People v. Conyers

• Decision Date: 25 November 1986
• Citation: 503 N.E.2d 108,510 N.Y.S.2d 552,68 N.Y.2d 982
• Parties: , 503 N.E.2d 108 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Samuel CONYERS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 552

510 N.Y.S.2d 552

68 N.Y.2d 982, 503 N.E.2d 108

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Samuel CONYERS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 25, 1986.

Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender (Donald G. Rehkopf, Jr., Rochester, of counsel), for appellant.

Howard R. Relin, Dist. Atty. (Joan A. Psaila, Rochester, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 115 A.D.2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 834, should be affirmed.

Defendant was arrested in his home November 18, 1980 and charged with two counts of assault, first degree, in connection with the shooting of Thelma Barnes. The arrest was made upon probable cause but without a warrant and thus was illegal under the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. After the arrest, defendant was placed in a police vehicle, given Miranda warnings and taken to police headquarters where he remained alone for two hours before being questioned by the police. After he had been questioned for approximately an hour, defendant made a statement admitting that he had shot the victim but claiming the shooting was accidental. A written statement was later prepared by the police and signed by him.

Defendant moved to suppress his postarrest statements. The hearing court denied the motion, holding that the arrest was lawful although made without a warrant because Payton was not to be applied retroactively and, alternatively, that even if the arrest was unlawful the illegality had been attenuated by subsequent events. Defendant was tried and convicted as charged. Upon appeal, the Appellate Division noted that subsequent to the hearing court's decision the Supreme Court decided that Payton was to be applied retroactively (see, United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202). It nevertheless affirmed the hearing court's order denying suppression, agreeing with the court's finding of attenuation.

When a defendant challenges the admission of statements he has made, claiming they are the product of an illegal arrest, the burden rests on the People to demonstrate that the statements were acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the arrest to be purged of the illegality. That determination requires consideration of the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct (People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 407, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 28-29, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 385 N.E.2d 541; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2563, 65 L.Ed.2d 633; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416). The postarrest administration of Miranda warnings by the police is an important but not a conclusive factor in determining whether the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest (Brown v. Illinois, supra, p. 603, 95 S.Ct. at p. 2261).

The hearing court in this case made extensive findings. It noted particularly: that defendant was promptly and fully advised of his Miranda rights at least twice before questioning began and that he waived his rights; that defendant was alone for at least two hours after the arrest in an interview room before questioning started; that when the police subsequently...