211078.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 17, 2015.

Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, John H. Deist, Laurence K. Sullivan, Catherine A. Rivlin and Karen Z. Bovarnick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

LIU, J.

The statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender (hereafter sometimes MDO) beyond termination of parole requires the trial court to “advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial” and to hold a jury trial “unless waived by both the person and the district attorney.” (Pen.Code § 2972, subd. (a) (hereafter section 2972(a) ).) We granted review to decide whether a trial court must advise the defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and whether the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant before holding a bench trial to extend the defendant's commitment as a mentally disordered offender.

We conclude that the trial court must advise the MDO defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence—that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision.

Here, the trial court did not advise defendant Bruce Lee Blackburn of his right to a jury trial, did not obtain Blackburn's personal waiver of that right, and did not find that there was substantial evidence that Blackburn lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. Thus, the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial that extended Blackburn's commitment. When a trial court errs in completely denying an MDO defendant his or her statutory right to a jury trial, the error constitutes a miscarriage of justice and automatically requires reversal. In Blackburn's case, however, because the trial court and the parties, in reliance on prior law, likely did not contemplate the need to make a record in conformity with today's holding, we reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment upholding the extension order and remand the case to that court with directions to remand to the trial court for a proper determination of whether Blackburn personally made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial or whether, at the time of counsel's waiver, there was substantial evidence that Blackburn lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver.

I.

In 2004, Blackburn was convicted of first degree burglary and forcible false imprisonment. Blackburn had entered the home of an 85–year–old woman at night, and she awoke to find him naked and lying on top of her. He pinned her down with his legs and restrained her by pulling her hair, but the woman managed to escape. When the police arrived, they found Blackburn sitting naked on the toilet, eating pork chops, and speaking incoherently. In December 2006, he was declared a mentally disordered offender and committed to Atascadero State Hospital as a condition of parole. His commitment was extended in 2009 and again in 2010.

In April 2011, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a third petition to extend Blackburn's commitment. No record was kept of the relevant pretrial proceedings. However, according to a settled statement requested by the Court of Appeal, defense counsel notified the trial court that Blackburn opposed an extension of his commitment and wanted a trial. Defense counsel requested a bench trial, and the prosecutor agreed.

At trial, Dr. Kevin Perry testified that Blackburn suffered from “schizoaffective disorder

, bipolar type” and was not in remission. He noted that Blackburn was paranoid, believed that other patients were stealing from him, believed that he is the Son of God, and suggested that he could communicate over long distances without technology. Blackburn appeared to understand the purpose of the evaluation but jumped from topic to topic without logical connections. Blackburn generally continued to take his medication after a court order compelling him to take it had expired and realized that it was helpful to attend group therapy. When asked about the basis for his conclusion that Blackburn presented a risk to the community, Dr. Perry responded that he showed “active symptoms of the same disorder that was previously adjudicated as a causal or an aggravating factor in a violent crime.” Dr. Perry also explained that before Blackburn could be released, he needed to develop a discharge plan to help identify and manage his symptoms, and that Blackburn had not completed a viable plan. Blackburn did not testify and did not attempt to undermine Dr. Perry's testimony. The court sustained the petition and extended Blackburn's commitment.

Blackburn appealed, arguing that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to advise him of the right to a jury trial and by conducting a bench trial without first obtaining his personal waiver of that right. Although Blackburn's commitment had expired, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to address his claims because the issues are recurring and would otherwise evade review. The court held that the language of section 2972(a) “imposes a mandatory duty” on the trial court to advise the defendant and “reflects a legislative intent to judicially ensure that ‘the person’ knows that he or she has the right to a jury trial.” (All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial court had not advised Blackburn of his right to a jury trial, but held that the omission was harmless because it was not reasonably probable Blackburn would have obtained a more favorable result had he been advised of his right to a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal further held that section 2972(a) does not require personal waiver of the right to a jury trial. However, the court said, because the purpose of the jury trial advisement is “to inform the MDO of the right to a jury trial so that he or she can decide whether to waive it,” section 2972(a)'s waiver requirement cannot reasonably be read to give counsel “exclusive control” over the decision whether to waive a jury trial. Instead, the court explained, counsel may waive a jury trial only “at the MDO's direction or with his or her knowledge and consent,” or “over an MDO's objection when the circumstances cast reasonable doubt on the MDO's mental capacity to determine what is in his or her best interests.” The court found that because counsel had likely informed Blackburn of his rights and there was no indication he disagreed with counsel's decision to waive a jury trial, Blackburn could not meet his burden to show error. Further, even if Blackburn could establish error, he could not establish prejudice in light of Dr. Perry's uncontested adverse testimony.

Finally, the Court of Appeal observed: “The best assurance of compliance is a record that reflects it.” Accordingly, the court created a prospective rule for lower courts requiring that, when a trial court conducts a bench trial to extend an MDO defendant's commitment without receiving a personal waiver from the defendant, the record must reflect the facts establishing the defendant's awareness of the right to a jury and the validity of counsel's waiver. Alternatively, the record must contain an advisement and waiver form signed by the defendant.

We granted review in this case and in the companion case of People v. Tran (Aug. 17, 2015, S211329) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, 354 P.3d 148, 2015 WL 4879683, which presents similar issues in the context of commitment extension proceedings for persons found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b).)

II.

“[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty.” (Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (Addington ); see Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 ; Humphrey v. Cady (1972) 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 [commitment to a mental hospital produces “a massive curtailment of liberty”]; People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1098, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 281 P.3d 753 (Barrett ) [“civil commitment for any purpose can affect liberty and other vital interests”].) “Moreover, it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomena ‘stigma’ or choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.” (Addington, at pp. 425–426, 99 S.Ct. 1804 ; see Vitek v. Jones (1980) 445 U.S. 480, 492, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 [“The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement.”]; Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 223, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1 [involuntary “confinement in a mental hospital ... deprived appellant of freedom in its most basic aspects and placed a lasting stigma on her reputation”].)

At the same time, a civil commitment proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, even though it is often collateral to a criminal trial. We have recognized that some constitutional protections available in the criminal context apply as a matter of due process to defendants in certain commitment...