People v. Tran

• Decision Date: 17 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. S211329.,S211329.
• Citation: 61 Cal.4th 1160,191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251,354 P.3d 148
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dawn Quang TRAN, Defendant and Appellant.

61 Cal.4th 1160

354 P.3d 148

191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Dawn Quang TRAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S211329.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 17, 2015.

Carl A. Gonser, San Rafael, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Catherine A. Rivlin and Karen Z. Bovarnick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

LIU, J.

In the companion case of People v. Blackburn (Aug. 17, 2015, S211078) ––– Cal.4th ––––, ––– Cal.Rptr.3d ––––, –––P.3d ––––, 2015 WL 4879673 (Blackburn ), we addressed the meaning of provisions in the statutory scheme for extending the commitment of a mentally disordered offender (MDO) that require the trial court to “advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial” and to hold a jury trial “unless waived by both the person and the district attorney.” (Pen.Code § 2972, subd. (a).) We held that the trial court must personally advise the MDO defendant of his or her right to a jury trial. In addition, before conducting a bench trial, the court must obtain the defendant's personal waiver of his or her right to a jury trial unless the court finds substantial evidence—that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision.

In this case, we address the meaning of nearly identical language in the statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of a person originally committed after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to a criminal offense. The NGI statute provides that in a commitment extension proceeding, “the court shall advise the person named in the petition of the right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial” (Pen.Code § 1026.5, subd. (b)(3) ), and “[t]he trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the prosecuting attorney” (id., § 1026.5, subd. (b)(4) ). We hold that this language has the same meaning as the parallel language in the MDO statute: The trial court must advise the NGI defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision.

In this case, a bench trial resulted in an order extending the commitment of NGI defendant Dawn Quang Tran. The trial court did not advise Tran of his right to a jury trial, nor did it obtain a personal waiver from Tran or find substantial evidence that Tran lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. In these respects, the trial court erred. When a trial court errs in completely denying an NGI defendant his or her statutory right to a jury trial, the error constitutes a miscarriage of justice and automatically requires reversal. In Tran's case, however, because the trial court and the parties, in reliance on prior law, likely did not contemplate the need to make a record in conformity with our holding, we reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment upholding the extension order and remand to that court with directions to remand the case to the trial court for a proper determination of whether Tran personally made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial or whether, at the time of counsel's waiver, there was substantial evidence that Tran lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver.

I.

In 1998, Tran pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under age 14. (Pen.Code § 288, subd. (b)(1) ; all subsequent statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Tran was committed to Napa State Hospital for treatment, and his commitment was extended by written waiver in 2005, by bench trial in 2007, and by jury trial in 2009.

In April 2011, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to extend Tran's commitment a fourth time. No record was kept of the relevant pretrial proceedings. According to a settled statement requested by the Court of Appeal, defense counsel notified the court that Tran opposed an extension of his commitment and wanted a trial. Defense counsel requested a bench trial, and the prosecutor agreed.

At trial, Tran's treating psychiatrist at Napa State Hospital, Dr. Eric Khoury, testified that Tran suffered from bipolar disorder, which at times had been severe and had caused psychotic episodes. Dr. Khoury explained that the disorder was a chronic condition requiring regular medication. Although Tran generally took his medication, he occasionally claimed he was cured. Dr. Khoury expressed concern that without close supervision, Tran would stop taking his medication and, as a result, would pose a danger to himself and others due to his mental disorder. In response, Tran testified on his own behalf. He acknowledged that he was mentally ill at the time of commitment but believed he was ready for release. Although he admitted he had previously stopped taking his medication, he said he would take his medication for the rest of his life. The court sustained the petition and extended Tran's commitment.

Tran appealed, arguing that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and by failing to obtain his personal waiver of that right before conducting a bench trial. The Court of Appeal held that the language of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(3) (hereafter section 1026.5(b)(3) ) “imposes a mandatory duty” of advisement on the trial court and “reflects a legislative intent to judicially ensure that ‘the person’ knows that he or she has the right to a jury trial.” The Court of Appeal found that the trial court had failed to advise Tran of his right to a jury trial, but that this error was harmless because “the record does not show that defendant was unaware of his right.” The Court of Appeal reasoned that because Tran's third petition was tried before a jury, he was likely aware of his right to a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal further held that section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4) (hereafter section 1026.5(b)(4) ) does not require personal waiver. However, the court said, because the purpose of the jury trial advisement is “to inform the NGI of the right to a jury trial so that he or she can decide whether to waive it,” the waiver provision cannot reasonably be read to give counsel “exclusive control” over the decision to waive the right. Instead, the court explained, counsel may waive a jury trial only “at the NGI's direction or with his or her knowledge and consent” or “over an NGI's objection when the circumstances give counsel reason to doubt the NGI's competence to determine what is in his or her best interests.” The court found that because Tran was likely aware of his right to a jury trial and there was no indication that Tran disagreed with counsel's decision to waive a jury trial, Tran could not meet his burden to show error. Further, even if Tran could establish error, he could not establish prejudice in light of Dr. Khoury's adverse testimony.

We granted review in this case and in a companion case, Blackburn, which presents similar issues in the context of commitment extension proceedings for mentally disordered offenders. (§ 2972, subd. (a).)

II.

The Legislature enacted the statutory scheme that governs NGI commitment proceedings in 1979 in the wake of decisions of this court finding due process guarantees applicable to certain commitment proceedings. (See In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 467, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097 ; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 350, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373 ; People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 324–325, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352 ; In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201.) The statute, as enacted, set forth several procedural protections generally available only in the criminal context (Stats. 1979, ch. 1114, § 3, pp. 4051–4053), and those protections remain in the law today (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(3), (4), & (7) ). (See Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 820–822, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 748, 339 P.3d 998 [reviewing legislative history of section 1026.5 ].)

A criminal defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and who is found legally insane at the time of the offense may be committed to a state medical facility for a period as long as the maximum sentence that could have been imposed for the underlying offense. (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) At least 180 days before the commitment term expires, the facility's medical director must submit an opinion to the prosecuting attorney advising whether the defendant represents a “substantial danger of physical harm to others” due to “mental disease, defect, or disorder.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), (2).) In turn, the prosecutor may request “supporting evaluations and relevant hospital records.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(2).)

The prosecuting attorney may then file a petition with the superior court seeking to extend the defendant's commitment by two years. Subdivision (b)(3) through (7) of section 1026.5 set forth the procedures applicable to a hearing on such a petition. As relevant here, when a petition is filed, “the court shall advise the person named in the petition of the right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial” (§ 1026.5(B)(3) ), and “[t]he trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the prosecuting attorney” (§ 1026.5(b)(4) ).

We review de novo questions of statutory construction. (Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v....