People v. Branch
| Decision Date | 28 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89SC461,89SC461 |
| Citation | 805 P.2d 1075 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Michael BRANCH, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Hope P. McGowan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheryl A. Linden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner.
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Janet Fullmer Youtz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.
We granted the People's petition for certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in People v. Branch, 786 P.2d 441 (Colo.App.1989), which reversed the conviction of the defendant, Michael Branch, for second-degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. In reaching this result, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant's statements to a court-appointed psychiatrist during a competency examination were voluntary and hence were admissible to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. In contrast to the trial court's ruling, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant's statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel and, on that basis, were involuntary and could not be used for any purpose at trial. We conclude that the court of appeals, and also the trial court, applied an incorrect standard in resolving the voluntariness of the defendant's statements. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.
The defendant was charged by information with the first-degree murder of his wife, Linda Dean Branch, sometime between September 16 and September 18, 1985, in Denver, Colorado. The information was filed in the district court in October 1985, and the case was continued at the defendant's request for the entry of an attorney. On December 16, 1985, the court was advised that the defendant's parents, who lived in Chicago, had retained a Chicago attorney, and the case was continued to January 13, 1986, for the attorney's entry of an appearance. The out-of-state attorney entered an appearance on that date, and the court ordered that he associate himself with a member of the Colorado Bar, see C.R.C.P. 221, and continued the case to March 3, 1986, for that purpose. On March 3, the Chicago attorney did not appear and the court, with the defendant's consent, continued the case for thirty days.
During the defendant's appearance in court on March 3, he requested permission to speak to the court in chambers. The court granted this request and met with the defendant in the presence of the court reporter and a deputy sheriff. The defendant informed the court that he was concerned about his mental and emotional state and needed some help. When asked if he could cooperate with his attorney, the defendant gave a somewhat rambling and unresponsive answer, at which time the court indicated that it was going to order a competency evaluation. The court explained to the defendant that "[i]ncompetency means you may be in such an emotional state that you can't cooperate and participate with your lawyer." The court then told the defendant that the doctor examining him might be able to provide some help and stated, "We will have somebody take care of you." Although the court advised the defendant that a copy of the doctor's report would be given to the court and defense counsel, the court did not inform the defendant that the prosecution would also receive a copy of the report. The court also failed to advise the defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination during the competency examination and his right to confer with counsel prior to the examination. The court appointed Doctor Kathy Morall, a forensic psychiatrist, to conduct a competency examination of the defendant at the county jail.
Subsequent to appointing Doctor Morall, the court on March 25, 1986, entered an order to the effect that if the out-of-state attorney did not associate with local counsel by April 2, 1986, the court would remove him from the case. When the defendant appeared on April 2 without an attorney, the court discharged the out-of-state attorney from the case and appointed the public defender to represent the defendant. The court continued the case until April 25, 1986, for the filing of Doctor Morall's report of the competency examination.
Doctor Morall conducted psychiatric interviews with the defendant on three occasions at the county jail. There is no indication in the record that the defendant was advised by the public defender or Doctor Morall of his constitutional rights during the competency examination. During his meeting with Doctor Morall, the defendant told the doctor that before becoming involved with Linda, the victim, he had a four-year relationship in Chicago with another woman named Renee. He told the doctor that he broke off that relationship because he was bored and was eager for a new experience and wanted someone with more motivation. Linda, as related by the defendant to the doctor, "had a half million dollars worth of checks from her cousin who was a postal inspector" and who would "bust postmen stealing checks and would keep them and give them to Linda." The defendant also described Linda as a woman who appealed "to my greed" and added that he "didn't like her because she was loud and had too many dudes over at her house." He told the doctor that he and Linda had a volatile relationship, involving "about 150 to 200 fights," and that a son, Christopher, was born to them in August 1985.
The defendant told the doctor that Linda had tried to kill their son on prior occasions and that he believed she was trying to kill him on the night of the homicide. He then stated:
I figured she was the devil. I was asleep when she came in and I heard her say I was dead. She was just raving. I got up and went to the bathroom and she was trying to suffocate Christopher. I saw her doing this and I couldn't take it. I really thought I was dead and thought I should cut my hair if I were dead so I had the clippers in my hand. I tried to tie her up with the cord of the clippers. She was hurting the baby more and more. I ran down the hallway yelling for help, but nobody was there. I knew I couldn't get help in time. When I came back inside she was getting ready to throw Christopher out the window, so I tried to tie her up again. She was looking like the devil and wouldn't stop. I thought Christopher was dead so I had the cord around her neck and was saying, "Stop!" She was choking Christopher. I picked her up by the cord around her neck and she dropped the baby. I was hoping she would come back to herself. I let her go and gave Christopher mouth-to-mouth. She was breathing heavy on the floor, then started jerking. I thought she was fainting. I ran out of the house with Christopher to get help but he was OK so I came back into the apartment and tried to pick Linda up and she folded back like she had no backbone and her head hit against the wall. She didn't wake up. She was dead. I didn't know what to do. I went in the bathroom and screamed. I was talking crazy too. I got Christopher ready and we drove around all night. When we came back I thought she'd be alive, but she was stiff. She was smelling like crazy the next morning and I didn't want her spirit to possess me or Christopher. I was talking to her. I wrapped her in a blue sheet and put her in the closet. I asked the lady upstairs to babysit Christopher. I left with her about twelve noon.
The defendant described to the doctor how he returned to the apartment and wrapped the victim's body in plastic and placed the body in a large box, and rented a U-Haul truck and drove to Cheyenne, Wyoming, where he stood the box "straight up in an area by itself so it would be conspicuous" and then drove back to Denver. He also told the doctor that he sent for "an old girlfriend, JoAnn, and she came in from the airport." The defendant and JoAnn then left for Chicago with Christopher, and upon his return to Denver the defendant was arrested.
Doctor Morall, in her report, concluded that the defendant presented a "hysterical personality disorder with anti-social features" and, although in need of psychiatric attention, he was legally competent to proceed to trial. The doctor filed her report with the court on April 24, 1986, and the court, based on the report, made a preliminary finding that the defendant was competent to proceed. See § 16-8-111(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986). Because neither the prosecution nor the defense requested a hearing on the issue of competency, the preliminary finding became a final determination of competency. See § 16-8-111(2), 8A C.R.S. (1986).
The case was set for trial to a jury commencing on October 6, 1986. At trial the prosecution presented evidence establishing that police officers, after discovering the victim's body in a lot behind a grocery warehouse in Cheyenne, Wyoming, were able to trace the box to the defendant in Denver, and were also able to identify a fingerprint on the plastic wrapping around the victim's body as the defendant's print. At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the court entertained a motion by defense counsel to suppress the defendant's statements to Doctor Morall during the competency examination on the ground that such statements were involuntary. In support of the suppression motion, the defendant testified at an in-camera hearing that he believed that he would be provided with counseling and that he talked to Doctor Morall in reliance on the court's statement to him: "We will have somebody take care of you." He further testified that he was never advised prior to the examination that anything he said to the doctor could be used against him at trial and that he believed...
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