People v. Bonaparte

• Decision Date: 06 June 1991
• Citation: 78 N.Y.2d 26,574 N.E.2d 1027,571 N.Y.S.2d 421
• Parties: , 574 N.E.2d 1027 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Jerome BONAPARTE, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 421

571 N.Y.S.2d 421

78 N.Y.2d 26, 574 N.E.2d 1027

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Jerome BONAPARTE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 6, 1991.

Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty. (Jodi L. Mandel, Jay M. Cohen and Peter A. Weinstein, of counsel), Brooklyn, for appellant.

Winston McIntosh and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Chief Judge.

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1], [3]. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, 161 A.D.2d 774, 556 N.Y.S.2d 363, holding that the trial court had improperly delegated a judicial function to a court officer when, during jury deliberations, the court directed the court officer to inform the jurors that they were going to be sequestered for the evening and to take them to dinner and a hotel. The jurors were thus sequestered without being instructed by the court that they should not discuss the case among themselves or with anybody else during the recess.

While we do not approve of this procedure, on this record the court's failure to so instruct the jurors does not require a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of conviction.

The charges against defendant stemmed from the beating and strangulation death of a 61-year-old man, an acquaintance of defendant and his sister. The trial lasted approximately a week and a half. The court's charge was delivered on a Monday morning, following a weekend recess, and the jury retired to deliberate at 11:20 A.M. that day. That afternoon, pursuant to the jury's request, the court repeated its instructions concerning the definition of the charges. Deliberations resumed at 3:40 P.M. The jury was sequestered sometime after 5:00 P.M., and they reached a verdict a half hour after resuming deliberations the following morning.

When the court reconvened to receive the verdict, defendant's attorney expressed his concern that, because the jury had deliberated such a short time that morning, the verdict may have been the product of unauthorized deliberations during the sequestration period. Defense counsel acknowledged that he had been informed that the jury was "just going to be sent out", but now protested that the court should have instructed the jury to stop deliberations before sequestration. The court explained that its practice was to sequester the jury without such an instruction, because

"when a Judge makes a decision to sequester a jury for the evening, the decision has been made, the jury has worked hard enough for the day, and they should no longer have to stay around the courthouse. They should then be taken to dinner and relax, as far as I'm concerned, as soon as possible. If I have to call the lawyers--I would not communicate, obviously, to the jurors anything without the lawyers being present. I would have to reach out for the attorneys, who knows where they are * * *. The defendant would have to be brought up. I would say--it would be fair to say it would occasion a delay of at least from fifteen minutes to another half an hour just to tell the jury good night and stop deliberating."

The court asked the court officer to state on the record what he said to the jurors prior to their sequestration. The court officer stated that he told the jurors to "cease all deliberations" and that they were going to be taken to dinner and sequestered for the evening. Upon further questioning from the court, the court officer stated that the jurors had not discussed the case during dinner or breakfast and that the rest of the time was spent in pairs or individually in their hotel rooms, with no opportunity for joint deliberations. The court officer also noted that all jury supplies--verdict sheets, paper, etc.--had been secured in the courtroom before the jury left for the evening.

Based on this information, the court found no indication that the jury had deliberated during the sequestration period. The court noted that the jurors' request for clarification of the definition of the various charges shortly before their sequestration indicated to him, based on his experience, that the jury was close to a verdict at that time. Thus, he did not consider it unusual or indicative of improper overnight deliberations that the jury had reached a verdict so quickly the next morning. The court concluded, "So that's the Court's reaction to it. I don't think you made any kind of motion. I don't know what I am supposed to do at this point, other than to say that's my reaction to it." Defendant's attorney said nothing further. The court thereupon called in the jury, which rendered its verdict finding defendant guilty of intentional murder and felony murder.

On defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division determined first that the verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence and that it was in accord with the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, however, "because the court improperly delegated a judicial function to a court officer and because, in so doing, it abridged the defendant's right to be present during a critical stage of his jury trial" (People v. Bonaparte, 161 A.D.2d 774, 556 N.Y.S.2d 363).

It is true, of course, that a defendant has the right to be present during all critical stages of a trial and that this includes the right to be present when the jury is given instructions or information by the court (see, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674; People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 812, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966, 559 N.E.2d 660; People v. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100, 505 N.E.2d 610; see also, CPL 310.30). Equally true is that the court may not delegate to a nonjudicial staff member its authority to instruct the jury on matters affecting their deliberations (People v. Torres, 72 N.Y.2d 1007, 534 N.Y.S.2d 914, 531 N.E.2d 635; People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984, 487 N.E.2d 894).

Nevertheless, not every communication with a deliberating jury requires the participation of the court or the presence of the defendant. For example, in People v. Harris (supra), we held that the court could seek clarification of a readback request from the jury without the defendant's presence, and in People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 437, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371, 391 N.E.2d 1347, we noted that a court officer could perform the ministerial task of inquiring whether the jury had reached a verdict. Even the dissent in Harris acknowledged that the defendant's presence was not required for communications with the jury about "the logistics of the deliberative process, such as the timing of the jury's eating break" (People v. Harris, supra, 76 N.Y.2d at 813, n., 559 N.Y.S.2d 966, 559 N.E.2d 660 [Titone, J., dissenting].

Indeed, the supervisory role of the court officer with respect to a deliberating jury will often require the officer to speak to the jurors about a variety of ministerial matters, as the statute conferring such supervisory authority acknowledges (see, CPL 310.10 [court officer may not speak to jurors "(e)xcept when so authorized by the court or when performing administerial duties with respect to the jurors"]. Ministerial duties may include, by way of example, determining who to contact to secure whatever personal belongings the jurors might need for an overnight stay or enforcing the court's instructions not to discuss the case among themselves or others during periods of...