People v. Blessett
| Citation | 155 P.3d 388 |
| Decision Date | 20 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04CA0434.,04CA0434. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shala L. BLESSETT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Cheryl Hone, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Ann M. Aber, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant, Shala L. Blessett, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding her guilty of false reporting of explosives, a class six felony, and impeding the staff of an educational institution, a class three misdemeanor. Defendant also appeals her aggravated range sentence. We affirm.
On a school-day morning, a female caller telephoned four bomb threats to an elementary school, prompting evacuations of the building. Police searched the school but found nothing.
An investigation revealed that the calls had been made from inside the school. The two secretaries who received the bomb threats recognized the caller's voice as that of defendant, a teacher's aide at the school. Defendant was also seen using the telephone in the teacher's lounge during the times that two of the calls were made. That afternoon, police asked defendant to come to the police station for questioning. After approximately one hour of questioning, defendant confessed to making the calls.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress her confession as involuntary. The jury convicted defendant, and the trial court imposed an aggravated range sentence of two years for false reporting of explosives, to run concurrently with a six-month sentence for impeding the staff of an educational institution. This appeal followed.
Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying her challenges for cause to two prospective jurors. We disagree.
The decision concerning a challenge for cause to a prospective juror is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be overturned on appeal only when the record reveals an abuse of discretion. Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478 (Colo.1999); People v. Baca, 109 P.3d 1005 (Colo.App.2004). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, an appellate court should examine the entire voir dire examination. People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 (Colo.1984).
A trial court must sustain a challenge for cause if the prospective juror's state of mind evinces enmity or bias toward the defendant or the prosecution. But a prospective juror should not be disqualified because of a previously expressed opinion if the court is satisfied that the juror will render an impartial verdict based on the law and evidence presented at trial. Section 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S.2005; Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X); People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319 (Colo.1987); People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048 (Colo.App. 2004).
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her challenge for cause to Juror K because the juror believed defendant was guilty in light of her confession to the charged crimes. We disagree.
A trial court must sustain a challenge for cause if a prospective juror is unable or unwilling to accept the basic principles of criminal law. Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668 (Colo.2000); People v. Wilson, 114 P.3d 19 (Colo.App.2004). However, the challenge should not be sustained if subsequent examination of the prospective juror clearly demonstrates that the juror's original statement was the product of mistake, confusion, or some other factor unrelated to the juror's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356 (Colo.1986).
Here, defense counsel challenged the juror based on the following exchange:
Defense counsel challenged the juror asserting that "she clearly stated that she thinks if somebody's sitting here, they did something wrong."
The trial court conducted further voir dire. When it discussed the presumption of innocence with the juror, it was apparent she believed it was undisputed that defendant had already confessed to the crime:
The prosecutor then explained to the juror that any mention of a confession was merely hypothetical for purposes of voir dire and that it was unknown whether defendant had confessed:
We conclude that Juror K's statements with respect to the presumption of innocence were based on a hypothetical assertion that defendant had confessed to committing the crimes. When that assumption was removed, there was no indication that the juror would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict or would be unwilling to honor the presumption of innocence.
People v. Wilson, supra, on which defendant relies, does not dictate a contrary result. There, the juror never indicated that he could honor the presumption of innocence, nor was there any rehabilitation by subsequent voir dire. The opposite is true in this case.
Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause.
To the extent that defendant asserts the challenge should have been sustained because the juror stated that if defendant confessed, she believed defendant was automatically guilty without examining any other evidence in the case, we note that this was not the basis of the challenge in the trial court. Hence, we decline to address that assertion for the first time on appeal. See People v. Cevallos-Acosta, 140 P.3d 116 (Colo.App. 2005)(court declined to address challenge to juror based on argument not previously presented in the trial court).
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her challenge for cause to Juror B because his statements indicated that he would give more weight to the testimony of police officers. We do not agree.
A trial court is not required to dismiss a juror simply because the juror has indicated a possible source of bias. People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237 (Colo.1988); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172 (Colo.App.1999). Rather, the question is whether the juror can set aside preconceived notions and base a decision on the law and the evidence. People v. Drake, supra.
Here, Juror B stated, "If it comes down to it, to a police officer's word and someone I don't know ... I would go with the police officer's word, in all honesty." However, the juror agreed that police officers were human and could be wrong, and he indicated that he would listen to the witnesses individually and assess their credibility based on what they said.
Although this juror's statements evinced a belief, in the abstract, that police officers are more credible than other witnesses, he indicated that he could decide the case based on the law and the evidence. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause. See People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496 (Colo.1986)(no abuse of discretion to deny challenge for cause where juror inclined to give more weight to testimony of police officers); People v. Cevallos-Acosta, supra (); People v. Richardson, 58 P.3d 1039 (Colo.App.2002)(no abuse of discretion to deny challenge for cause to juror whose comments indicated a belief that police are more credible than other witnesses, because there was evidence juror would base decision on the law and evidence).
Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress her oral confession to the detectives. We disagree.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216 (Colo.2001); People v. Arroya, 988 P.2d 1124 (Colo.1999). An appellate court must defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence in the record, but will review its conclusions of law de novo. People...
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People v. Cardman
...promises by the police, so too did he waive his claim for a remedy for the alleged unkept promises. See also People v. Blessett , 155 P.3d 388, 397 (Colo. App. 2006) (declining to address the defendant's claim for enforcement of an alleged governmental promise during an interview because it......
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