People v. Bradford

Decision Date19 October 2010
Citation937 N.E.2d 528,910 N.Y.S.2d 771,15 N.Y.3d 329
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dana R. BRADFORD, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Kimberly F. Duguay of counsel), for appellant.

Michael C. Green, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GRAFFEO, J.

This appeal requires us to consider whether there is record support for the Appellate Division's conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of defendant's confession. Because there is a basis in the record for the Appellate Division's determination that the confession was sufficiently attenuated from defendant's initial detention by the police, we affirm.

In November 2003, defendant began a relationship with a young woman he met on a telephone "chat line." He was a 37-year-old registered sex offender; she was a 16 year old who had been adjudicated a "person in need of supervision" under article 7 of the Family Court Act.* In order to visit with Jane, defendant would pick her up near her mother's house in Ontario County, drive her to his apartment in Monroe County (a 30 to 45 minute trip each way) and then return her home later in the day. During these visits, defendant usually supplied Jane with alcoholic beverages and he engaged in sexual intercourse with her on several occasions.

Defendant and Jane eventually made plans to celebrate New Year's Eve. On the afternoon of December 31, 2003, Jane and her 15-year-old sister (also adjudicated a "person in need of supervision") were preparing to leave their house when their mother's boyfriend overheard Jane on the telephone telling someone that she was going out in 10 minutes. When the mother's boyfriend left for work shortly thereafter, he noticed a grey Mitsubishi parked around the corner from the house, with a man in the driver's seat speaking on a cell phone. Because he did not recognize the car or the driver, he jotted down the vehicle's license plate number before continuing to his workplace.

[910 N.Y.S.2d 773, 937 N.E.2d 530]

At around 5:00 p.m. that evening, Jane's mother left her job, went food shopping and then drove to her boyfriend's place of employment to bring him dinner. He told her what he had observed earlier that day and provided her with the vehicle's license plate number. On her way home, she decided to stop at the State Police barracks to give them information about her daughters and the vehicle that her boyfriend had observed. Supplied with this information, the trooper undertook a search ofvehicle registration records and learned that the grey Mitsubishi belonged to defendant. The computer search also revealed defendant's status as a registered sex offender and his home address in Rochester.

When Jane's mother arrived home at approximately 9:30 p.m., she discovered that neither girl was present, despite their 8:30 p.m. curfew. She telephoned the trooper that she had spoken to earlier and he issued a "file 6" bulletin, which notified police agencies to be on the lookout for two young women suspected as runaways. A short time later, a trooper patrolling in the vicinity of defendant's residence received a police radio transmission directing him to defendant's address, where he located the grey Mitsubishi with the identified license plate in the parking lot. The trooper saw defendant exiting the apartment building with two females who matched the description of Jane and her sister. As defendant walked to the parking lot, he noticed the State Police vehicle and changed direction. The trooper immediately approached defendant, confirmed his name, handcuffed him and placed him in the police vehicle. After conferring with Jane and her sister, the trooper called for another police car to transport the girls.

Upon arriving at the State Police barracks at about 11:00 p.m., defendant was taken to a room and issued Miranda warnings. He indicated that he was willing to speak to the trooper but the officer did not engage in further conversation at that point. Jane and her sister were placed in a different room and interviewed. Jane told the police that defendant was her boyfriend and that they had engaged in sexual intercourse on a number of occasions at his apartment. Her sister provided some corroborating information and both young women acknowledged that defendant had supplied them with alcohol.

Defendant was confronted with these statements at approximately 1:00 a.m. He then admitted to the police that he gave Jane alcohol and had intercourse with her once, though he claimed that Jane had represented that she was 17 years old. Defendant eventually revised his story, admitting that he had sex with Jane three times and that both girls had consumed alcohol in his presence. After an investigator prepared his typewritten confession, defendant again waived his Miranda rights and signed the document shortly before 4:00 a.m.

As a result of the admissions he provided and the statements of the sisters, defendant was charged with multiple counts ofrape in the third degree ( see Penal Law § 130.25[2] ) and endangering the welfare of a child ( see Penal Law § 260.10[1] ). Defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police, claiming that his arrest in the parking lot of his apartment building lacked probable cause. County Court denied the motion, concluding that it was proper to detain defendant to conduct a preliminary investigation and that the statements from Jane and her sister justified the arrest. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of statutory rape in the third degree and six counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender to an

[937 N.E.2d 531, 910 N.Y.S.2d 774]

aggregate 4 1/2-to-9-year term of imprisonment and orders of protection were issued relating to Jane and her sister.

The Appellate Division modified by amending the length of time that the orders of protection would remain in force, but otherwise affirmed (61 A.D.3d 1419, 877 N.Y.S.2d 586 [4th Dept.2009] ). The court determined that defendant had been arrested without probable cause, but that his inculpatory statements were admissible because they were sufficiently attenuated from the arrest. A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (13 N.Y.3d 794, 887 N.Y.S.2d 543, 916 N.E.2d 438 [2009] ).

Evidence that is obtained through illegal police action is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule ( see e.g. People v. Jones, 2 N.Y.3d 235, 241-242, 778 N.Y.S.2d 133, 810 N.E.2d 415 [2004]; People v. Young, 55 N.Y.2d 419, 425, 449 N.Y.S.2d 701, 434 N.E.2d 1068 [1982], cert. denied 459 U.S. 848, 103 S.Ct. 107, 74 L.Ed.2d 96 [1982] ). For example, a confession that is made after an arrest without probable cause is not subject to suppression if the People adequately demonstrate that the inculpatory admission was "attenuated" from the improper detention; in other words, it was "acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the arrest to be purged of the illegality" ( People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 983, 510 N.Y.S.2d 552, 503 N.E.2d 108 [1986] ). The attenuation doctrine requires a court to consider "the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" ( id.; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 [1975] ). Because application of the attenuation doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact ( see e.g. People v. Ryan, 12 N.Y.3d 28, 31, 876 N.Y.S.2d 672, 904 N.E.2d 808 [2009]; People v. Divine, 6 N.Y.3d 790, 791, 812...

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