People v. Blackman

• Decision Date: 12 July 1977
• Citation: 90 Misc.2d 977,396 N.Y.S.2d 982
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Sandra P. BLACKMAN, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 982

396 N.Y.S.2d 982

90 Misc.2d 977

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Sandra P. BLACKMAN, Defendant.

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County, Jury Part I.

July 12, 1977.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Queens County, (Gary C. Di Leonardo, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens, of counsel), for the People.

Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Kew Gardens, for the defendant.

ALLEN BELDOCK, Judge.

The defendant moves for an order pursuant to Section 160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law directing the sealing of the defendant's record and the return of her fingerprints and photographs. She had originally been charged with a violation of Section 1192(3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York, driving while intoxicated. Thereafter, and for purposes of disposition, the charge of Disorderly Conduct, a violation of Section 240.20 of the Penal Law, was added to the information and the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the added charge of Disorderly Conduct, a violation, to cover the information. The sentence was a Conditional Discharge. The defendant contends that since the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a non-printable offense, the violation of Disorderly Conduct, she is entitled to the benefit of Sec. 160.50 of the CPL and the return of her fingerprints and photographs which were both taken when she was charged with the misdemeanor printable offense of driving while intoxicated. The posture of the defendant therefore is that the above facts of this case indicate that the termination of the criminal action or proceedi against the defendant was in her favor within the provisions of Sec. 160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law so as to entitle her to the relief sought in this motion. She relies on the cases of People v. Flores, Misc., 393 N.Y.S.2d 664, Trial Term, Part 4 of the Criminal Court, Kings County, People v. Miller, Misc., 394 N.Y.S.2d 1006, Part AP5, Criminal Court, New York County, and Dwyer v. Guido, 54 A.D.2d 956, 388 N.Y.S.2d 636. In each of these cases the Court ordered the return of defendant's fingerprints and photographs and in People v. Flores, supra, the papers were ordered sealed.

The fact that Sec. 160.50, CPL, has been in effect less than one year (it became effective September 1, 1976) has apparently prompted my colleagues to seek to interpret its provisions in Opinions in the Flores case, supra, (Opinion by Judge Brown), and the Miller case, supra, (Opinion by Judge Golden) and in People v. Cosella, Criminal Court, Part API, Richmond County, Galfunt, J., reported in NYLJ, June 27, 1977, pg. 17, col. 2. In the last mentioned case, the application for a return of fingerprints and photographs was denied. A study of the logic and reasoning reflected in the Opinions in these cases leads this Court to reject the conclusions reached in the Flores and Miller cases and adopt that reached in the Cosella case. The crux of the issue in each of these cases is the interpretation to be given to the term "in favor of such person" as that phrase is contained in the subdivisions of Sec. 160.50 CPL. The Legislature, however, seems to have removed from the court the need to interpret that phrase. Subdivision 2 of Sec. 160.50 CPL specifically sets forth under what circumstances "a criminal action or proceeding against a person shall be considered terminated in favor of such person." This subdivision lists seven such instances, none of which include a plea to a reduced and lesser charge than that with which the defendant was initially charged. In this respect this statute differs from Sec. 79-e of the Civil Rights Law which was the forerunner of Sec. 160.50 CPL and which was repealed upon the enactment of Sec. 160.50 CPL. Sec. 79-e of the Civil Rights Law did not define under what circumstances a proceeding or action would be considered as being terminated in favor of a defendant. The Dwyer and Flores cases, supra, can be distinguished from the case at bar just as Judge Golden in the Miller case indicates that they are distinguishable from the Miller case. In Dwyer and Flores, it appears that the dockets and/or accusatory instruments on which prints and photographs were taken were dismissed and guilty pleas entered on separate non-printable accusatory instruments. Therefore it could be said that the dismissal of such accusatory instruments resulted in the proceedings on those instruments being terminated favorably to the defendant. I...