People v. Blumenberg

• Decision Date: 22 December 1915
• Docket Number: No. 10125.,10125.
• Citation: 271 Ill. 180,110 N.E. 788
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BLUMENBERG et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

271 Ill. 180

110 N.E. 788

PEOPLE

v.BLUMENBERG et al.

No. 10125.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1915.

Error to Appellate Court, Second District, on Error to Circuit Court, Will County; Dorrance Dibell, Judge.

Marc A. Blumenberg and others were indicted for conspiracy to injure the character, business, and property of another, and to extort money. From a judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming conviction of William Geppert, he brings error. Reversed and remanded.Brundage, Landon & Holt and Edward A. Alexander (Benson Landon, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

P. J. Lucey, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Martin, State's Atty., of Joliet, and George P. Ramsey, of Springfield (Snapp, Heise & Snapp, of Joliet, of counsel), for the People.

DUNN, J.

William Geppert was indicted, together with Marc A. Blumenberg, Thomas B. Thompson, and Bernard S. Maloy, for conspiracy to injure the character, business, employment, and property of John V. Steger, and to extort money from him. Blumenberg was not arrested. Thompson and Maloy were discharged before trial, and Geppert was tried alone. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $2,000 and to be imprisoned for two years in the penitentiary. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, and he has sued out a writ of error to have the record reviewed.

The indictment consisted of five counts, and it is insisted that each of them is insufficient in law. Three of the counts are based upon section 46 of the Criminal Code and are substantially alike. After reciting at great length the history of John V. Steger and his business enterprises, the relation of the defendants to him and to one another, and the fact that Blumenberg was in the control and management of a paper known as the Musical Courier Extra, of which Geppert was the editor, it is charged that the defendants did unlawfully and corruptly conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together, between and among themselves, with the fraudulent and malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the character, business, employment, and property of said John V. Steger, by uttering, composing, circulating, and publishing, and causing to be composed, circulated, and published, orally and in writing, particularly in and through said Musical Courier Extra, false, malicious, scandalous, and defamatory matters of and concerning said John V. Steger. The third and fourth counts are common-law counts, and charge the defendants with conspiring with the fraudulent, corrupt, and malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to extort from Steger large sums of money by like publications.

The first objection made to the indictment is that each count fails to allege that the defendants conspired to do anything, but it is alleged only that they conspired with intent to do. The language of each count in this respect follows the language of the statute. It may be true that this language is not grammatically exact. The language is that the defendants conspired with intent to injure Steger by making certain publications. The meaning is not different from the charge that with intent to do so they conspired to injure Steger by making the publications. There is no substantial difference in the statements, and there can be no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the language in this respect in each of the counts. The indictment is in the ordinary form in which indictments have been drawn upon which convictions have been affirmed in numerous cases. Cole v. People, 84 Ill. 216;Thomas v. People, 113 Ill. 531;Ochs v. People, 124 Ill. 399, 16 N. E. 662;Tedford v. People, 219 Ill. 23, 76 N. E. 60;People v. Nall, 242 Ill. 284, 89 N. E. 1012. In other cases where the indictments were in like form the judgments have been reversed for reasons aside from the indictment, but the sufficiency of the indictment seems never to have been questioned. Evans v. People, 90 Ill. 384;People v. Hartsig, 249 Ill. 348, 94 N. E. 525. The indictment states the offense so plainly that its nature may be easily understood by the jury, and that the defendants may know what they are accused of, and this is all that is required.

[2] Another objection made to the indictment is that none of the counts state the elements of the conspiracy with sufficient particularity, and it is specially urged that the means by which the injury was to be caused are not averred. Section 46 of the Criminal Code, so far as applicable to this case, declares that:

‘If any two or more persons conspire or agree together * * * with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the person, character, business, or employment, or property of another, * * * every such offender * * * shall be imprisoned,’ etc.

A conspiracy is defined in Bishop's New Criminal Law (volume 2, § 171) as:

‘The corrupt agreeing together of two or more persons to do by concerted action something unlawful either as a means or an end.’

A conspiracy to do an unlawful act by any means is an indictable offense, and so is a conspiracy to do any act by unlawful means. The unlawful act which it is the object of a conspiracy to accomplish need not itself be an offense against the criminallaw. Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17, 76 Am. Dec. 780. There are unlawful acts which the law does not punish criminally. The common law does not limit conspiracies which are indictable and punishable as crimes to those formed to commit crimes, and the statute expressly denounces conspiracies to injure the character, person, business, employment, or property of another. Such an injury is an unlawful act, and the section of the statute cited is expressly aimed against a conspiracy to do such act. Where a conspiracy is formed to do an unlawful act, it is not necessary that the indictment should allege the means by which the act is to be accomplished. Smith v. People, supra; Thomas v. People, supra; Johnson v. People, 22 Ill. 314;Chicago, Wilmington & Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N. E. 770;People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91, 87 N. E. 885; People v. Nall, supra. The essence of the offense is not the accomplishment of the unlawful object, but it is the unlawful combination or agreement to accomplish the criminal or unlawful purpose. It is unnecessary to prove any overt act toward the accomplishment of the unlawful purpose. The offense is complete when the agreement is made, although no act is done toward carrying it into effect. The means to be employed to accomplish the unlawful purpose may never have been disclosed, or may never have been agreed upon, so that they could not be stated, and yet the offense would be complete, and might be proved by overt acts or other circumstances. Johnson v. People, supra; Garland v. State, 112 Md. 83, 75 Atl. 631,21 Ann. Cas. 28;Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 Atl. 1058;State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386;State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271, 22 Am. Rep. 719; Regina v. Banks, 12 Cox's C. C. 393.

It is insisted that the evidence does not establish the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The first, second, and third counts alleged that the conspiracy was entered into in the city of Chicago in October, 1907, and the third and fourth counts allege a conspiracy entered into in Will county in March, 1912. It is urged that there was no evidence that the defendants conspired in Cook county in October, 1907, or within 18 months of that date, or in Will county in March, 1912, or within 18 months prior to that time. The evidence tends to show the formation of a conspiracy in New York and its renewal in Chicago by acts done in furtherance of its purpose. It is contended that the evidence also tends to show overt acts committed in Will county. Although, as has been stated, the unlawful combination alone constitutes the offense of conspiracy, and no act in furtherance of the unlawful design is necessary to complete the offense, yet every such act is regarded in law, as a renewal or continuance of the unlawful agreement. People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 229, 21 Am. Dec. 122;Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521;McKee v....