People v. Trujillo, No. 01SC434.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01SC434. |
| Citation | 49 P.3d 316 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Theodore Alex TRUJILLO, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Laurie A. Booras, First Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
Suzan Trinh Almony, Broomfield, Colorado, Attorney for Respondent.
In this case we consider whether a defendant's unwarned custodial statements may be used to rebut the theory of defense or to impeach a witness other than the defendant when the defendant does not testify.1 The defendant, Theodore Trujillo, failed to attend a court proceeding in Jefferson County and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was thereafter arrested in Denver on the warrant for violating his bail bond in the Jefferson County case. While in custody in Denver, and without being given Miranda2 warnings, Trujillo made incriminating statements to police officers that he knew there was a warrant for his arrest.
Trujillo was then prosecuted in Jefferson County for the crime of violating bail bond conditions. The trial court ruled the statements were not made following Miranda warnings. Trujillo did not testify at trial. After the defense rested, the prosecution offered Trujillo's custodial statements through the testimony of a police officer to rebut Trujillo's defense that he possessed poor cognitive ability and therefore did not know about the hearing. On appeal the prosecution argues in the alternative that this evidence was properly admitted to impeach Trujillo's wife's testimony. The court of appeals reversed the conviction on the grounds that Trujillo's custodial statements were improperly admitted at trial to rebut defense witnesses other than the defendant. People v. Trujillo, 30 P.3d 760 (Colo.App.2000). We hold that a defendant's voluntary, unwarned, custodial statements may only be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies at trial. If the defendant does not testify at trial, such unwarned custodial statements may not be used either to rebut a defense theory or to impeach a witness other than the defendant. Because Trujillo did not testify at trial, the admission of his custodial statements was constitutional error, and our review of the record leads us to conclude that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals to reverse the judgement of the trial court and to return this case to the trial court for a new trial.
On February 3, 1997, Trujillo was scheduled to appear in Jefferson County Court in Golden. He failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The warrant was then transferred to Jefferson County District Court. Trujillo was subsequently arrested on February 12, 1997 at the Warwick Hotel in Denver.
Following his arrest, two police officers asked Trujillo questions without first giving him Miranda warnings. Trujillo told the officers that he understood there was a warrant for his arrest and that at the time of the arrest he was fleeing to California.
A suppression hearing was held in a different case in Denver District Court on separate charges arising from his February 12 arrest in Denver. That court determined that Trujillo's statements were taken in violation of Miranda, and could not be used during the prosecution's case in chief as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. However, the court also ruled that the statements were made voluntarily and could be admitted on rebuttal for impeachment purposes if the defendant were to testify.
At trial in Jefferson County District Court, Trujillo did not testify. His mother, Alice Trujillo, testified that her son has a poor memory, had taken Ritalin in the past, and took special education classes in school. Similarly, Trujillo's wife, Shelly Trujillo, testified that her husband is very forgetful and that she takes care of organizing the household, including keeping track of her husband's obligations, such as court dates. Shelly Trujillo's day-timer page for February 3, 1997 was admitted into evidence. It reflected that her husband had a court appearance scheduled in Lakewood on February 3. It did not reflect that he was scheduled to appear in Golden.
Shelly Trujillo's testimony was vague and inconclusive. She testified that either Trujillo did not tell her the correct date or that she had recorded it incorrectly. At one point, the defendant's attorney asked Shelly Trujillo if her husband told her the date he had to be in court when he returned home from the preliminary hearing. The prosecutor objected on the grounds that the question called for hearsay. The court held that the answer was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and was therefore not hearsay. Shelly Trujillo's answer did not indicate that her husband told her anything. She stated that he usually tells her about court dates after a hearing and that if he did not tell her, she would write it in the day-timer when she found out about it later.
After the close of the defendant's case, the prosecution offered the testimony of Sergeant David Fisher to impeach Shelly Trujillo's testimony and to rebut Trujillo's defense that he is generally unable to keep track of his appointments and was unaware of the scheduled court appearance on February 3, 1997.
The trial court did not hold a separate suppression hearing regarding the admissibility of Trujillo's statements but allowed argument on this issue by the parties out of the presence of the jury. The court also referred to the rulings of the Denver District Court regarding Trujillo's custodial statements. Although the Denver court ruled that Trujillo's statements would be admissible only to impeach him if he testified, the trial court in this case ruled that Trujillo's statements were admissible as evidence to rebut the theory of defense that the defendant did not know about his court appearance because of his learning disabilities and poor memory. In addition, the trial court noted that the Denver District Court transcript did not indicate the statements were involuntarily made.
Thereafter, Sergeant Fisher testified that during a post-arrest interview, Trujillo told Fisher that Trujillo knew there was a warrant for his arrest and that on the day of his arrest he was in the process of fleeing to California.
During closing arguments, the prosecution argued Trujillo's unwarned custodial statements satisfied the mens rea element of "knowingly" that is required to find Trujillo guilty of the crime of violating bail bond conditions. The prosecution argued that because Trujillo told Sergeant Fisher that Trujillo was aware of the warrant and that he was fleeing the state, he knew about the Jefferson County court date which he failed to attend nine days earlier:
[T]his is how you prove culpable mental state . . . . the best way to prove that is by the person's own statements. And what are the defendant's statements? That he knew there was a warrant for his arrest and that he was in the process of fleeing to California. It doesn't get any clearer than that. We have proven this case and we ask that you find him guilty. Thank you.
And:
It says right here "culpable mental state" of course is an element and must be proven. . . . And the clear inference is when someone says they are fleeing — what did he say? What is the position of the defense that he is a confused fellow? What did the defendant say when he is finally captured nine days later? Did he say, Is that what he said? No, he is fleeing to California. He knew there was a warrant out for his arrest. I mean, that is clear.
The defense did not request, and the trial court did not provide, a limiting instruction informing the jury of the purpose for which it was to consider Trujillo's statements.
The jury convicted Trujillo of the crime of violating bail bond conditions. He was also adjudicated a habitual criminal and sentenced to imprisonment for six years. The court of appeals reversed Trujillo's conviction and vacated the habitual criminal adjudication on the grounds that Trujillo's unwarned custodial statements were improperly admitted at trial. The court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court's holding in James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 110 S.Ct. 648, 107 L.Ed.2d 676 (1990), precluded the use of defendant's unwarned statements to rebut the testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant.
The prosecution appeals the court of appeals' holding to this court.
The prosecution argues that Theodore Trujillo's unwarned custodial statements were properly admitted to impeach Shelly Trujillo's testimony. The prosecution also argues that Theodore Trujillo's statements were admissible to rebut his defense that he did not know, due to cognitive disabilities, of his court appearance on February 3, 1997. Both parties concede that Trujillo's statements were illegally obtained since he was not advised of his Miranda rights before making them. Both parties also agree that Trujillo's statements were voluntary. Thus, neither the illegality of the police action nor the voluntariness of the statements are at issue here.
Analysis of this case requires us first to consider definitions of the terms impeachment and rebuttal. We then turn to the admissibility of a defendant's custodial statements in general, and apply these basic principles to whether Trujillo's statements were admissible.
Impeachment is a technique used to attack the truth-telling capacity of a witness. Impeachment may be accomplished by demonstrating the witness' bias, self-contradiction, poor character, defect in perceptive capacity, prior convictions or bad acts, or by contradicting the witness on...
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