People v. Bradshaw

• Decision Date: 09 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06SA366.,06SA366.
• Citation: 156 P.3d 452
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Brandon J. BRADSHAW, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

156 P.3d 452

PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Brandon J. BRADSHAW, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06SA366.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 9, 2007.

Kenneth R. Buck, District Attorney, Nineteenth Judicial District, Michael J. Rourke, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Douglas K. Wilson, State Public Defender, Jeri D. Shephard, Deputy State Public Defender, Greeley, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2006), to reverse a trial court ruling suppressing statements and physical evidence obtained during the custodial interrogation of defendant, Brandon J. Bradshaw ("Bradshaw"). The trial court's ruling to suppress statements was based on its finding that the interviewing officer violated Bradshaw's Miranda rights by failing to cease the interrogation when Bradshaw requested an attorney. The trial court further suppressed evidence from swabs of Bradshaw's mouth as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Because the record supports the trial court's ruling that Bradshaw's statements were properly suppressed, we affirm this aspect of the trial court's order. As to the physical evidence from the buccal swabs, we find that the trial court inappropriately applied the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a Miranda violation. Thus, with respect to the physical evidence from the buccal swabs, we reverse the trial court's order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On January 7, 2006, a man calling himself "Mike Wallace," met a female real estate agent ("E.P.") at her office in Weld County. After discussing various properties, the two drove separately to a home for sale outside of Keenesburg. Following a tour of the home, E.P. says the man grabbed her from behind, dragged her into the laundry room, and demanded her credit cards with personal identification numbers. When she was unable to tell him the access numbers, he took her to her car to collect her checkbook and forced her back into the home. The man then took E.P. to the master bedroom and ordered her to write out six separate checks in the amount of $1,000 each, payable to Brandon Bradshaw. She claims she was then made to undress, lay on the bed, and was sexually assaulted. E.P. told police that when the man was finished, she was allowed to drive back to her office.

E.P. immediately reported the incident to police. Later that day, she identified Brandon Bradshaw from a photographic lineup as the man who assaulted her. Two days later, Bradshaw was found in a Wheat Ridge hotel where he was arrested for a parole violation. He was booked into the Jefferson County Jail and interviewed by investigator Alan Caldwell ("Caldwell"). At the start of the interrogation, Caldwell identified himself as a detective with the Weld County Sheriff's Office. He told Bradshaw that he wanted to ask him some questions "regarding the crime of sexual assault." Caldwell then advised Bradshaw of his Miranda rights, including the right to have a lawyer present during questioning. Bradshaw stated that he understood these rights and that he was willing to talk to the detective. Caldwell asked Bradshaw to tell him what happened. Bradshaw told the detective that he did meet E.P. to tour the house but that after the tour they began talking about their lives and ended up having sex in the empty house. Bradshaw also told Caldwell that E.P. voluntarily wrote him three checks for $1,000 each because he needed the money.

Caldwell then told Bradshaw that E.P.'s version of the encounter differed significantly from his.

Caldwell: So this lady is telling us that this isn't really . . . how it happened. She told us you grabbed her.

Bradshaw: No. I never grabbed her.

Caldwell: Unless you were going, okay, let's backtrack a little bit. Tell me from beginning to end what happened exactly from the time you got there.

Bradshaw: You know, if she's, if she's got some other different story, I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this, because this is, this is, you know, I mean, this obviously, this is a serious thing.

Caldwell: This is a serious thing.

Bradshaw: You know, I mean, I don't know what class felony it is, but you know, I mean, obviously this is serious if she's saying something different.

Caldwell: Okay.

Bradshaw: So, you know, um.

Caldwell: So, are you, are you telling me that this was consensual?

Bradshaw: Yes it was.

Caldwell: And are you telling me that you want to talk to a lawyer now?

Bradshaw: Well, yeah. I mean, you know, you're telling me she said something different and uh.

Caldwell: Okay. Well, what I need to know is whether you want to continue talking to me in here or not. Okay? If you, if you want to speak to a lawyer then I will stop my questions, okay. If you want to continue to talk to me, it needs to be voluntary on your part and you need to tell me the truth.

