People v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 26 March 2021
• Docket Number: KA 18-02090,167
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

192 A.D.3d 1659

144 N.Y.S.3d 278

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Christopher BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.

167

KA 18-02090

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: March 26, 2021

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ERIN A. KULESUS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (ASHLEY R. LOWRY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CARNI, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by directing that the sentences imposed on counts six and eight shall run concurrently with each other and with all other counts, and as modified the judgment is affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of three counts of robbery in the first degree ( Penal Law § 160.15 [1], [4] ), two counts each of burglary in the first degree (§ 140.30 [2], [4]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]), and one count each of assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [4]), attempted murder in the second degree (§§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (§ 165.45 [5]). Defendant contends and the People correctly concede that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because County Court "mischaracterized it as an ‘absolute bar’ to the taking of an appeal" ( People v. Dozier , 179 A.D.3d 1447, 1447, 119 N.Y.S.3d 318 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 941, 124 N.Y.S.3d 290, 147 N.E.3d 560 [2020], quoting People v. Thomas , 34 N.Y.3d 545, 565, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970 [2019], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 2634, 206 L.Ed.2d 512 [2020] ). We note that the better practice is for the court to use the Model Colloquy, which "neatly synthesizes ... the governing principles" ( People v. Brooks , 187 A.D.3d 1587, 1588, 133 N.Y.S.3d 690 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1049, 140 N.Y.S.3d 875, 164 N.E.3d 962 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Nevertheless, we reject defendant's contention that the court erred in determining that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making certain statements to the police and thus erred in refusing to suppress those statements. It is well settled that "[a] statement given freely and voluntarily" is admissible in evidence ( Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966] ). Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, which included the testimony of a police investigator who interviewed defendant and a video recording of that interview, establishes that the investigator advised defendant of his Miranda rights and then asked defendant whether he understood them. Defendant nodded his head affirmatively to indicate that he understood (see People v. Henriquez , 159 A.D.3d 541, 541, 70 N.Y.S.3d 507 [1st Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1149, 83 N.Y.S.3d 430, 108 N.E.3d 504 [2018] ; People v. Madison , 71 A.D.3d 1422, 1423, 897 N.Y.S.2d 363 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 753, 906 N.Y.S.2d 826, 933 N.E.2d 225 [2010] ). The investigator asked, "Yes?," and defendant again nodded his head affirmatively. The investigator asked defendant to say "yes" so that he would know defendant was listening. Thereafter, defendant said, "Yes." The investigator then asked defendant if he wished to speak, and defendant nodded his head affirmatively. We conclude that, viewing the totality of the circumstances (see People v. Deitz , 148 A.D.3d 1653, 1653, 50 N.Y.S.3d 726 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1125, 64 N.Y.S.3d 675, 86 N.E.3d 567 [2017] ), defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. Furthermore, although defendant appeared to be in discomfort during the interview, he explained to the investigator that he had been shot approximately four weeks earlier and did not require immediate medical attention (see People v. Harrington , 163 A.D.2d 327, 327-328, 557 N.Y.S.2d 451 [2d Dept. 1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 940, 563 N.Y.S.2d 69, 564 N.E.2d 679 [1990] ).

We agree with defendant, however, that the sentence is illegal insofar as the court directed that the sentence imposed for assault in the first degree under count six of the indictment run consecutively to the sentence imposed for criminal possession of a weapon under count eight. Where a defendant is charged with both criminal possession of a weapon in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (3) and a different crime that has an element involving the use of that weapon, consecutive sentencing is permissible if "[the] defendant knowingly unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm before forming the intent to cause a crime with that weapon" such that the possessory crime has already been completed ( People v. Brown , 21 N.Y.3d 739, 751, 977 N.Y.S.2d 723, 999 N.E.2d 1168 [2013] ; see People v. Lozada , 164 A.D.3d 1626, 1627, 84 N.Y.S.3d 630 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1174, 97 N.Y.S.3d 588, 121 N.E.3d 215 [2019] ). The People have the burden of establishing that consecutive sentences are legal, i.e., that the two crimes were committed through separate and distinct acts (see People v. Houston , 142 A.D.3d 1397, 1399, 38 N.Y.S.3d 368 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1146, 52 N.Y.S.3d 297, 74 N.E.3d 682 [2017] ).

Where, as here, a defendant is convicted by a guilty plea, the People may rely on the allegations in the counts of the indictment to which the defendant pleaded guilty, as well as the facts adduced during the plea allocution (see People v. Dean , 8 N.Y.3d 929, 931, 834 N.Y.S.2d 704, 866 N.E.2d 1032 [2007] ; People v. Laureano , 87 N.Y.2d 640, 644, 642 N.Y.S.2d...