People v. Brady

• Decision Date: 21 October 1965
• Citation: 264 N.Y.S.2d 361,211 N.E.2d 815,16 N.Y.2d 186
• Parties: , 211 N.E.2d 815 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent-Appellant, v. Michael Pat BRADY, Appellant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 361

264 N.Y.S.2d 361

16 N.Y.2d 186, 211 N.E.2d 815

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent-Appellant, v. Michael Pat BRADY, Appellant-Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 21, 1965.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Milton M. Stein and H. Richard Uviller, New York City, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Samuel Shapiro, New York City, for appellant-respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of criminally concealing and withholding stolen and wrongfully acquired property as a felony (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1308). The conviction was reversed on the law and a new trial granted.

On these cross appeals by permission, the defendant argues that the arrest was unlawful and the search of his person incident to the arrest improper. The defendant also points to the lack of compliance with a rule requiring specific findings of fact or their equivalent upon the hearing of motions to suppress (People v. Lombardi, 18 A.D.2d 177, 239 N.Y.S.2d 161, affd. 13 N.Y.2d 1014, 245 N.Y.S.2d 595, 195 N.E.2d 306; People v. Lopez, 19 A.D.2d 809, 243 N.Y.S.2d 333). This latter argument is disposed of by our decision in People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 211 N.E.2d 644. There we decided that an appellate court's requirement of findings is often a desirable practice but that the defendant there, as here, had a full and fair hearing on the motion to suppress and that the record itself serves as an ample basis for review of the determination which was made.

We think that the motion to suppress was properly denied since the testimony supports the affirmed finding that the stolen jewelry was seized as an incident to a lawful arrest. On the night he was arrested the police officers saw the defendant coming out of a hotel where a series of burglaries had recently taken place. Some months previous, he had been stopped on one of its upper floors with keys to five different rooms in his possession. Before approaching him on the night here in question, the officers saw him repeatedly take 'little white boxes' out of his pockets and examine their contents as he walked along the street. When he was stopped he denied that his name was Brady and that he had been at the hotel that evening. The acts observed by the officers during their surveillance of the defendant, together with the information which they had concerning his prior activities, were sufficient to give them probable cause for believing that a crime had been committed and that the defendant had committed it. Under the circumstances the interrogation was permissible (People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32) and the obvious falsehoods uttered by the defendant in reply to the officers' questions warranted his detention and arrest (People v. Hook, 15 N.Y.2d 776, 257 N.Y.S.2d 344, 205 N.E.2d 536). At every step the officers observed the standard of what would be probable cause to 'a reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer' (Bell v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 254 F.2d 82, 86, cert. den. 358 U.S. 885, 79 S.Ct. 126, 3 L.Ed.2d 113). Therefore, the search at the precinct station after defendant's arrest was incident to it and the evidence was thereby lawfully obtained.

The People appeal from the Appellate Division's decision which criticized the trial court on the ground that it erred in failing to instruct the jury that, if they found that the value of the property was less than $100, they should find the defendant guilty of a misdemeanor. This difference is not resolved by the rule announced in the case of People v. Walker, 198 N.Y. 329, 91 N.E. 806 (1910). In the case before us the defendant in his testimony admitted that the value of the stolen jewelry exceeded $100...