Bradshaw: Well, I want to know what I'm facing here. I mean.

Caldwell: Well, I'm investigating a sexual assault, and I think you did it.

Bradshaw: Okay, and, and, you know, you have that right, but I mean what are we looking at, I mean?

Caldwell: It's a felony. I don't know what class felony it is.

Bradshaw: Why, I knew it was a felony. I mean, obviously [it's] a felony.

Caldwell: But, but, that's all I, I don't know on the top of my head whether it's a class three, class four felony, but it is a serious felony. So, do you want to continue talking to me here or not or do you . . .?

Bradshaw: Yeah, I'll talk to you.

(Emphasis added).

The interrogation then continued for another forty-five minutes, during which Bradshaw made various incriminating statements. Toward the end of the interrogation, Caldwell asked Bradshaw to consent to a swab of his mouth for DNA. Caldwell read aloud a consent form for the search as Bradshaw silently read along. Bradshaw then verbally agreed to the search and signed the waiver. The swabs were later tested by the CBI, which determined that Bradshaw's DNA was a conclusive match to the physical evidence found at the scene.

Before trial, Bradshaw filed a motion to suppress all statements he made after his request for an attorney. In a separate motion, Bradshaw also sought to suppress all physical evidence arising from the swab of his mouth, claiming that the search was involuntary because it came during an unconstitutional interrogation.

Bradshaw argued that he unambiguously requested counsel on two occasions moments after he signed the Miranda waiver. Bradshaw claimed that he initially requested an attorney when he stated, "I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this." He next requested an attorney seconds later then Caldwell asked, "Are you telling me that you want to talk to a lawyer now?" to which Bradshaw answered "Well, yeah." Bradshaw argued that these two demands for representation should have placed Caldwell on notice that Bradshaw was invoking his right to counsel. Thus, Caldwell's failure to scrupulously honor this request was a violation of Bradshaw's Miranda right to counsel.

Regarding the physical evidence arising from the buccal swabs, Bradshaw argued that as a consequence of the unconstitutional interrogation, he did not have access to an attorney who would have advised him not to submit to the test. Bradshaw further argued that since the physical evidence was collected during the unconstitutional interrogation, the Fourth Amendment search cannot be separated from the Miranda violation. This made the physical evidence from the buccal swabs fruit derived from the poisonous tree of illegal government action. Thus, Bradshaw argued that all evidence collected by the police during the interrogation must be suppressed.

Upon reviewing Bradshaw's motions, the interrogation transcript, and having heard the testimony of Detective Caldwell, the court issued a ruling from the bench finding that Bradshaw unambiguously and unequivocally requested counsel when he stated, "I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this." The trial court ruled that Caldwell should have scrupulously honored this request by ending the interrogation and contacting the Public Defender so that counsel could be provided to Bradshaw. Thus, the trial court held that all statements made by Bradshaw after the implication of his right to counsel should be suppressed.

The court similarly suppressed the physical evidence from the buccal swabs. The court found that because Bradshaw signed the consent form allowing the physical search after he invoked his right to an attorney, the swabs should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Citing C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), the prosecution commenced this interlocutory appeal disputing both the suppression of the statements and the physical evidence.

II. Analysis

The issue in a suppression case is one of mixed law and fact. People v. Arroya, 988 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo.1999). While we defer to the trial court's findings of fact "when there exists sufficient evidence in the record to support them," the court's conclusions of law are subject to our de novo review. People v. Adkins, 113 P.3d 788, 791 (Colo.2005).

After reviewing the court's order, the tape recording of the interrogation and accompanying transcript, we hold that the trial court correctly found that Bradshaw requested an attorney early in the interrogation. Consequently, we hold that there was a factual basis for suppressing all statements made during the interrogation after Bradshaw asserted his right to an attorney. When Bradshaw stated, "I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this," he made an unambiguous and unequivocal request for a lawyer. The interrogation should have immediately ceased and a lawyer should have been provided to Bradshaw prior to continued questioning. Thus, we affirm the order of the trial court regarding...