People v. P.J. Video, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1986
• Citation: 501 N.E.2d 556,68 N.Y.2d 296,508 N.Y.S.2d 907
• Parties: , 501 N.E.2d 556, 55 USLW 2279 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. P.J. VIDEO, INC., Doing Business as Network Video, and James Erhardt, Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 907

508 N.Y.S.2d 907

68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 55 USLW 2279

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. P.J. VIDEO, INC., Doing Business as Network Video, and James

Erhardt, Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 28, 1986.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 23, 1987.

See 107 S.Ct. 1301.

Richard J. Arcara, Dist. Atty. (John J. DeFranks and Jo W. Faber, Buffalo, of counsel), for appellant.

Paul J. Cambria, Jr., and Mary Good, Buffalo, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

In our earlier decision in this case, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 483 N.E.2d 1120, we held that the issuing magistrate erred in approving a warrant authorizing the seizure of video cassette films as evidence that defendants were promoting obscenity. The warrants were void, we said, although supported by police affidavits itemizing several scenes of patently offensive sexual conduct, because the evidence before the magistrate did not establish probable cause to believe that the films were obscene within the three-part definition of Penal Law § 235.00. On certiorari review the Supreme Court of the United States found the evidence satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and it therefore reversed our decision and remanded the case to us so that we could decide whether article I, § 12 of the State Constitution ¹ imposes a more exacting standard for the issuance of search warrants authorizing the seizure of allegedly obscene material than does the Federal Constitution (People v. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 572, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 483 N.E.2d 1120, rev'd & remanded, New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 89 L.Ed.2d 871). We hold that it does and we therefore affirm the order of County Court suppressing the films.

I

The appeal arises from proceedings instituted in the Village of Depew Justice Court charging defendants with multiple counts of obscenity in the third degree based upon their knowing possession, with intent to promote, of allegedly obscene video cassette films (Penal Law § 235.05). After arraignment, defendants moved to suppress the films contending that the warrant authorizing seizure was not based on probable cause. Justice Court granted the motion and dismissed the informations. County Court affirmed its order and a Judge of this court granted the People leave to appeal. Upon review we addressed both procedural and substantive issues. The procedural issue concerned the extent of the inquiry a magistrate must make before issuing a warrant to seize materials that may enjoy First Amendment protection. ² Inasmuch as the magistrate had not viewed the films nor questioned the police but rather relied solely on the police officer's affidavit for each film, the substantive issue posed was whether the affidavits presented sufficient evidence to enable the magistrate to make an objective determination that there existed probable cause to seize the films because they constituted the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of a crime. Applying established law, we resolved the procedural issue by stating that the determination of probable cause had to be made by the magistrate, not the police, that it had to be made from information submitted or available to him, and that--because the materials presumptively enjoyed First Amendment protection--the magistrate was required to perform his duty with "scrupulous exactitude" (People v. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 569-570, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 483 N.E.2d 1120, supra, citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-485 85 S.Ct. 506, 509-512, 13 L.Ed.2d 431). We held that the magistrate was not required to view the films, or even supplement the affidavits by questioning the investigating officers. If he relied solely on affidavits, however, the allegations contained in them had to satisfy the legal standards of probable cause, i.e., the information must be sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime has been committed or that evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place (see, e.g., People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 83 S.Ct. 407, 412-13, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; see also, 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1 § 3.7).

On the substantive issue, we noted that before a person may be found guilty of promoting obscenity the materials he promotes must be more than sexually explicit, they must be obscene under the statutory definition. That definition contains three elements: the material must not only be patently offensive but also, when considered as a whole and judged by the average person applying contemporary community standards, its predominant appeal must be to prurient sex, and it must lack serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value (see, People v. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 572, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 483 N.E.2d 1120, supra ). ³ Acknowledging that, in this case, the magistrate had cause to believe that the films violated paragraph (b) of the statutory definition, we held that he nevertheless erred because the affidavits on which he acted contained only an itemized list of sexual acts, and the police officer's conclusory assertion that the list represented the "content and character" of the films or that such scenes appeared "throughout" the films. Accordingly, we held the magistrate did not have probable cause to support issuance of a warrant to seize the films as evidence of the crime of promoting obscenity because he had permitted the police officer to make the determination for him that the films as a whole appealed predominantly to prurient sex and lacked value (People v. P.J. Video, 65 NY2d 566, 572, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 483 N.E.2d 1120, supra ).

On certiorari review, the Supreme Court judged probable cause by applying the totality of the circumstances/fair probability test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527. The Gates rule originally was adopted to test the reliability of anonymous informants' tips. It overruled the established two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637) which required a court to review both the basis of the informant's knowledge and the reliability of his information, to permit a magistrate to now decide whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the police affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. In this case, the Supreme Court extended the reach of this "totality of the circumstances/fair probability" standard and applied it, for the first time, to an obscenity case to permit the magistrate to focus generally on the explicit nature of pornographic material without specifically considering the other statutory elements of the crime (see, New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 1615-1616, 89 L.Ed.2d 871, supra ). Having done so, it remanded the case to us for our further consideration.

II

State courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court when reviewing Federal statutes or applying the Federal Constitution. Under established principles of federalism, however, the States also have sovereign powers. When their courts interpret State statutes or the State Constitution the decisions of these courts are conclusive if not violative of Federal law. Although State courts may not circumscribe rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret their own law to supplement or expand them (see, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 741; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 430; see also, 1 Rotunda, Nowak and Young, Constitutional Law § 1.6 see, Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 ). Thus, notwithstanding that the evidence before the magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause under the Federal Constitution, we have the power on remand to interpret article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution as requiring more. We turn then to the question whether we should measure probable cause in this case by different standards under the State Constitution.

Courts and commentators have identified many considerations and concerns upon which a State court may rely when determining that its Constitution accords greater protection to individual liberties and rights than the protection guaranteed by the Federal Constitution (see generally, State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 Symposium: Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex.L.Rev. 959-1318 Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 Syracuse L.Rev. 731 Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324-1502 Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va.L.Rev. 873, 934-944 ). One basis for relying on the State Constitution arises from an interpretive review of its provisions. If the language of the State Constitution differs from that of its Federal counterpart, then the court may conclude that there is a basis for a different interpretation of it (see, Maltz, Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex.L.Rev. 995, 1000-1001). Such an analysis considers whether the textual language of the State Constitution specifically recognizes rights not enumerated in the Federal Constitution; whether language in the State Constitution is sufficiently unique to support a broader interpretation of the individual right under State law; whether the history of the adoption of the text reveals an intention to make the State provision coextensive with, or broader than, the parallel Federal provision; and whether the very structure and purpose of the State Constitution serves to expressly affirm certain rights rather...